Orbis

A Journal of World Affairs

Volume 41, Number 2, Spring 1997

David R. Gress On Huntington's "Clash"

ARE U.S. FORCES OVERSTRETCHED?

A Conference Report

Eliot A. Cohen / Harry G. Summers Jr. / Donald Kagan

AMERICA'S ALLIANCE ANXIETIES

Prizes and Pitfalls of NATO Enlargement
Congressman Gerald B. Solomon

The Death Throes of Dual Containment
Harvey Sicherman

Superpowers Shouldn't Do Windows
John Hillen

Why Is Mexico So Hard To Help?
Ian Vásquez

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

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Essential Reading

DISSOLUTION

The Crisis of Communism
and the End of East Germany

Charles S. Maier



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
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Editor's Column

"Make yourself indispensable," went the old adage, "for then you cannot be fired." "Don't make yourself indispensable," says the Dilbert-era sage, "for then you cannot be promoted." Roger Donway has been so indispensable to FPRI that he survived every downsizing campaign for a decade. As managing editor he has conducted the daily business of *Orbis* since 1987; overseen production of thirty-seven issues, hundreds of newsletters, and several book-length publications; edited more than a hundred articles; and authored many of our features. He has assisted, bailed out, and otherwise put up with three different editors, twelve manuscript and assistant editors, and a merry-go-round of interns. He has been our institutional memory.

But neither was he immune to promotion. This month Roger departs Philadelphia for New York state to accept the challenge of starting up and editing a new journal of ideas that should prove a fountainhead of keen philosophical and cultural criticism. So thank you, Roger, and (as Germans say when their paths may not cross again) *lebe wohl*—live well. We shall not forget you.

In These Pages

The central irony of the Clinton administration is that a president who was so critical of the U.S. armed forces and interventionism during the 1960s has "sent in the marines" at a rate that would make Eisenhower or Reagan seem isolationist by comparison. But at the same time, Pentagon budgets for personnel, procurement, and training have fallen so sharply since the end of the cold war that the ability of the U.S. military to discharge its tasks, much less fight a major war, grows dubious. Future historians may identify this disconnect between American commitments and capabilities (a phenomenon Harvey Sicherman dubs "cheap hawkery") as a major cause of whatever crisis or catastrophe lurks over the horizon. That is why this issue of *Orbis* zeroes in on the implications of these trends for the armed services, U.S. foreign policy, and America's allies in Europe and Asia.

A trio of heavyweights introduces the problem by way of reporting on an off-the-record FPRI conference that inquired into the health of the U.S. defense posture. Eliot A. Cohen describes the state of civil-military relations, Donald Kagan the services' current roles and missions, and Harry G. Summers Jr. the shortfalls in operations, procurement, and the defense industrial base. U.S. military power and preparedness, in turn, have profound effects on the utility and durability of America's alliances in the post–cold war era. In these pages, John Hillen echoes the conference's somber findings and

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concludes that if the U.S. military is not allowed to hone its war-fighting edge, it may lose the ability (and the American public the will) either to make war or to keep peace abroad. Hence, the United States has no choice but to insist on a major reshuffling of responsibilities within its various alliances. Foremost among those is NATO, about which critical decisions will be made at the July summit in Madrid. Congressman Gerald B. Solomon, a leader on Capitol Hill in all matters pertaining to the Atlantic alliance, offers a candid briefing on the hurdles and prizes involved in the race for NATO enlargement. Lastly, Harvey Sicherman provides a disturbing, in-depth analysis of how the "dual containment" of Iraq and Iran, though a strategic success in the short run, may end up dissolving the inner and outer coalitions forged by President George Bush before the war in the Persian Gulf. And Ian Vásquez probes the weak link in NAFTA, only to discover that the International Monetary Fund's clumsy efforts to help Mexico deserve much of the blame for that country's incorrigibility. Our quarterly "last but not least" is David R. Gress's erudite exegesis of *The Clash of Civilizations.* You may already have read several reviews of Samuel Huntington's book, but none has prepared you for the subtexts Gress has uncovered.

Night Thoughts of an I.R. Professor

Having been asked to review both the original and revised National Standards for History,[1] and having served as co-director of FPRI's History Academy for secondary-school teachers, I have been more than a little vexed and perplexed by this latest campaign of "culture wars." Should our nation promote national standards at all in so politically charged and imprecise a discipline as history? If so, who should draft them and who approve them? Do the National Standards funded by the National Endowment for the Humanities and generated at the University of California Los Angeles under Gary Nash and Charlotte Crabtree tilt too much in the direction of multiculturalism, feminism, and knee-jerk anti-Americanism? Or, once shorn of some tendentious passages, do they represent a necessary updating of high-school curricula informed by the latest historiographical trends? After what seemed a fifteen-round bout over such questions, I came to share the battle weariness expressed by Diane Ravitch and Arthur Schlesinger Jr. "Enough abstract debate," I remember saying, "Just give me a textbook to review."

Well, now I have one—the first, by all appearances, to be patterned on the Nash/Crabtree National Standards.[2] As such, *United States History: In the Course of Human Events,* to be released in 1997 by the West Publishing Company of St. Paul, Minnesota, represents a high-roller's gamble to the effect that those

[1] See Walter A. McDougall, "Whose History? Whose Standards?" *Commentary,* May 1995, pp. 36–43; Walter A. McDougall, "What Johnny Still Won't Know About History," *Commentary,* July 1996, pp. 32–36.

[2] A version of this review will appear in *The Textbook Letter,* a bimonthly review of high-school textbooks edited by the Textbook League, P.O. Box 51, Sausalito, California 94966.

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controversial standards will indeed steer the purchasing decisions of state and local school boards nationwide. For this 1,200-page tome glittering with color illustrations on virtually every page, and boasting of 123 inset "features," 97 maps, and 91 tables and graphs, must have been unusually costly to produce. So glitzy is its layout, in fact, that the reader must make an act of will to block out the ubiquitous pictures and boxes in order to follow the narrative. Perhaps the publishers are counting on that, because the text that is obscured by all those visual aids not only reflects the slant of the National Standards, it does not even realize the balance the standards achieved between "white male" political and economic history on the one hand, and the social histories of minorities and women on the other.

I was disappointed to discover that imbalance, because the front material of *United States History* gives reason for hope. (Perhaps, again, the publishers hope the preface is all your school board members will read.) The Statue of Liberty graces the cover, and the introductory "Greeting" boldly affirms the old-fashioned idea that history differs from other subjects in that it tells a story. What is more, the story's main themes include democracy and citizenship, geography and the environment, multicultural society, everyday life, arts and humanities, economics, technological developments, and global interactions—a laudable list. But the preface also boasts that this textbook (in line with the standards) is "as inclusive as possible" with regard to "multicultural and multiracial history," that it expressly "privileges" social history and is "especially concerned with the forces and events that affected the everyday lives of ordinary people [since] the best way for us to put our lives into historical perspective is to know what happened in the past to people like us" (p. xxiv). In sum, this is history from the bottom up, informed by a bias toward groups rather than individuals or the nation as a whole, and by a "perspective" on what happened to people. People "to whom things happen" are implicitly victims.

The chronological breakdown of *United States History* is almost identical to that of the Nash/Crabtree standards. The latter divided American history into ten eras, while this text has eleven main units. But this text rushes through the settlement and growth of the American colonies, the war for independence, the Constitutional Convention, and the early national period in just two units, while the National Standards at least budgeted three. The textbook cashes in on these savings by devoting almost four units to post–World War II history where the National Standards were content with two. Why the scanting of early American history in favor of the contemporary era? In order, it seems, to make room for full treatment of the liberation movements of African-, Hispanic-, Native-, Asian-, and female Americans, and to discuss at length the issues presumed to be of interest to young people today, such as immigration, homelessness, drugs, AIDS, and the Internet (indeed, the "last word" in the text is given to Bill Gates). Such detailed coverage of recent and current events is not in itself bad. But inasmuch as this course may be the only chance many students have to grasp the origins and

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essence of their nation's history, the short shrift given earlier periods is disturbing.

Disturbance turns into alarm when the attentive parent discovers that the discussion of those earlier periods is rent with lacunae. The first unit begins with the "three cultures" premise of the National Standards to the effect that the United States is a hybrid of Amerindian, African, and European cultures. But where the pre-Columbian and African civilizations are described in sympathetic detail, that of Renaissance Europeans is dismissed in a few pages devoted only to their skill in shipbuilding and lust for spices and gold. Thus, we learn that Native Americans had complex cultures and trade routes and practiced equality for women and matrilineage. Aztecs appear only as victims of Spain, and the only reference to the vivisectionist religion of pre-Columbian peoples is this: "Like other cultures of the time, the Olmecs may have practiced human sacrifice" (p. 16). In other words, they may *not* have—and even if they did, they were no different in that from other (unnamed) cultures. Likewise, fifteenth-century Africans displayed "diverse cultures," "great luxury," and a university in Timbuktu that "attracted students from all over North Africa" (p. 25). No mention is made of the fact that Europeans had by 1492 founded sixty institutions that merit the name university. But then no mention is made of any of the values, institutions, or achievements of Western civilization save its technology. The Renaissance receives seven lines of text, the Reformation none, and the Enlightenment—that taproot of American political philosophy—six short sentences. Judging by the information provided here, the European settlers of the Americas might as well have come from Mars.

One need not excuse, much less glorify, Spanish imperialism or English colonization to grant that Europeans, too, were real people with a rather "complex" civilization. But motives or belief-systems other than plunder find little place in this book. The names Luther and Calvin, Erasmus and Loyola, Bacon and Newton do not appear in the index. Nor do Episcopalians, Methodists, Congregationalists, or Presbyterians—and Baptists appear only as opponents of women's ordination. Missionaries are invariably predatory and intolerant, and the authors seem clueless in matters of theology. We read, for instance, that thanks to the first Great Awakening in the eighteenth century, "people began to realize that they could make choices about how to practice religion" (p. 93). As if Europeans had not been fighting for two centuries for precisely that choice.

The secular origins of the United States are, if anything, even more rudely treated. The account of the origins of the American Revolution dwells on the issue of taxation but says almost nothing about representation. Suffice to say that the Magna Carta, the English revolutions, and John Locke's Whig philosophy that inspired Thomas Jefferson are not to be found in a book otherwise subtitled "In the Course of Human Events." George Washington merits a box as one of fifteen "People Who Made a Difference." But whereas the three African-Americans, one Hispanic, one Asian, and four women who made that list are praised as

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heroic, Washington alone is described as a cold man of "ordinary talents" who was a symbol more than a real hero. He was idolized, the book suggests, simply as a form of "self-congratulation"—hence, "the idea of George Washington, not always the man himself, was what counted" (p. 135). Susan B. Anthony, Harriet Tubman, "Mother Jones," Cesar Chavez, and other leaders of women's and minorities' movements get not only unqualified praise but more space than Washington.

The Constitution is discussed at length, and its text printed in toto. But the *Federalist Papers*, perhaps the greatest body of political philosophy Western civilization has produced, inspire only two short quotations and are deemed important only for their role in promoting ratification of the Constitution. Foreign policy is granted almost no importance whatever. Washington's Farewell Address merits one short paragraph and the successes of John Quincy Adams (including the Monroe Doctrine) less than a page. More space is given diplomacy in the twentieth century but once again without any context by which a student might make sense of it. Fascism, for instance, just "happens" when "in 1933, Germany had elected [sic] a new chancellor, Adolf Hitler," whose Nazi Party had "capitalized on the discontent and suffering caused by the harsh peace settlement imposed by the Treaty of Versailles" (p. 721). (Hitler was appointed, not elected, and no mention is made of the effects of the Great Depression or the suicide of the Weimar Republic.) Japan, too, appears suddenly in 1937 as an expansionist power. Fascism's ideology and totalitarianism do not exist for these authors. Nor, for that matter, do Stalin's. The world of the 1930s is just described as "unstable," and U.S. entry into World War II is brushed over in three pages of text. The spare chapter on the war itself is concerned as much with labor and ethnic strife, and women and African-Americans in the work force, as with the millions of (overwhelmingly white male) Americans who risked their lives to defeat fascism. As much space is devoted to internment of the *nisei* as to D-Day and all the campaigns in the Pacific through 1944.

References to feminism appear on cue in almost every chapter, as they did in the National Standards. Women are rarely presented as wives and mothers who worked alongside their fathers and husbands and sons and generally shared their values and opinions, but as a beleaguered minority in the same category as slaves and Indians. When disparities of income between men and women are discussed, for instance, the evidence is presented at face value, with no effort to explain why such disparities may exist for reasons other than sexism. A gratuitous leading question is even appended that is sure to please the teachers' unions: "What is especially significant about this difference [in pay] in a field such as teaching?" (p. 939). Other graphs, such as one purporting to show a shocking reversal in social and military spending under Reagan, distort reality to force a tendentious conclusion. According to this text, Reagan won elections because he was a professional actor in league with big business and the New Right (a constant, looming presence in the last chapters). His economic policies and "slashing" cuts in

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welfare had "profound negative effects on the economy and government services" (p. 1032). His military buildup and covert operations were dangerous and illegal, and they led to "worsened relations" with the USSR. Gorbachev alone ended the cold war. Worse yet, "Reagan's legacies would continue to shape the nation in years to come" (p. 1032).

The debate over the National Standards, I had come to conclude, degenerated into shadowboxing. The telling blows would land when textbooks based on the standards began to appear. Judging by this one, the critics were right. A book that presumes to explain U.S. history by ignoring Lockean individualism, disparaging Washington, and defending, by way of conclusion, pornography on the Internet ("The culture wars have a new front in cyberspace" [p. 1101]) is a fraud. But let its final paragraph speak for itself: "The application of the ideas of liberty, equality, and justice on which this democracy is founded are [sic] constantly evolving in response to changing times" (p. 1101). A truism masquerading as wisdom graced by a subject/verb disagreement is just the product you would expect from American schools today.

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Are U.S. Forces Overstretched?

In July 1996, the Foreign Policy Research Institute convened an off-the-record blue-ribbon Defense Task Force for the purpose of examining, in depth, the state of American defenses in the post–cold war era. Chaired by the Honorable John F. Lehman, former secretary of the navy and a member of FPRI's board of trustees, and directed by Harvey Sicherman, president of FPRI, the two-day conference addressed a number of disturbing trends that, taken together, might seriously impair the ability of the U.S. armed forces to discharge their responsibilities in the near future. Three areas were examined at length: "demilitarizing the military," the increasing use of the military for complex peacekeeping missions at the expense of the forces' war-fighting skills and training; "involuntary disarmament," a shortfall of funds for procurement in the context of high operating tempos, rising prices for equipment, and a shrinking and less-competitive defense industrial base; and reduced civilian control of the military, deriving from accumulating civil-military frictions, lack of military experience on the part of American leaders, career patterns, service recruitment policies, and unusual centralization of the armed forces at the top.

The rapporteurs for the three sessions summoned to discuss these trends were Donald Kagan, a professor of history at Yale and author of, among many books, the best-selling *On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace*; Colonel Harry G. Summers Jr., U.S. Army (ret.), whose classic Clausewitzian analysis *On Strategy* helped to inspire the army's post-Vietnam renaissance; and Eliot A. Cohen, one of America's premier, and most prolific, defense intellectuals. Cohen undertook to lead the debate on civil-military relations, Kagan chaired the panel concerned with the U.S. armed services' roles and missions after the cold war, and Summers led the discussion on operations, procurement, and the U.S. defense industry.

The three distinguished panels also included Lieutenant General Bernard E. Trainor, U.S. Marine Corps (ret.), the former director of national security programs at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard; the Honorable Dov S. Zakheim of SPC International, former deputy secretary of defense for planning and resources; the Honorable Everett Pyatt, former assistant secretary of the navy for shipbuilding and logistics; Daniel Gouré of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, an expert on the defense industrial base; Andrew J. Bacevich, director of the Foreign Policy Institute at Johns Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies; Mackubin Thomas Owens of the U.S. Naval War College, the editor-in-chief of *Strategic Review*; David R. Segal, a distinguished military sociologist and director of the University of Maryland's Center for Research on Military Organization; William

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Rosenau, former advisor to Senator Arlen Specter (R-Pa.) on foreign and defense policy and an expert in low-intensity conflict; and David Alan Rosenberg, a professor of history at Temple University and the National War College, and (as a lieutenant commander in the U.S. Naval Reserve) a veteran of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the Persian Gulf War.

The three essays printed here are drawn from the conversations at the conference but also go beyond them. What follows should therefore be regarded as the views of the authors and should not be construed as statements of complete consensus among the panelists. FPRI will be releasing a detailed report of the task force's findings that specifies all dissenting opinions.

—The Editors

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Are U.S. Forces Overstretched?

Civil-Military Relations

by Eliot A. Cohen

There is no crisis in American civil-military relations if crisis means the kind of collision between civil and military authority that would breed a coup d'état or other manifestation of a breakdown of civilian control of the military, such as systematic and open disobedience of orders. But, to a remarkable degree, members of the Defense Task Force agreed that deep and pervasive difficulties plague American civil-military relations, that these problems merit attention and exploration, and that dramatic and possibly painful actions are required to resurrect the relationship between the armed forces and civil society that the Founders envisioned and that makes sense for a twenty-first-century democracy. The three core problems discussed at length were the politicization of the military, the growing divide between civil society and those who wear the uniform, and the centralization of military power in the Joint Staff and in the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).

A Politicized Military

As one participant put it, when hearing military officers speak about President Bill Clinton, he felt tempted to turn Voltaire's apocryphal defense of free speech on its head: "I agree with everything that you say and am appalled by the fact that you say it." The first two years of the Clinton administration were marked by an extraordinary display of open disdain and hostility by the military for the new president. The ill-advised nature of his manpower policies (particularly his effort to lift the ban on homosexuals serving in uniform), the general disregard for things military that characterized junior staffers in the White House, a proclivity to see the military as a tool of domestic and international social work rather than strategic action, and the president's own evasion of the Vietnam-era draft explained this behavior on the part of officers but in no way made it acceptable. On many occasions senior military officers not only tolerated

Eliot A. Cohen is a professor of strategic studies at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University. For his work as the director of the Gulf War Air Power Survey in 1991–93, he received the U.S. Air Force's highest civilian decoration. © 1997 by Eliot A. Cohen.

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their subordinates' making contemptuous remarks about the commander in chief—itself an offense subject to court-martial under the Uniform Code of Military Justice—but amplified and reinforced such comments. Military officers also were increasingly willing to announce their political affiliation (almost invariably with the Republican Party) or to display their political beliefs in such ways as driving cars with anti-Clinton bumper stickers onto military bases, in defiance of tradition and the norms of military service.

Yet most conference participants argued that the politicization of the military reflects something more profound than the reaction of the officer corps to a particular politician. As one put it, "There has been a long-term, secular trend towards politicization of the U.S. officer corps." To some extent that mirrors similar trends within other professional groups in American society. The current conception of the military officer still reflects an image drawn from the austere portrait of the "professional" put forward in the 1950s. Professionals, according to the social science literature of the time, were defined by three characteristics: corporateness (that is, a sense of collective identity), responsibility (to society at large and not simply to a particular client or customer), and education (both throughout their careers and at a high intellectual level). Society viewed the professional as someone whose technical expertise and detachment from politics made him both unique and difficult to manage, and much ink was spent on the subject of how professionals defined their relationships with those around them.

Over time, this purist model of the professional has changed and eroded. As doctors and lawyers have become politicized and demythologized, so too have military officers shed the image of pure and apolitical expertise once ascribed to them. Like other interest groups, albeit a particularly important one, they lost a sense of uniqueness and learned how to play the game. Indeed, it is not uncommon for officers to describe themselves as a governmental interest group and to justify (if somewhat abashedly) their collective actions in such terms.

Politicization sprang from other sources as well. In the last thirty years, the American military has become remarkably sophisticated regarding politics, in part through a professional military education that stresses the importance of the political dimension of warfare. A revival of the study *On War*, Carl von Clausewitz's classic text examining the relationship between war and politics, followed on the heels of the Vietnam War as officers struggled to understand why they lost a war in which they seemingly held the trump cards of firepower, mobility, and resources. In his introduction to *On Strategy,* one of the earliest critiques of the military's efforts in Vietnam and a major contribution to the Clausewitz revival, Colonel Harry Summers recalled his conversation with a North Vietnamese officer during the final armistice negotiations. When Summers remarked to his counterpart that the Vietnamese never beat the Americans in a single battle, the North Vietnamese colonel paused for a moment and said: "That's true. It's also irrelevant."[1] More than one officer came away from that

[1] Harry G. Summers Jr., *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War* (1982; Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1995), p. 1.

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war convinced of the necessity of entering the next with a far more sophisticated appreciation of policy than that brought to bear in Vietnam. At the same time, the rejection of the military by some segments of American society after the war dismayed members of the officer corps, who consequently came to believe that domestic politics also required their attention.

Yet Vietnam merely accelerated trends that originated during World War II and the early cold war, when officers found themselves engaged in the murky areas where politics and war overlapped. Programs ranging from courses in American and international politics at the war colleges to internships in government exposed officers to politics in various forms. Today military officers serve on congressional staffs and are present throughout the federal government, even in such seemingly non-defense-oriented bureaucracies as the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Indeed, General Colin Powell, perhaps the shrewdest political general since Eisenhower, describes his year as a White House Fellow serving in OMB as his introduction to the bureaucratic politics that he would play so well during his time in Washington.

Seared by its experience in Vietnam, the officer corps reacted by seeking to manipulate political leaders and processes so that any commitment to conflict would be made under circumstances that it approved. An early case in point was General Creighton Abrams's successful creation of the Total Force in the 1970s—in particular, an army dependent on reserve mobilization to conduct any sizable war. With the tacit acquiescence of the civilian leadership, the military in effect created a system that could not go to war without some kind of national mobilization, even though the army's leadership traditionally mistrusted the reserve components.

To some extent, political awareness is desirable in an officer corps. But when military officers lose their self-restraint about both political identification and actual participation in politics—including behind-the-scenes manipulation of any branch of government—a boundary has been crossed. The military is a unique calling that bears special responsibilities for the security of the nation and poses particular threats when deformed by open partisanship. When officers do not hesitate to refer to themselves as another interest group, when they willingly identify themselves by party affiliation and feel free to comment in public, and in front of their subordinates, about the faults of their civilian superiors, corrective action is needed.

The Gap between Society and the Military

Since 1940, military service has shaped the early careers of millions of American young men, particularly those who have gone on to become business and political leaders. The end of the draft in the early 1970s created a noticeable gap between civilian and military elites. That gap widened with the dramatic shrinkage of the military in the wake of the cold war, a shrinkage likely to continue. At first glance, this development might not seem terribly important. After all, throughout most of U.S. history the military was small and in many

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cases unrepresentative of American society. The great difference today is that the United States is, and will remain, a superpower for whom military might is central to national policy. That was not the case in times of peace before World War II.

The gap between the military and society is exacerbated by the military's increasing tendency to recruit from narrower segments of the population. One conference participant reported that some 25 percent of new entrants into the military now come from military families. Of greater concern, in the view of some, is the increased role of the military academies as providers of officer candidates. Whereas during the cold war West Point, Annapolis, and the Air Force Academy produced only 10 percent of new officers, today they produce roughly one-quarter. In the view of many, the services would be happy not only to restrict as much officer intake as possible to the service academies but to force new officers to serve for extended periods of time. The demands of efficiency, in particular the desire to reduce training expenses and turnover, lead the military to press for long-term service contracts.

Increasingly, some military leaders also see a growing gap between military and societal values. The U.S. Marine Corps, perhaps the least civilianized of all the armed services, has changed its basic training programs to instill values in recruits that it believes American society has failed to provide. Military leaders routinely remark, with more than a little complacency, that the military has coped with problems that still bedevil the rest of American society: drug and alcohol abuse, and even in large measure race relations. As sociologist Charles Moskos has put it, the army is the only institution in which black men routinely give white men orders and no one thinks twice about it. The army's success on issues involving the sexes is less clear. The military has struggled, with varying success, to open to women careers that traditionally embodied masculine qualities. Still, that the military has come to see itself as an organization with better values and more functional social behavior than civil society marks yet another departure from the past, when the armed forces saw themselves more as a reflection of society and less as its superior.

Different issues are inherent on the civilian side of the relationship. Fewer politicians, let alone their staff assistants, have any military experience; yet they will be required to make decisions about the employment and structuring of military forces. Not all conference participants had equal concerns here. Some pointed to political leaders such as Abraham Lincoln who with minimal military experience nonetheless proved to be outstanding strategists and civilian leaders. But all agreed that it would be desirable to improve the military expertise of today's generation of Congress members and journalists. The current ignorance gives rise to two equally problematic trends: a growing number of political elites who have little appreciation for the military's needs and are inclined to view it in terms of stereotypes of discipline and inflexibility, and, no less troubling, the emergence of a political class that unthinkingly defers to this alone of all public institutions, without subjecting it to critical but informed scrutiny.

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The Rise of a Centralized Military Staff

Since the turn of the century, there has been steady movement toward the centralization of military authority in large staffs. The creation of a chief of staff of the army and a chief of naval operations was followed during World War II by the creation and later institutionalization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Defense Department Reorganization Act of 1958 further strengthened the chairman of the JCS and the Joint Staff, and the Goldwater-Nichols legislation of 1986 took another large step in that direction. Today, the chairman of the JCS serves as a de facto commander of the American armed forces, operating under the supervision of either the president or the secretary of defense. The Joint Staff has taken over many of the prerogatives of the service staffs, both civilian and military, and has even strayed into the legitimate territory of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). These developments have generated several problems:

A reduction of sources of military advice for civilian authority. The president and secretary of defense need more than one senior military advisor. Any one advisor, being human, may have the prejudices and distorted perceptions that naturally can accumulate during a career. While Goldwater-Nichols does not prohibit civilians from seeking advice from the other chiefs, it tacitly discourages such a move. As a result, during the war in the Persian Gulf, the secretary of defense was forced to resort to unusual channels to elicit more options than he was receiving from the Joint Staff.

An attenuation of long-range thinking. The perspective of the Joint Staff and the regional and functional commanders in chief (CINCs) is short term; their understandable concern with immediate operational issues leads them to discount future problems and focus on current activity. In the past, the services provided a long-range perspective, but their weakened bureaucratic clout and exclusion from military planning activities have undercut their ability to make contributions in this area.

A weakening of competition. The United States has benefited greatly from the armed services' competition with one another for sources and missions. In all other walks of life, the United States has traditionally appreciated the merits of competition. Yet in the Pentagon the trend has been towards centralized control and allocation of resources. Particularly as technology allows the services to compete for roles and missions (in the area of deep strike, for example), it makes sense to enhance rather than diminish the competitiveness that has been so valuable in the past.

A diminution of civilian control. Goldwater-Nichols did little to enhance the quality or power of the staff in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, but it tremendously strengthened the roles and career tracks of Joint Staff officers. As a result, the weight of influence within the Pentagon has shifted decidedly in favor of the Joint Staff, which has an increasingly strong hand in bargaining with OSD and sometimes takes positions at variance with it.

To be sure, some of the results of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation have been favorable. "Jointness" is not merely a fad of the moment, but an

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undeniable trend in military operations brought about by changing technology. When shipboard systems (missiles as well as aircraft) can precisely strike the same targets as land-based ballistic missiles or aircraft, increased coordination of effort is clearly needed. As certain common systems—intelligence-gathering satellites, for example—gain importance, so too does the need for Department of Defense–wide management of them. Moreover, some of the parochialism and obstructionism of the services conceivably has diminished in the face of the growing power of the chairman of the JCS, the Joint Staff, and the theater CINCs. Nonetheless, like all orthodoxies, that of jointness requires critical examination and a dispassionate review of its impact on long-term strategic thinking and civilian control.

Solutions

The ills besetting civil-military relations in the United States are the deeply rooted product of historical developments dating back several decades or longer. Remedies will take time to have an effect. More important, they will require tough and imaginative civilian leadership, because they will be opposed by important (though by no means all) segments of military opinion and will be relatively unattractive politically. The military opinion will be bolstered by civilian allies, including military retirees (who can speak far more freely than those in uniform) and that large group of civilians who occasionally confuse unthinking support of military traditions and practice with patriotic support for the armed forces.

Reforming the military academies. It should be a basic principle of the American armed forces that the officer corps be as widely recruited as possible. Therefore, for both practical and symbolic reasons, the military academies should be modeled along the lines of Sandhurst. That is, officers would complete their undergraduate educations at any acceptable civilian college or university and then attend a military academy for nine months to a year of military training. This system would preserve the valuable traditions and character-building qualities of the academies, while dispensing with their cliquish and self-absorbed nature. The services would still be pressed to maintain active ROTC presences on campuses, including those that might produce small numbers of high-quality officers.

The service academies currently wrestle with two contradictory missions: the training of young officers and the provision of a liberal education. They cannot be expected to do both well, for the two purposes are somewhat at odds with each other. This proposed reform would allow officers to receive their normal, liberal education elsewhere, leaving the academies free to focus on military training.

Recruitment schemes for the citizen-soldier. Soldiers and civilians alike applaud the concept of the citizen-soldier, but the time has come to reconsider what that term means. It is neither accurate nor adequate to say that professional soldiers have the full rights of all other citizens, thereby making them citizen-

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soldiers. Rather, citizen-soldiers are best understood to be short-term or temporary service personnel whose primary careers are in the civilian rather than the military world. Ideally, such personnel would comprise a large part of the armed services. The services should therefore be required to develop and advertise programs similar to those operated with some success by the army, which attract young men and women for short (twenty-four-month) stints of service in return for college tuition or other benefits. Similar plans would be designed to attract older men and women to the reserves, which would be revamped to take advantage of the many talents in the civilian sector.

Now more than ever, the National Guard and the reserves embody the concept of the citizen-soldier, whose centrality to the national defense was enshrined in the Constitution and remains important today. The guard and reserves have much to offer the armed services by bringing the maturity and expertise of civilians to bear on military problems, as seen in the notable success of the army reserve civil-affairs units. Moreover, the reserves have a tremendous range of programs, from the extremely successful reliance of the air force on reserve air crew and support personnel to operate the logistics fleet, to the far less successful incorporation of naval reservists into the fleet. Many future units may focus on the realm of information technology, where expertise often commands salaries that the military cannot match. Overall, a general review of reserve policy seems called for, particularly as some reserve units (army civil-affairs units, for example) have begun to be extremely active, to the point of being overstretched, while others (combat divisions in the National Guard) seem to have little function at all.

Professional military education. The conference members also argued for increasing the military educational system's attention to problems in civil-military relations. Too few officers, even at senior levels, have reflected on, not only such well-known cases of civil-military friction as Douglas MacArthur's dismissal from command in Korea, but the legislative and philosophical underpinnings of the U.S. military establishment.

Moreover, as the nature of warfare itself changes, so too does the nature of military professionalism. In an age when the direction of firepower increasingly takes place from a distance, the very concept of officership must be reassessed. To a remarkable degree, current regulations, organizational forms, and rank structures reflect a bygone era, in which the roles and relationships of both commissioned and noncommissioned officers were very different from what they are today. A first-order reexamination of what officership means is thus in order. To this end, the curricula of the staff and war colleges need to be reviewed, including the material that deals with civilian control of the military. The clichéd notion that civilian control consists of giving the military unambiguous (and unchanging) goals, providing resources, and stepping aside—a notion particularly prevalent following the Persian Gulf War—needs to be replaced with a more discriminating, if less comfortable, view.

Military familiarization programs. Lastly, it is desirable to institute programs that would improve the quality of civilian leadership by educating civilians about military organizations and modern warfare. These programs

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would be intended for legislators, journalists, and other "opinion leaders" (to include civic leaders and people in business), to help them develop sound criteria for evaluating contemporary defense matters. Formats for such an enterprise could include the following:

> lectures on the organization and function of the Department of Defense;
>
> visits to a variety of facilities, including training installations;
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> participation in simulations and exercises; and
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> academic work (through case studies, seminars, and site visits) in the field of military history.

Currently, the Department of Defense offers many groups visits to ships or military facilities, such as the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California. But these opportunities, though valuable, are episodic (that is, undertaken without a coherent plan of instruction) and are not selectively targeted. A military installation's standard "pitch" for civilian outsiders is generally intended to highlight the sophistication and excellence of its people and machines, not to promote critical evaluation.

A serious program of military instruction would be quite different. It could be a part-time course during two years that would require roughly the same level of participation as reserve duty—say, a weekend a month plus a two-week stint of "active duty." These visitors to military installations would receive more than the standard dog and pony show, and they would be exposed to a variety of opposing views on a range of military matters (for example, the future of the aircraft carrier, or manned aircraft, or women in combat). Innovative use of educational technologies, such as CD-ROM-based instruction like that pioneered by the Air Command and Staff College at Maxwell Air Force Base, would enable participants to absorb quickly many of the basic details of military equipment, organization, and procedure on their own. Participation in such a program would be selective and begun on a small scale.

If Nothing Is Done

No one at the conference suggested that absent these recommendations the republic would be in mortal danger. But it is worth speculating about the direction of American civil-military relations without the kinds of measures indicated above to correct current adverse trends. An ever more inbred military elite would evolve, recruited largely from families of military personnel and increasingly educated at the service academies. Confronted (as appears likely) by a steadily shrinking defense budget, this group would not retire into frosty isolation but would attempt to influence the political process directly. Military officers might, within the bounds of the law (but just barely), attempt to throw support to the political party most favorable to their interests.

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At the same time, a political elite generally ignorant of military affairs would divide into three groups: The first, and largest, would simply be indifferent to defense matters and would be inclined to regard military expenditure as wasteful unless proven otherwise. Another group would view the military with suspicion, believing its notions to be both retrograde and at odds with those of society on a variety of issues, most notably homosexuality. And a third group would regard the military with unthinking admiration as the embodiment of virtues shunned by the rest of society.

Oddly enough, this last group could prove to be the most dangerous. Democratic society normally produces a certain amount of healthy suspicion of the military—a distaste for the hierarchy, subordination of self, and adherence to discipline that military life requires. Unrestrained deference to military authority and expertise, on the other hand, can lead to gross errors in both foreign and defense policy. The horrifying experience of World War I, when deference to military authority was at an all-time high, offers an important warning. The generals repeatedly resorted to strategies of appalling bloodshed, not merely out of arrogance, but because of the adulation from journalists and politicians, who made them into gods of war rather than what they were—fallible men, albeit well-educated, patriotic, and determined. By the end of that conflict, mutual confidence at the top and throughout society had broken down, politicians mistrusted their military subordinates, and more than one military leader was willing to endorse the theory of the "stab in the back."

Healthy civilian control of the military requires a political leadership that understands how uncertain of a business war is, and that recognizes that even the best-trained and most dedicated military professionals can err. Such politicians can exert effective civilian control because they appreciate military virtues, can discern which military officers are the best, and can weigh the relative importance of political and military requirements. On the other side of the equation, civil-military relations require officers who understand and accept the preeminence of political considerations in the conduct of war, and who can cope with civilian intrusion into their realm whether or not they like it. And at the very top, a dialogue must exist between statesmen and generals, unequal though that dialogue may be. Overall, healthy civil-military relations need a military with standards distinct from those of general society and a society that appreciates the need for the difference, even if it does not always approve of the military's views.

Left uncorrected, the trends in American civil-military relations could breed certain pathologies. The most serious possibility is that of a dramatic civil-military split during a crisis involving the use of force. In the recent past, such tensions did not result in open division; for example, Franklin Roosevelt insisted that the United States invade North Africa in 1942, though the chiefs of both the army and the navy vigorously opposed such a course, favoring instead a buildup in England and an invasion of the continent in 1943. Back then it was inconceivable that a senior military officer would leak word of such a split to the media, where it would have reverberated loudly and destructively. To be sure, from time to time individual officers broke the vow of professional

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silence to protest a course of action, but in these isolated cases the officers paid the accepted price of termination of their careers.

In the modern environment, such cases might no longer be isolated. Thus, presidents might try to shape U.S. strategy so that it complies with military opinion, and rarely in the annals of statecraft has military opinion alone been an adequate guide to sound foreign policy choices. Had Lincoln followed the advice of his senior military advisors there is a good chance that the Union would have fallen. Had Roosevelt deferred to General George C. Marshall and Admiral Ernest J. King there might well have been a gory debacle on the shores of France in 1943. Had Harry S Truman heeded the advice of his theater commander in the Far East (and it should be remembered that the Joint Chiefs generally counseled support of the man on the spot) there might have been a third world war.

Throughout much of its history, the U.S. military was remarkably politicized by contemporary standards. One commander of the army, Winfield Scott, even ran for president while in uniform, and others (Leonard Wood, for example) have made no secret of their political views and aspirations. But until 1940, and with the exception of periods of outright warfare, the military was a negligible force in American life, and America was not a central force in international politics. That has changed. Despite the near halving of the defense budget from its high in the 1980s, it remains a significant portion of the federal budget, and the military continues to employ millions of Americans. More important, civil-military relations in the United States now no longer affect merely the closet-room politics of Washington, but the relations of countries around the world. American choices about the use of force, the shrewdness of American strategy, the soundness of American tactics, and the will of American leaders have global consequences. What might have been petty squabbles in bygone years are now magnified into quarrels of a far larger scale, and conceivably with far more grievous consequences. To ignore the problem would neglect one of the cardinal purposes of the federal government: "to provide for the common defense" in a world in which security cannot be taken for granted.

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Are U.S. Forces Overstretched?

Roles and Missions

by Donald Kagan

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, American military forces have been used to remove the ruler of Panama, to drive the Iraqi army out of Kuwait and later to deter its return, to alleviate a famine in Somalia, to remove a military junta from Haiti and restore the elected president to power, to compel warring ethnic factions in Bosnia to stop fighting and then to enforce the resulting truce until elections could be held, and to deter a threat from China against Taiwan, among other interventions. At the same time, American forces have been stationed in Korea to deter an attack from the north and in the Persian Gulf to deter aggressive actions by either Iran or Iraq.

Two Constrained Visions

The end of the cold war has removed the danger of a war between the two superpowers, but plainly it has not removed the need for strong and competent American military forces to deal with problems around the world that engage the attention of the United States. The relative clarity that underlay America's cold war policy and strategy is gone, replaced by confusion, debate, and a denial of reality. At the extreme is a call to bring America home, to focus attention on domestic problems, and to cut the budget for international affairs and military forces to the bone in order to pay for domestic programs and tax cuts. This call is often connected to the assertion that there is no credible threat to American security, that American military power and expenditure are colossal compared with those of any other state, and that no danger to the general peace and security is anywhere in view. Such problems as arise, it is said, can be dealt with by regional powers or the United Nations. The United States should stand aloof and avoid unilateral intervention; it should not even involve itself as the senior partner of an alliance.

More common than this view are less-extreme demands for limiting American involvement. These assert that America cannot afford the cost of

Donald Kagan is the Hillhouse Professor of History and Classics at Yale University. He is the author of *A New History of the Peloponnesian War* (Cornell University Press, 4 volumes, 1969–1987) and, most recently, *On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace* (Doubleday, 1995).

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widespread engagement, and that involvements abroad for the purpose of humanitarian intervention or for establishing and keeping the peace run a high risk of "mission creep," military escalation, and descent into a deadly quagmire similar to Vietnam. To avoid such mistakes, advocates of this position insist, a set of rigid requirements should be met before any engagement of American forces. But these requirements are so rigid that they would, in practice, prevent any use of American military power in instances short of a direct attack on the United States or its allies.

Advocates of both these arguments agree that American military forces should be used only in defense of the country's vital interests, which is generally defined in a limited fashion to include only the defense of the United States, its allies, and its critical economic interests. That is the place to begin considering the missions for the various elements of American military forces: What are the country's interests? Which are most important? Need interests be "vital," a matter of life and death for the country, before military force can be used? What strategy should the United States adopt to protect its interests, and where does the use of military power fit? A discussion of the proper missions for military forces must respond to these questions, and a responsible policy must follow from the answers.

America in Today's World

American grand strategy must begin with the recognition that the United States is a satisfied power. It has no desire to extend its territory and no unsatisfied territorial claims. It has the world's largest and most powerful economy and has achieved that status under the current rules of the game. Even after making severe cuts in expenditures, it is by far the world's greatest military power. Historically, such predominance causes fear and jealousy among other states, who usually band together to balance and oppose such hegemony, but that has not been the response to American preeminence. The United States is allied with most of the world's wealthiest nations, many of whom possess impressive military forces of their own. The United States is the world's leading democratic state and the exemplar of free enterprise and trade at a time when these values are admired and widely shared. Though annoyed from time to time by America's policies and its ability to have its way, U.S. allies do not fear American aggression, but rather fear the United States will withdraw from active involvement and leadership.

Few, if any, nations in the history of the world have ever enjoyed such a favorable situation. It stands to reason that the keystone of American strategy should be an effort to preserve and sustain the situation as well and as long as possible. America's most vital interest, therefore, is maintaining the general peace, for war has been the swiftest, most expensive, and most devastating means of changing the balance of international power. But peace does not keep itself, although one of the most common errors in modern thinking about international relations is the assumption that peace is natural and can be

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preserved merely by having peace-seeking nations avoid provocative actions. The last three-quarters of the twentieth century strongly suggests the opposite conclusion: major war is more likely to come when satisfied states neglect their defenses and fail to take an active part in the preservation of peace.

It is vital to understand that the current relatively peaceful and secure situation is neither inevitable nor immutable. It reflects two conditions built up with tremendous effort and expense during the last half century: the great power of the United States and the general expectation that Americans will be willing to use that power when necessary. The diminution of U.S. power and credibility, which would follow on a policy of reduced responsibility, would thus not be a neutral act that would leave the situation as it stands. Instead, it would be a critical step in undermining the stability of the international situation. Calculations based on the absence of visible potential enemies would immediately be made invalid by America's withdrawal from its current position as the major bulwark supporting the world order. The cost of the resulting upheaval in wealth, instability, and the likelihood of war would be infinitely greater than the cost of continuing to uphold the existing international structure.

The Main Task

The chief mission of American military forces, therefore, must be to maintain their superiority, that is, their ability (in cooperation with their allies) to fight and win wars at such a level as to deter possible disturbers of the peace from seeking to change the international situation by violence or the threat of violence. That is no easy task, especially for modern democratic countries at this moment in history. The achievements of deterrence are always hard to see and to appreciate. If there is no war and no immediate threat in sight, opponents of the policy will denounce it as an unnecessary expense diverting resources from more desirable causes. They will regard the peaceful international situation as natural and unconnected to what has helped produce it: the effort and money expended on military power. The only time in its history that the United States has steadily maintained powerful military forces in order to deter war was from 1950 through the end of the cold war, a period that concluded with the peaceful collapse of its major rival. Throughout that time, the policy was under domestic attack on the grounds that it was either unnecessary, or provocative, or both. In the absence of an obvious, already powerful opponent, it is even harder to convince many people that the current advantageous situation rests on a base to which preponderant American military power is essential.

Yet it is remarkable how swiftly an apparently secure peace can be shattered by a sudden challenge to the complacency of the satisfied states from an unexpected source. In 1919 Germany was defeated, isolated, disarmed, and strategically contained. The situation was fundamentally unchanged when Adolf Hitler's Nazi regime came to power in 1933. Yet by 1941 Germany had launched a world war, conquered France and all of Western Europe, and was on the point of bringing the entire continent under its control.

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As late as the 1920s, the notion that Japan might be a threat to peace seemed absurd even to the former first lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill. As chancellor of the Exchequer (1924–29), he repeatedly reduced naval appropriations to help pay for social programs, dismissing future dangers in the Far East: "Why should there be a war with Japan? I do not believe there is the slightest chance of it in our lifetime." The Admiralty, he said, should make plans "on the basis that no naval war against a first class Navy is likely to take place in the next twenty years."[1] In 1931 Japan invaded Manchuria. Several years later it launched an invasion of China, and in 1941 it attacked British, French, and Dutch colonies and American forces at Pearl Harbor and elsewhere, bringing World War II to the Pacific.

In 1990, few would have believed that a third-rate power such as Iraq would offer a military challenge to the sole remaining superpower, but in that year Saddam Hussein's army invaded Kuwait, compelling the United States to send a vast military force to drive the Iraqis out, at enormous expense.

Lesser Tasks

Deterrence of war at the level of at least theater campaigns—through strength and the evident willingness to use it—must be the most important mission of America's armed forces. It cannot, however, be the only one, as the uses of American forces abroad in the last decade show. Neither the Bush nor the Clinton administration can fairly be described as looking for trouble. Both made deep cuts in expenditures for defense, and both faced serious domestic opposition to interventions abroad. Thus, whatever the wisdom of any particular involvement, each one resulted from a decision by a government not eager to take it. There is little reason to doubt that similar problems and challenges will continue to arise in the future. Challenges to peace and security arise naturally from the conflict for power between and within states. Some conflicts, like the fighting in Bosnia and the Chinese menace to Taiwan, involve principally the interests and security of America's friends and allies. But a consistent American refusal to take action to meet threats to peace and security that fall short of invasions or similarly obvious dangers will raise questions about the U.S. willingness and ability to do so, undermining the confidence and support of friends and allies. The current, unusually stable condition of the world rests heavily on the belief in America's military power and commitment. If these are seen to decline, the stability and security of the world will decline apace. The United States need not involve itself in every challenge that arises; it need not take action whenever it takes part. However, it must face the fact that whenever it chooses to stand aloof from challenges that may concern it, there is a price to pay in damage to the credibility of its policy of deterrence.

[1] Quoted in Telford Taylor, *Munich: The Price of Peace* (New York: Doubleday, 1979), p. 203.

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Still, decisions to intervene or not must be made. And the nice calculations needed to make the decision in each case are far from the various rigid checklists that some analysts wish to have filled out before any use of military force is undertaken. Serious and continued study and discussion of basic principles and historical experience will always be needed to alert decision makers to the risks of both intervention and abstention, but there is no magic formula that can make decisions in advance. That is what statesmen are for.

What seems clear, however, is that interventions on a scale smaller than war should and will take place from time to time. Opinions differ on how frequent these will be, but experience suggests that they will be most frequent and most difficult when the powers that wish to preserve peace are, or seem to be, unable or unwilling to resist its breach. The Korean War, for instance, broke out when the United States appeared both unable and unwilling to defend its South Korean ally. Swift and enormously deep reductions in the size and quality of the U.S. Army right after World War II brought it down in just a few years from some ten million to about 552,000, half of them on occupation duty overseas serving as clerks and policemen, the other half in the United States performing various administrative tasks. General Omar Bradley, who inherited this army in 1948, described it as one that "could not fight its way out of a paper bag."[2] Early in 1950, the American secretary of state gave a speech that mentioned a number of states in the Far East that the United States would fight to defend. South Korea was not among them. The combination of America's evident military weakness and its apparent lack of will encouraged North Korea to launch an attack and its Soviet sponsor to permit and support it. The ensuing war almost ended in swift defeat and disaster for South Korean and American forces. In any case, it lasted for years, cost a great fortune, and took thousands of American lives before ending in a stalemate that has required the emplacement of American forces in Korea for more than four decades.

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 took place at a time when American military power was far stronger—the foremost in the world, the power of the Soviet Union having declined. Saddam Hussein could, nevertheless, challenge U.S. might because he had good reason to doubt American willingness to use its military power to prevent or reverse an invasion of Kuwait, a doubt strengthened by the absence of significant American ground forces in the vicinity.

There is good reason to believe that the violence and loss of life involved when Yugoslavia disintegrated, and the threat that these have posed to the stability of Europe, could have been avoided by timely intervention on the part of the United States and its allies. Given the power of American military forces, then recently demonstrated in the war in the Persian Gulf, there would probably have been no need to use those forces had the United States and NATO made clear that violence would not be tolerated. Instead, both attempted to avoid the responsibility of intervention, thus permitting and encouraging the horrors and disruptions that followed, only to decide in due course that these were

[2] Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair, *A General's Life* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), p. 474.

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not tolerable. When at last NATO resorted to intervention, it required the serious use of arms and the deployment of a considerable force for at least a year. But all of that happened after the Bosnian horrors had taken place. And the end of the difficulties and of American involvement are far from evident.

These examples show that the denial of American interest and attempts to avoid involvement, such as the threat or use of military force, can have a result opposite to what is desired. Instead of preventing the expenditure of resources and the risk of American lives, such avoidance may encourage conditions that cause greater expenditure and risk. There is no realistic alternative to the requirement that America's armed forces be able both to fight and to win real wars, as well as to engage in smaller actions to deter war, to establish peace, and to keep the peace for some period after it has been established.

The Checklist Illusion

Unimpressed by such proposals, yet fearful that peacekeeping and similar assignments would seriously degrade the army's war-fighting ability, some people propose an approach that would keep these involvements to a minimum and, indeed, make them rare events. To this end, they insist that an established canon of criteria be met before American armed forces are introduced abroad. One set of suggestions, not meant to be unduly restrictive, requires a determination prior to any intervention (1) that the action has some reasonable chance of success; (2) that the United States has resources adequate for its execution; (3) that its purpose is to protect American interests; (4) that the U.S. government is able to define and explain the mission; and (5) that the mission solves a greater problem than it creates. These are all sensible considerations, and no government should commit armed forces abroad without thinking about them, among others. But they do not help much. The third item will almost always be debatable, and the fourth amounts to little more than an exercise in rhetorical skill. And determinations about the others cannot be made in advance. Statesmen responsible for deciding will have to act on their best judgment, as they have in the past. There can be no guarantee that they will make the right decision, but there is no escape from deciding.

The one criterion not yet discussed, common to most lists of requirements, presents the greatest difficulty. It would require evidence of a national, or at least political, consensus before a decision is made to use armed force. This suggestion arises from the understandable desire to avoid involvements that have been seen as disasters in the past and that have arisen from the commitment of American armed forces in situations short of declared war. The instance most frequently cited is Vietnam; another is the peacekeeping intervention in Lebanon during the Reagan years, which led to the death of 241 marines. The humanitarian mission to Somalia is a third example.

The purpose of this requirement is to make such interventions impossible, or at least highly unlikely. In retrospect, it may seem improbable that the American people or their representatives would have given advance approval

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to missions of this kind, but the proviso offers no guarantee against unsatisfactory involvements. The interventions in Vietnam and Korea earned both political and popular support as long as the government was seen to be aiming at victory. Presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush would surely have won support had they sought public approval for the missions to Lebanon and Somalia, and there is no reason to be certain that the dismay caused by the mishaps in those places would not have been overcome and forgotten had the government in each case found a good reason to persist in the mission. The main effect of such a requirement would be similar to the effect of Bush's decision to gain congressional support before launching a military effort against Iraq—to give America's opponent further reason to doubt U.S. resolve and to refuse a peaceful conclusion to the crisis, and to give him time to improve his military or diplomatic situation.

The unspoken assumption underlying this and other restrictions meant to hamper interventions is that inaction is safer than action. But the history of this century does not support that opinion. In 1936 Adolf Hitler violated both the Versailles and Locarno treaties by sending a military force to occupy the demilitarized Rhineland. Had the leaders of France and Great Britain, or even France alone, acted to drive out his pitiful contingent they might well have destroyed his regime on the spot and avoided a war that ultimately caused some 40 million deaths. At the very least they would have made impossible the swift German defeat of France in 1940. Given the climate of opinion at the time, leaders of Great Britain and France might have found it hard to convince their publics to support military action. But that will never be known, because the leaders were paralyzed by the bitter memories of World War I and believed that restraint and the avoidance of the use of military force were the only way to preserve peace. They found excuses for inaction, and the Nazis were able to take the first major step on the road to war and conquest.

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait is also instructive. The U.S. military leadership, badly scarred by public criticism and unsatisfactory outcomes during the Vietnam War, as well as by the affair in Lebanon, advised inaction. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that a line be drawn to defend Saudi Arabia, leaving Kuwait in Saddam's hands. Many members of the political opposition vigorously and publicly opposed military intervention. Had President Bush been guided by the need to test public support before deciding to take action he would not have acted. Instead, he decided at once that Saddam's coup de main "would not stand." With great effort, and the passage of valuable time, he was able to win, by only a few votes in the Senate, congressional support for the use of force to drive the Iraqis from Kuwait. But that was accomplished after he had already decided on action; mustering support would have been impossible had he not already made his decision. To win the congressional vote the president undertook a last attempt at diplomacy, and that had consequences. For one thing, it took time. For another, any chance that visible resoluteness and serious military preparations might convince Saddam to retreat without a fight was undercut by the efforts at last-minute negotiation, forced by the need to sway domestic opinion.

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Moreover, if these diplomatic efforts had succeeded, if Saddam had withdrawn before the fighting began, the result would have been almost as bad as leaving him in place. He could have retreated with his large military force intact, a force that included chemical weapons and possibly nuclear and biological ones as well. He also could have retreated with the prestige of his forces undiminished. Doubt about American resolve and willingness to fight would have lingered and grown, undermining the confidence of friendly and moderate elements in the Middle East. The threat to peace and American interests would not have been defeated but only delayed. What was needed was a swift military response as soon as possible after Iraq's violation of Kuwait's frontier. Public support would have been available, as it was once the president made his decision clear. Delay caused by the desire to win such support in advance could have been very costly had not Saddam proved to be such a convenient opponent.

These examples, and they could readily be multiplied, show that there may be dangers not only from military involvement but also from a refusal to undertake such involvement. Indeed, in countries like the Western democracies, there may be more danger from the latter than from the former. The avoidance of interventions short of full-scale war, therefore, is not a safe refuge but an illusion. In any case, there is no way to know in advance whether it is safer to stay out or go in, no escape from the judgment of statesmen, and no security in tying their hands. It is necessary, therefore, to seek the best ways to meet the challenge of varied and unforeseeable missions in a manner compatible with maintaining a military force capable of fighting and winning major conflicts.

Trends Eroding U.S. Strength

Still, the question remains: Can the armed forces carry out these smaller assignments without damaging their ability to carry out their primary mission—to win major wars? In particular, can the army do so? For it is to the army that these secondary assignments present the most serious difficulties; the other services find little in them that runs the risk of degrading their war-fighting capacities. But commitments of tens of thousands of soldiers to peace-making and peacekeeping missions for periods of months or years place a serious strain on the army, whose numbers are already below those of the inadequate force available at the outbreak of the Korean War.

Budget cutting. Yet the desire to cut military expenditures has created pressure to reduce the army's numbers even further. That is justified by the assertion that wars of the future will rely heavily on new "smart" and "stealthy" weapons, many of them unmanned and many others released from ships and airplanes at a great distance, thus making large numbers of soldiers unnecessary.

But one must be cautious about claims that new technology will make traditional ground forces marginal or irrelevant. Previous advances in military technology, even when they have had important effects on the character of warfare, have produced exaggerated claims and expectations. After the Franco-

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Prussian War, the officers of the German general staff ignored the complexities of traditional grand strategy and put their hopes and faith in mastery of the new technology. "Theirs was a narrow world of technical marvels: cartography, railroads, communications, weapons systems. They mastered statistical tables, devised intricate mobilization schedules, formulated complicated plans,"[3] all of which, however, was not enough to overcome the traditional disadvantages of numbers and geography.

Similarly, British advocates of air power in the interwar years thought they could deter war or win it without the use of ground forces by developing the new technology of "strategic" aerial bombardment. "To the British Government rearmament came to seem almost a question of air power alone. Cabinet discussions tacitly assumed that the next war, if it came, would take the form of a direct, almost a private duel between the British and German Air Forces."[4] The ensuing war nevertheless lasted more than five years, involved bitter warfare between enormous armies, and ended only when ground forces marched into the German capital.

The war to drive Iraqi forces from Kuwait brought swift victory to the side with an overwhelming advantage in modern technology, including the first significant use of "smart" and "stealthy" weapons. Yet that victory required the employment of hundreds of thousands of ground troops even after a month-long pounding of Iraqi forces from the air. An air force colonel who flew in the Persian Gulf War rightly observed: "Airpower can only do so much; the Army must go in on the ground to defeat the enemy's ground forces to finally win the battle."[5] It is also true that the placement of ground forces in significant numbers is one of the most effective means of deterring breaches of the peace. But with inadequate numbers the army will be unable to perform its vital part in these jobs.

Unfortunately, the army is an attractive target for budget cutters because manpower, especially in the form of professional volunteers, is very expensive, and the army has by far the largest number of men and women. However, the United States must resist the temptation to save money by assuming that ground forces in future wars will play a less important role, at least until it is clear that some better substitute will be available. Until that time, it would be reckless to assume that a modernized ground force of considerable size will not be needed to fight (and deter) the wars of the future.

The problem of numbers is intensified by financial considerations. Already there is broad agreement that currently projected forces will be inadequate to carry out the strategy of the Clinton administration's *Bottom-Up Review*. Some analysts suggest that forces for the current strategic plan are

[3] Holger H. Herwig, "Strategic Uncertainties of a Nation-State: Prussia-Germany, 1871–1918," in *The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War*, ed. Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin Bernstein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 251.

[4] Correlli Barnett, *The Collapse of British Power* (New York: Morrow, 1972), p. 4.

[5] Quoted in John Pimlott and Stephen Brady, *The Gulf War Assessed* (London: Sterling Publishers, 1992), pp. 122–23.

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underfunded for the period 1997–2002 by some $130 billion. If they are right, then even without involvement in missions short of war U.S. forces' capacity to do their job in both the short run and long run will be undermined.

The problem is also exacerbated by the need to keep pace with the advance of military technology. Whether or not America finds itself in the midst of a true revolution in military affairs, there is no doubt that the continued effectiveness of U.S. armed forces will require expensive investments to replace worn and obsolete equipment with the weapons and defenses of the future. There is already considerable tension within the armed forces over the need to maintain the forces at an adequate state of readiness to cope with current challenges and those of the near future, and the need for research, development, and procurement of the weapons of the next generation.

Numerous non-war assignments. The erosion caused by budget cutting is multiplied by involvement in secondary missions. The practice has been to carry out these missions without providing adequate additional funds, so that the decision to engage in them comes at the expense of general readiness and modernization. America's peacekeeping force in Bosnia, for example, will cost at least $3.5 billion for its first year of deployment.[6] The temptation, therefore, is to resist involvement in such missions in order to avoid degrading the war-fighting capacity of the armed forces.

Opponents of secondary missions also fear another source of degradation. They point to the danger that a focus on these lesser activities could undermine the army's war-fighting capacity in more subtle, yet fundamental, ways. The skills and qualities needed for peacekeeping are not the same as those required for war fighting. The toughness, aggressiveness, and ferocity that are essential for the latter are the opposite of the tact, patience, and caution often needed for the former. The fear is that the training needed to produce effective peacekeepers would degrade the trainees' capacity for war fighting. Some believe that the kind of soldier who excels in one assignment, regardless of training, is less well suited to the other. There is thus concern that as peacekeeping becomes more frequent, the peacekeeping type of soldier will be more readily favored and advanced, at the expense of the army's war-fighting capacity. This tendency, it is feared, will be increased if the army looks to the new, smaller missions as a means for building or protecting the size of the army against current and future reductions.

Various proposals have been suggested to meet these threats. One is to divide the army into two kinds of soldiers, each with its distinct kind of training. This plan would reduce at once the number of available fighting men, and in time it would create a sense that one group consisted of "real" soldiers while the other did not, with devastating consequences for morale. Most people believe that this would produce the worst possible degradation of the army's effectiveness, and they argue for a single kind of soldier with uniform training in both assignments. They place their hopes in a new kind of training that

[6] "Bosnia Force Costs U.S. $3.5 Billion a Year," *New York Times*, Aug. 8, 1996.

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would allow soldiers to move comfortably and effectively from one kind of assignment to the other after a period of transitional preparation.

Another approach is to make greater use of reserves and guardsmen for peacekeeping purposes. That could increase the numbers available, since political support for these troops is strong. To make this approach work, however, training of reserves and guardsmen would need to improve to something like that employed by the marines with their reserves. Nevertheless, questions arise: If these auxiliaries are to be used in both types of assignments, will their training and duality be adequate for war fighting? If not, would not a two-tiered army emerge with the problems discussed above?

In sum, there is no real choice but to produce a doctrine and training program that will allow the army to carry out the range of missions that America's situation requires. Peace and American security depend on it.

This assignment is not easy and calls for both resolve and clear, hard thinking. The military and civilian leaders planning America's defense policy must be prepared to make the kinds of organizational changes, even radical ones, that may be needed in the new era, and to institute training to meet the new conditions. They also need to find better ways to reduce and control the cost of acquiring and maintaining needed weapons, for financial restrictions will always be serious.

However, they must face the fact that more money than is now budgeted or anticipated will be needed to meet the challenge. Their natural tendency to withdraw from as much responsibility as possible as soon as possible, and to shape defense expenditures to meet domestic political rather than strategic needs, has twice in this century put the Western democracies at risk. The major responsibilities facing America's leaders today are to resist that tendency, and to educate the American people and their representatives as to what is needed for peace and security and what it will cost.

A New Strategy Is Needed

None of that can happen without the formulation of a clear national grand strategy to suit the international situation. In 1950, Paul Nitze (then head of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff) was charged with producing a comprehensive statement of national security policy. The document, known as NSC-68, became the general foundation of the containment strategy that shaped American policy in the next half century. The policy of containment laid out in those years was a rare example of a state making a rational evaluation of the problems it faced, the nature of its opponent, and the character of the threat that opponent posed to stability and peace, and then deciding on a reasoned course of action, including the sacrifices and commitments needed for success. It was a realistic approach that rested on an understanding of the need for military power and the manifest willingness to use it when necessary. Yet it was a subtle approach that gave full weight to the importance of ideas, economics, institutions, culture, and the need to adapt to change.

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The adoption of the fully shaped policy of containment required a sharp break with America's past. Contrary to its traditions, the United States joined in a continuing alliance with nations in Europe and, later, in other parts of the world. It consciously undertook the chief burden of preserving the peace, under conditions tolerable to itself and its allies, gearing its economy for the purpose and adopting military conscription in peacetime. American leaders took these taxing and extraordinary measures to meet what they believed to be a serious and imminent threat. But the policy of containment was also shaped by their understanding of the origins of World War II. That war, they had concluded, originated in the failure of the Western democracies to meet their responsibilities after World War I, their withdrawal into isolation, and their unwillingness to bear the costs of keeping the peace, which required the capacity and will to resist detrimental changes in the balance of power caused by dissatisfied states using subversion, threats, and military force to achieve their purpose.

To define the missions for America's armed forces in the decades to come requires a new NSC-68. There needs to be a full national debate, followed by the adoption of a grand strategy of continued engagement in the new constellation of international relations. The United States must take the lead in preserving the peace by deterring the resort to armed violence and intervening to prevent or stop it when necessary. With that goal established and understood, American military and civilian leaders can better turn to the difficult task of anticipating potential missions and preparing the means to make them successful.

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Are U.S. Forces Overstretched?

Operations, Procurement, and Industrial Base

by Harry G. Summers Jr.

One need not look far afield to see the devastating effect that the post–cold war drawdown in the U.S. military could have on America's ability to fight and win on the battlefield. The former Soviet military, once the most feared in the world and for almost a half century the very criterion by which the U.S. military judged itself, has virtually collapsed.

Like the U.S. military, Russia's armed forces have suffered draconian cuts. In 1988, during the cold war, the Soviet military (which then included not only the Russian military but also the military forces of the other Soviet republics) had more than 5 million soldiers, sailors, and airmen under arms. By 1995, Russia, the successor to the Soviet Union, had only 1.5 million military personnel on active duty.

This decline in the physical aspects of Russian combat power is only part of the story. The precipitous decline in soldier morale is even more telling. As one former officer said, "The armed forces had become a disaster area" with the soldiers "separated in spirit by the total lack of a common purpose or unified goals."[1] The results were apparent in the debacle in Chechnya, where lightly armed Muslim guerrillas held the Russian military at bay for almost two years.

The Hollow Army

Could a similar scenario of military decline unfold in the United States? As then army chief of staff General Gordon Sullivan, who presided over the U.S. Army's post–cold war drawdown, emphasized in 1991, it almost did in July 1950 in the opening days of the Korean War. At that time, America's lead

[1] Vadim Makarenko, "'I realized something had broken down,'" *U.S. News and World Report*, Aug. 26, 1996, p. 35.

Colonel Harry G. Summers Jr., U.S. Army, retired, is a syndicated columnist for the *Los Angeles Times* and an Army War College Distinguished Fellow. His most recent book is *The New World Strategy* (Touchstone, 1995).

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element, Task Force Smith (the First Battalion, Twenty-first Infantry Regiment commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Charles B. Smith), was decimated by the advancing North Korean army, which had the American troops outgunned and outmanned. In the early days of the war, the United States was behind on the weapons-technology curve. U.S. 2.36-inch antitank rocket launchers, for instance, could not stop the North Korean army's Soviet-supplied T-34 medium tanks, and neither could the light tanks of the divisions coming from Japan.

I witnessed this tragedy first-hand as a young corporal in a tank company in the Twenty-fourth Infantry Division, Task Force Smith's parent unit. We lost all of our 75mm-gun M24 Chaffee tanks within the first week of the war. My platoon sergeant, who had fought the Nazi panzers as a tanker in World War II, shot twelve rounds into an advancing T-34, only to see them bounce harmlessly away. The enemy tank then blew out his entire engine compartment with one round from its high-velocity 85mm gun.

As if that were not demoralizing enough, two close friends and my company commander died for want of a seventy-five-cent starter solenoid on the company tank retriever when it stalled after the driver was shot in a North Korean roadblock. Unable to restart the retriever, the three were all gunned down as they tried to escape.

Like the untrained Russian conscripts in Chechnya, we had not been prepared for the terrible realities of war. As historian T.R. Fehrenbach put it, "In the first six months [of the Korean War] America suffered a near debacle because her Regular Army fighting men were the stuff of legions, but they had not been made into legionaries."[2] But it was not the first time that had happened.

From its beginning, the United States has followed a pattern of being caught unprepared, hastily mobilizing at great cost, then rapidly cutting back its forces after the crisis has passed. A few months after the end of World War I, Major George C. Marshall said in words that ring true today, "The public ran away from the tragedies of the War . . . and became obsessed with the magnitude of the public debt and the problems of its reduction. Forgetting almost immediately the bitter lessons of unpreparedness, they demanded and secured the reduction of the Army."[3]

Citing examples from the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, the Mexican War, and the Philippine Insurrection, as well as World War I, Marshall ruefully pointed out that there are numerous instances of the same general nature. But the astonishing fact is that America continues to follow a regular cycle in the doing and undoing of measures for the national defense. Americans start in making adequate provisions and then turn abruptly in the opposite direction and abolish what has just been done.[4]

[2] T.R. Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War: A Study in Unpreparedness* (New York: Macmillan, 1963), p. 438.

[3] Major George C. Marshall, "The Effect of School Histories on National Defense," in *Report of the Tenth Annual Conference of the Association of Military Colleges and Schools of the United States*, Washington, D.C., Mar. 7–8, 1923, p. 32.

[4] Ibid.

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Marshall must have recalled those words in September 1939 when he was appointed army chief of staff and took charge of a force completely unprepared for World War II. As his soldiers of the First Infantry Division in France had in 1917, these soldiers paid the price in blood at Bataan and Corregidor in the Philippines, and at the Kasserine Pass and the Fa'id Pass in North Africa as they bought time for the U.S. mobilization capability to catch up.

And when he took over as secretary of defense in the Korean War, Marshall must have thought of those words again as American soldiers once more paid the price for a hollow army. Eventually the prototype weaponry that for budgetary reasons had not been procured earlier, including 3.5-inch antitank rocket launchers and 90mm-gun M46 Patton medium tanks, made its way to the battlefield. But for thousands of soldiers it was too late.

No More "Task Force Smiths"

When he took over as army chief of staff in 1991, Sullivan adopted the motto "No more Task Force Smiths." It was a motto more provident than he realized. By the time General Sullivan left office in 1995, the army had declined from 770,000 soldiers and sixteen active combat divisions at the end of the cold war to 495,000 soldiers and ten active divisions, almost 100,000 fewer than the 590,000 soldiers of the hollow army at the beginning of the Korean War.

But Sullivan had been true to his word. Though smaller than its Korean War predecessor, the post–cold war army had no "Task Force Smiths." The army of 1950 had been gutted internally. None of its ten divisions had a wartime complement of weapons: the infantry regiments had only two of their three rifle battalions, the field artillery battalions had only two of their three firing batteries, and the divisions had only light-tank companies rather than the authorized medium-tank battalions.

While also ten divisions strong, the active army of 1995 had not been skeletonized. Budget cuts had somewhat degraded unit readiness, but the force was not a hollow one. Instead, the entire army was armed, manned, and trained for combat.

Back to Basics

While much has been made of the current revolution in military affairs, with its emphasis on Information Age technology and computer warfare, the real revolution took place almost a quarter century ago in response to the debacle in Vietnam. In 1972, under Admiral Stansfield Turner at the Naval War College, a "back to basics" movement began that swept the military. The false doctrines of the civilian nuclear war strategists, who preached that nuclear weapons had transformed the nature of war, were thrown out. So were the teachings of the social scientists, who argued that guerrilla insurgencies were

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the wave of the future and that nation building should be the principal military task.

These civilian-bred fallacies had almost destroyed the military's ability to wage conventional war. Admiral Turner insisted that the military again become the master of its own profession, and there emerged a renewed emphasis on conventional war-fighting doctrines and training fundamentals. To that end, the army formed its Training and Doctrine Command; the air force began Project Warrior and formed its Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education; and the navy initiated its Naval Doctrine Command. Training was revitalized, combat-maneuver training centers were established, and training simulators and computer war games were introduced to hone combat skills.

All the services also reworked their basic battle doctrines, concentrating on conventional war-fighting operations and tactics. Driven by then navy secretary John Lehman's emphasis on offensive rather than defensive operations, the navy and marines' Maritime Strategy focused on control of the high seas, power projection, operations on the flanks, amphibious warfare, and the ability to build a sea bridge to Europe to bring America's mobilization capability to bear.

The army formulated its AirLand Battle doctrine, with multidimensional rear-battle, near-battle, and deep-battle concepts. For its part, the air force concentrated on neutralizing and destroying the enemy's war-fighting capabilities and will to fight.

All of that effort paid off in the Persian Gulf War. The navy's initiative in preparing to build a sea bridge to Europe enabled it to build just such a bridge to the Middle East. The amphibious threat from the marines kept Iraqi divisions pinned down in static defenses. AirLand Battle worked as planned, as the army cut through the Iraqi defenses. And the air force swept the skies, paralyzing the enemy's military, political, and economic bases. Rising phoenix-like from the ashes of Vietnam, the American military had demonstrated convincingly that it was the world's most formidable fighting force.

Force XXI

But the services did not rest on their laurels. After the Persian Gulf War, each reassessed its war-fighting doctrines and organization for combat in preparation for the twenty-first century. Most striking was the navy's abandonment of its traditional blue-water strategy in favor of an emphasis on the world's coastlines, or littorals, as described in *Forward . . . From the Sea.*

The air force similarly underwent a major transformation. Acknowledging that in the post-nuclear age the term "strategic," once a synonym for nuclear weapons, had reverted to its original meaning, the air force discontinued its Strategic Air Command, which had been the very heart of the air force for almost a half century. It then adopted a new strategy, Global Reach, Global Power, and reorganized its force into "movers" and "shooters" in the new Air

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Mobility Command and Air Combat Command, the latter with composite squadrons of tankers, bombers, and fighters.

The nation's land forces underwent the least reorientation. Pleased with the performance of its AirLand Battle doctrine in the Persian Gulf War, the army made few immediate changes in either its war-fighting doctrine or its organization for combat. It did, however, set up an experimental force as a test-bed for the digitalization of combat operations.

The U.S. Marine Corps, only slightly affected by the post–cold war drawdowns, was more than pleased with the navy's new coastal strategy, which seemed tailor-made for the marines' traditional amphibious warfare mission. Prior to the war in the Persian Gulf, the marines had reorganized into marine air-ground task forces, in which units at every level from battalion to corps had an integral land component, air component, and logistics component. From the battalion-level marine expeditionary units to the corps-level First Marine Expeditionary Force, this new structure had been battle tested and validated in the Persian Gulf, and the marines saw no need for major change.

Unlike in previous postwar drawdowns, the military made a major effort in the latest reorganization to adapt its doctrines and structure to new realities. Both the Bush administration's 1991 *Base Force* model and the Clinton administration's 1993 *Bottom-Up Review* formulated a military strategy to square the enormous reductions in the size of the force with the dangers of the post–cold war world. But it soon became obvious that the new strategy had severe deficiencies.

First was the notion that the United States could fight two major regional contingencies nearly simultaneously among Northeast Asia, the Middle East, or Western Europe. Given the cuts in military capabilities, this so-called win-win strategy stretched credibility, for each of the previous wars in Northeast Asia and the Middle East required more divisions than existed in the post–cold war force, and there was no evidence a new conflict would be any less intense. At best the United States had a "win-hold" capability, and even that was tenuous.

But the real Achilles' heel of the new strategy was that it was seriously underfunded, with estimates of the shortfall ranging from $150 million to $200 billion. But instead of facing that fact, America tried to wish it away and avoid the hard choices that have to be made. One evasion was to assume that historically low inflation rates would make the problem go away. Another, a favorite of the defense contractors, was to argue that high technology could substitute for manpower, enabling further reductions in force size.

Technology versus Manpower

These arguments touch on a basic philosophical difference among the services. In the army and the marines, "machines" serve the man, and force levels are a primary concern. In the navy and air force, man serves the "machine," and technology has the edge, as it does with the American people.

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The revulsion over the carnage of World War I, where more U.S. soldiers were killed in action in three months on the line than in ten years in Vietnam, encouraged the idea of using "things" rather than people to win wars. On the very eve of Pearl Harbor, for example, columnist Walter Lippman wrote that America would fight World War II with air and naval power, and that there would be little need for land forces.

Although events proved him wrong, this thinking led to the enormous postwar cutbacks in ground forces and the hollow army with which the United States entered the Korean War. And these same ideas were at work in the post–cold war drawdown. Although the army had been cut by more than one-third, that was not good enough for those who believed technology could substitute for soldiers.

"Can we make a trade-off between nine more-modern divisions and ten less-modern divisions?" asked Senator Carl Leven (D-Mich.) during an April 1994 Senate Armed Services Committee meeting. "You could start modernizing tomorrow if you lopped off another two or three divisions," said Senator John Warner (R-Va.).[5] Three years later their notions still persist, and the army today is under pressure to cut 20,000 more soldiers in order to free up funds for new technology.

Adding fuel to this debate are the think tanks who preach that high technology renders soldiers obsolete, and that future wars in the Information Age will be fought by computers rather than soldiers. It is no accident, said one panel participant, that many of these think tanks receive a lot of money from the military-industrial complex, whose high-tech systems benefit the contractors instead of the military.

As former army vice chief of staff General Frederick Kroesen pointed out, excessive faith in today's high technology is but the latest manifestation of the "silver bullet" fantasy. Earlier versions included the horse, the phalanx, the crossbow, the iron-clad knight, the cannon, the machine gun, the tank, poison gas, the airplane, and the atomic bomb. Certainly the technology of the Information Age will revolutionize the battlefield, and cyberspace systems and digitalization have already begun to do so. The resulting changes will no doubt be as dramatic as the battlefield changes of the Industrial Age. But as the distinguished military historian Sir Michael Howard noted, the nation must also be prepared to wage war at the level of the Agrarian Age, for old verities about will and courage still apply.

Despite the intense debate over technology, the central issue confronting the armed forces has not been faced—whether the United States should maintain a cold war–type military with a relatively large standing army or whether it should return to the much smaller force of the interwar years.

Instead of using regional contingencies as the criterion for shaping the force, another panelist said, America should plan for the unforeseeable. U.S.

[5] Lisa Burgess, "Congress Wrestles with Technology, Force Cuts," *Defense News*, May 9–15, 1994.

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forces should have a more generalized strategy that minimizes the odds that they will get into serious trouble, no matter where they have to fight. But certain vested intellectual, organizational, and industrial interests weigh against such a strategy: Planners are wedded to their own ideas and concepts. The services prefer to fight the types of wars for which they are best trained and structured. And industry pushes for scenarios where their weapons systems are optimized.

What America suffers now, asserted another panelist, is a disparity among policy, force posture, and the budget. If, as some argue, war fighting is no longer the primary role of the military and peacekeeping should be the armed forces' principal focus, then the military as it exists today is unnecessary. But since the American people are not anxious to support such a "touchy-feely" military, they are not likely to favor a defense budget geared toward those tasks.

The Military-Industrial Complex and Procurement

Some people assert that the matériel dimension of strategy is the real heart of the "American way of war," by which the enemy is not so much defeated as overwhelmed by the enormous U.S. mobilization capability and matériel superiority.

During the April 1951 Chinese spring offensive in Korea, for example, American field artillery fired twenty-seven *Liberty Ship* loads of ammunition to turn back the 250,000-man attack, inflicting 70,000 casualties in the process. *Time* magazine quoted one U.S. officer as saying, "They're spending people the way we spend ammunition."[6]

In wartime, that equation suits the American people, who prefer to spend "things" and be the war's "arsenal of democracy" rather than spend the lives of their children and become its charnel house. But in peacetime, many Americans see the "arsenal" as a corrupt "military-industrial complex" that squanders tax money on overpriced toilet seats and $200 hammers. It follows that peacetime defense spending has been a prime target of budget cutters. While the size of the military has been cut by one-third in the wake of the cold war, the share of the gross domestic product devoted to national defense has been slashed in half, declining by 54 percent in real dollars since 1985 to its lowest level since before World War II.

Moreover, the Defense Department's procurement budget is at a fifty-year low. While a crisis is not immediately at hand, such reductions do portend future problems. Technology buys time, and intelligence estimates hold that the U.S. military today has about a fifteen-year edge on its likely opponents.

Unless that current technological advantage is maintained, however, a "bow wave" will develop that will reach staggering proportions early in the

[6] Quoted in Harry G. Summers Jr., "Spring Offensive, 1951," in *Korean War Almanac* (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1990), p. 256.

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next century. When the problem becomes apparent then, it will be too late to solve it. To change the military of 2015, one must start now. Except that now there is no vision to initiate those changes.

A case in point is the issue of air dominance. The navy and air force are calling for a $300 billion investment in new jet fighters to replace their aging aircraft. Even though the number of aircraft has been cut by some 35 percent since the Persian Gulf War (from 8,200 to 5,900 planes) to free up dollars for modernization, that is not enough to pay for the new planes.

"Getting there by 2001, as planned," notes the *Washington Post*'s Bradley Graham, "assumes future savings from military base closing and more efficient purchasing practices—assumptions that are proving more difficult to achieve than top defense officials had anticipated."[7] Base closings will certainly not compensate for the shortfall. As one panelist pointed out, Washington has already closed some 20 percent of the bases in the United States, but it will be ten years before the government sees any savings.

The other alternative, more efficient purchasing practices, was favored by two panelists whose time in office afforded them substantial experience in promoting competition and second sourcing for military procurement. During their tenure, sole-source and cost-plus procurement fell from 85 percent to 35 percent, with a significant reduction in costs. The cost of an Aegis cruiser, for example, went from $1.5 billion to $800 million. But the recent consolidation of defense industries in the name of efficiency has decreased competition. Lockheed-Martin accounts for 60 percent of current procurement. By returning to a Soviet-style monopoly supply system, the United States is in danger of unilateral disarmament.

The Dow-Jones Industrial Index has increased more than 70 percent in the past three years, noted one participant. But during the same period, in an era of declining military budgets, the defense industrial index rose almost 500 percent. Chief executive officers are back in the cost-plus high cotton with $40 million bonuses, and none of them can lose money.

And a dependence on internal defense industrial facilities is not an answer either. Combined, these large pockets of socialism—such as the army arsenal system, the navy shipyards and weapons stations, and the air force depots—are wasting $40–50 billion a year. A classic example from the Reagan years was the very high speed integrated chip (VHSIC). The Pentagon bureaucracy said Silicon Valley could not be counted on to produce fast enough chips for the integrated circuits of the high-tech weapons system then under development. So Washington taxed each of the services nearly $2 billion a year and sank approximately $12 billion overall into the VHSIC program. When the chip was finally produced in 1989, it was significantly slower and several generations behind the commercial counterpart produced by Silicon Valley companies.

Ironically, America is currently experiencing a golden era of productivity. The U.S. industrial base for high tech, low tech, heavy industry, and manufacturing

[7] Bradley Graham, "Pentagon Faces Huge Bill for Jet Fighters," *Washington Post*, Aug. 22, 1996.

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is the marvel of the world. And this base can still provide the country with an affordable defense if the government tells manufacturers exactly what military capabilities the United States needs. If Washington fails to do that, the industrial base will be in the driver's seat. The U.S. defense posture will then depend on what the industrial complex wants to sell instead of on foreign policy and defense decision makers, leaving the country at the mercy of the American "Krupps."

Although he agreed with that assessment, another panel member pointed out that procurement reform is a second-order issue. Even a 50 percent reduction in the existing $39 billion procurement budget would make only a small dent in the $260 billion defense budget. The big money is in operating and maintenance funds, and cuts there must be accompanied by a clear plan of action. Thus, the armed forces need a new NSC-68, the blueprint that laid out a coherent military policy to guide the cold war procurement policies.

Conclusion

What was not said by the panelists was as important as what was said. No one forecast any substantial increases in the defense budget in the foreseeable future. Despite some recent rumblings from the Republicans, defense spending was not a major issue in the 1996 presidential campaign. Perhaps one explanation is that, according to a 1995 public opinion poll, only 9 percent of Americans see foreign policy and defense as America's biggest problem, down from 42 percent in 1982.

But relief may be at hand. On July 17, 1996, the very day the Defense Task Force convened, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Shalikashvili unveiled his Joint Vision 2010, which addressed one of the panel's primary concerns. It was intended to serve as an industry roadmap for the next fifteen years, said the *Defense Daily*, "by channeling the military services' varied acquisition programs, as well as doctrine and strategy differences, into one common direction."[8]

As the *Defense News* noted,

> Joint Vision 2010 marks the first attempt by a Joint Chiefs chairman to define a strategy for each of the military services to follow in crafting investment and modernization plans. . . . Shalikashvili's plan also will serve as a litmus test for the military services' various weapons programs.[9]

A valiant attempt to apply logic to what has been until now an illogical system, Joint Vision 2010 was long overdue.

[8] Vega Muradian, "New Joint Warfare Plan Also an Industry Roadmap," *Defense Daily*, July 18, 1996.
[9] Robert Holzer, "Shali Pushes Future Force Strategy," *Defense News*, Aug. 19–25, 1996.

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America's Alliance Anxieties

Prizes and Pitfalls of NATO Enlargement

by Gerald B. Solomon

In post–cold war Europe, the Atlantic alliance has already proven that it has a continued, if rather new, role as the region's principal provider of security. The newness of the role is highlighted by a process of "double enlargement" that was launched in 1990 and now is well underway. Enlargement in the first instance refers to an enlargement of mission beyond the core function of collective defense; additional missions would include support for peace operations outside the territory of NATO's member states, as in Bosnia. Enlargement in the second instance refers to an expansion in the membership of the alliance, as well as an extension of certain alliance benefits (especially democratic and transparent security interaction) to the twenty-seven members of the Partnership for Peace (PFP), the largest military cooperation program in Europe.

Both types of enlargement directly advance vital U.S. national interests and the fundamental NATO security task of building a more stable European security space (both inside and outside the alliance) based on the growth of peaceful democracies and the assurance that no country will be able to intimidate or coerce any European nation or impose hegemony through the threat or use of force. Enlargement in the sense of crisis management and power projection beyond NATO's own frontiers recognizes that the active defense of democratic values and human rights, not only countering direct aggression upon NATO borders, can prove fundamental to upholding European security; enlargement of the geographical bounds of NATO can help eliminate a perceived "gray zone" of insecurity in Central Europe—a region that sparked both world wars in this century and that, for half a century, was denied the freedom and prosperity NATO and the Marshall Plan brought to Western Europe.

Nevertheless, key decisions are needed to advance this transformation further. Fortunately, on December 10, 1996, NATO members agreed to a U.S. proposal that a NATO summit, to be held in Madrid on July 8–9, 1997, should set the seal on three interrelated strategic undertakings that will determine the alliance's course in the twenty-first century. The first of these undertakings is to complete NATO's internal reform process so as to achieve two ends: make

Congressman Gerald B. Solomon (R-N.Y.) is chairman of the Rules Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives and vice president of the North Atlantic Assembly, the NATO parliamentarians' organization. This article was prepared as part of the author's work as a government employee.

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more efficient the pursuit of all possible NATO missions, and strike a new "trans-Atlantic bargain" that will forge a stronger European security and defense identity (ESDI) within the alliance while maintaining the North American link that is essential for European security. The second undertaking to be begun at Madrid is to invite certain states from Central and Eastern Europe to start accession negotiations, with the goal of admitting them to NATO by 1999. The third undertaking is to deepen NATO's relations with all PFP members and institutionalize a special relationship with Russia and Ukraine.[1] The purpose of this article is to review some of the outstanding issues now before the alliance, complex issues that will endure long after the 1997 summit as NATO endeavors to launch nothing less than "a fresh act of creation, equal to that undertaken by the postwar generation of leaders of Europe and America."[2]

NATO Restructuring

NATO is revisiting, albeit more actively than ever before, the familiar idea that North America and a more unified Europe should become "partners on an equal footing," as the chief architect of European integration, Jean Monnet, put it in 1961.[3] The challenge is three-fold: to maintain alliance cohesion; to accommodate the declared ambitions of European governments to assume greater responsibility for defense, in keeping with their growing economic weight and international political identity; and to allow for the possibility that not all NATO allies will regard responding to instabilities in or near Europe as being in their vital interest, while keeping NATO's assets available to assist those who do wish to act.

At their Berlin meeting on June 3, 1996, the NATO foreign ministers agreed that ESDI—a construct thus far limited in application to modest operations conducted by the non-NATO, ten-member Western European Union (WEU)—would be developed within the alliance. The longstanding French effort to shape an autonomous identity—a divisive and unrealistic quest that never attracted the full political support or financial resources of France's European allies—was overtaken by agreement within NATO, previewed in January 1994, to make available key NATO assets for European-led operations.

This development of ESDI is to be reflected in two ways in new geopolitically rationalized structures for commands, forces, and missions: first, through the use of combined joint task forces (CJTFs); secondly, by giving the structures an enhanced European character.

[1] Secretary of State Warren Christopher, "A New Atlantic Community for the 21st Century," Address at the State Theater, Stuttgart, Sept. 6, 1996.

[2] Henry A. Kissinger, "The Year of Europe," Address at the Associated Press annual luncheon, New York, Apr. 23, 1973, in Henry A. Kissinger, *American Foreign Policy*, enl. ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1974), p. 103.

[3] Quoted in Elliot R. Goodman, *The Fate of the Atlantic Community* (New York: Praeger, for the Atlantic Council of the United States, 1975), p. 148.

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Combined joint task forces, which are nonstatic and highly responsive, will help NATO as a whole to perform contingency operations more efficiently. Moreover, through CJTFs, the alliance will also be able to loan its assets for missions under WEU political direction and strategic control. These WEU/CJTF operations will be implemented under European command arrangements within NATO, and the alliance will retain the right to monitor and recall these "separable but not separate" assets. The precise degree of NATO authority in WEU-led operations was not decided in Berlin; in particular, the role of the supreme allied commander Europe (SACEUR) was left open, with France insisting upon a European chain of command and the United States favoring the SACEUR in a supporting command role. However, the following September the NATO chiefs of staff recommended that the deputy SACEUR, a post held by a European, be "double-hatted" for purposes of WEU-led operations that draw on NATO resources. Such a solution would offer a visible European identity within NATO and yet not bifurcate the integrated structure.

As the foregoing decision indicates, the European character of alliance structures is to be enhanced. Describing what is hoped will prove a cooperative outcome to the intermittent trans-Atlantic burden-sharing debate (both in its political and military aspects), the ministers declared that NATO adaptation "will enable all European Allies to make a more coherent and effective contribution to the missions and activities of our alliance as an expression of our shared responsibilities . . . and to act themselves as required."[4] Nevertheless, at least eight related questions surfaced within only a few weeks of the Berlin meeting, apart from the chain-of-command issue, and they are likely to preoccupy decision makers well into the future.

Primacy of politics. How can restructuring ameliorate overarching political issues? How will France be accommodated after almost thirty years, and while it seeks a "radical evolution of the command structure"?[5] How will Spain be accommodated after fourteen years? How, if at all, will restructuring improve relations between Greece and Turkey? In November 1996, Turkey claimed that Greece objected to Turkish participation in WEU-led CJTF operations (Greece is a full WEU member; Turkey is not), even though all European allies should be able to join such missions. Under the circumstances, Ankara warned, it would withhold its consent to the release of NATO assets for WEU-led CJTF missions.

Power projection. What will induce the Europeans to acquire power-projection capabilities across the spectrum of conflict intensity, in order to take full advantage of CJTFs? Germany's defense minister Volker Rühe stated after the Berlin meeting that "our capacity for crisis operations will continue to be limited," that the Bundeswehr would be "mainly available for national defense

[4] Final communiqué, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Berlin, June 3, 1996.

[5] Charles Millon, "France and the Renewal of the Atlantic Alliance," *NATO Review*, May 1996, p. 14. Millon is the defense minister of France.

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and the defense of the alliance."[6] Why this self-imposed restraint, despite alliance agreement to conduct missions outside the treaty area, and given that Germany has the highest level of conventional equipment of the European NATO nations under the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, and the second-highest level of manpower under the treaty's 1A Agreement? Could the loan of NATO, primarily U.S., assets (such as space-based surveillance, communications, airborne warning and control systems, joint-surveillance and target-attack radar systems, anti-ballistic missile defenses, and strategic lift) actually serve as a disincentive for Europeans to complement the CJTF option by adapting their defense priorities?

Costs. Can the financial requirements of a restructured NATO be sensibly estimated, and would they be met? Consider that, relative to GDP, the average NATO European defense budget is approximately half that of the U.S. outlay (2 percent versus 4 percent), and that many European nations will constrict budgets to meet the requirements of the European Monetary Union set for 1999. How will cost sharing be arranged when not all NATO allies participate?

The quest for status. Will not every country fiercely contest command of headquarters and its share of senior officer billets? By September 1996, the position of France, supported by Germany, was to favor Europeans for all major subordinate commanders. But this position was publicly contested by the United States, which cited continued U.S. command of Allied Forces Southern Europe, headquartered in Naples, as "essential" given the preponderance in the region of the Sixth Fleet (its sister commands for Northwest and Central Europe are commanded by European officers).[7] Spain and Portugal will have to find a solution on the modalities of command of the Iberian-Atlantic region, probably through a system of rotation. In addition, Spain seeks to eliminate the Gibraltar subordinate command owing to its historical dispute with the United Kingdom. Some nations may also resist downsizing or eliminating headquarters on their territory by citing their usefulness as regional centers for PFP activities. NATO has always managed to find solutions in the past, but as the major subordinate commands are cut from eight to possibly four, the principal subordinate commands from twenty-three to possibly eight, and the thirty-two sub-principal subordinate commands eliminated altogether, the competition for reconfiguration of national contributions and the quest for "chairs" could prove contentious and protracted.

In search of Europe. What does "European responsibility" imply in practice? Would not future European CJTFs essentially reflect the preponderance of British and French contributions, inasmuch as other NATO European nations have encountered difficulties in maintaining even their comparatively modest input to the implementation force (IFOR) in Bosnia during 1994–96? Why should the WEU, which has no integrated structure, be in control when only

[6] "Germany: Rühe views U.S., French Roles in 'New' NATO," Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: West Europe,* June 12, 1996, p. 25, from *Focus* (Munich), June 10, 1996.

[7] Craig R. Whitney, "Paris Blames U.S. Position for Setback Over NATO," *New York Times,* Oct. 13, 1996.

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certain of its member states, and no doubt many non-member European nations, may carry the burden? U.K. minister of state David Davis observed that he expects "European operations to be the exception rather than the rule," and that they would likely be "small and their scope limited."[8] If so, how is "responsibility sharing" to be measured? What might be the impact of a disconnect between theory and practice on those who believe the United States still contributes a disproportionate share of responsibility for security in Europe, or, for that matter, on those who still insist that the "first condition" for security in Europe is to reinforce the ability of Europeans themselves to take decisions in matters of defense, without a veto from non-WEU NATO allies?[9]

Jurisdiction. What are the geographical limits for CJTFs? Would Operation Desert Storm qualify today as a NATO operation? Should NATO formally cite regions outside the NATO area as being within the alliance zone of interest, as the supreme allied commander Atlantic, General John Sheehan, has suggested?[10] How would the different historical links that allies maintain with those regions affect consensus, e.g., French relations with Africa, or ancient hostilities between Turkey and Armenia? Is the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty a sufficient legal basis to justify operations outside the treaty area, or would a United Nations mandate be required in each case, thus possibly risking another controversy of the kind that surrounded the pre-IFOR U.N. protection force in the former Yugoslavia? Will the new NATO's area of responsibility equate de facto with that of U.S. European Command, which since 1990 has deployed troops for operations in many non-NATO areas—Liberia, the Persian Gulf, Cyprus, Israel, Zaire, Sierra Leone, Angola, the Commonwealth of Independent States, Somalia, Kenya, the former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda?

Mission creep. Even in purely European CJTF operations, would there not always be some possibility that the United States would become engaged? Would not important congressional-executive issues be raised when U.S. forces were unilaterally sent into harm's way without a declaration of war, and would not that, in turn, test U.S. support for the alliance? Of course, this problem could arise whether WEU operations took place autonomously or borrowed NATO resources; that is why NATO wants future WEU members to join NATO also, thus avoiding backdoor entanglements.

Interlocking institutions. Though the allies agreed that the ESDI should be developed within NATO, the fifteen-member European Union (EU), of which the WEU is the putative "defense arm," is not within the alliance, and relations between the EU and NATO are not formalized. Europe has been fitfully advancing toward a common foreign and security policy—witness its diplomatic performance in the former Yugoslavia and limited influence on the Middle East and

[8] Minister of State David Davis (U.K.), Foreign and Commonwealth Office, "Institutional Challenges—Institutional Variable Geometry, WEU-NATO and WEU-EU Relations and Enlargement," presentation to the Transatlantic Forum, Washington, D.C., June 25, 1996.

[9] Charles Millon, presentation to the Plenary Meeting of the North Atlantic Assembly, Versailles, Nov. 12, 1996.

[10] Agence France-Presse, Oct. 11, 1996.

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Cyprus. Yet without a united and effective foreign policy, how can European CJTFs serve diplomacy? Will it be necessary to overlay CJTFs with an agreed-upon trans-Atlantic policy, a policy that may prove difficult to forge and that may lag behind the imperatives of crisis management? Can these three organizations—EU, NATO, and WEU—work together given the long-standing tendency in Brussels to host separate rather than mutually reinforcing institutions?

The need for a watchdog. In short, whether restructuring will lead to a "stronger and more united" future for the alliance, as then U.S. secretary of defense William Perry put it,[11] or languish as a paper exercise remains to be seen. It cannot, however, be left to speculation and good intentions. The U.S. Department of Defense should undertake a yearly evaluation of the capacities of all allies to conduct all of NATO's missions, both within and outside the organization's area of responsibility, and of progress toward realizing the goal of mutually reinforcing institutions for security in Europe.

Membership Enlargement

It is unclear what the 1997 NATO summit will announce with respect to the enlargement of NATO's membership. The possibility of enlargement was formally announced at the NATO summit on January 10–11, 1994, and is an objective that has been at the forefront of Central European aspirations since at least 1991. These Central European nations see no reason why the benefits of collective and transparent defense, political consultation, support for democratic reform, and the trans-Atlantic link must remain the exclusive property of the present sixteen allies. None of them has demanded peacetime deployment on their territory of nuclear weapons or substantial foreign forces (the conditions Russia portrays as unacceptable), and NATO has clearly stated that no nuclear or foreign conventional forces are required as a precondition for NATO membership in light of existing international conditions. (Also, it should be noted, Russia has never matched NATO's sharp reductions, of more than 80 percent, in substrategic nuclear systems in Europe.)

Nevertheless, almost three years after signalling their perspective on enlargement, the allies do not share a common view on who should be invited to join. On December 10, 1996, the NATO foreign ministers could charge only that "comprehensive recommendations" be prepared on which country or countries to invite, including an analysis of the factors that would be relevant in considering states for admission, and recommendations on the adaptation of alliance structures required to integrate new members. On December 18, with the summit only seven months ahead, NATO defense ministers directed an assessment of the financial resource implications.

[11] Office of the Public Affairs Advisor, U.S. Mission to NATO, "Transcript: Perry's NATO Press Briefing 6/13," *Washington File*, June 13, 1996, p. 20.

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The "ultimate political purpose" of NATO was defined in 1967 as establishing "a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe accompanied by appropriate security guarantees."[12] Yet this language has not reappeared since the enlargement debate began in earnest. Indeed, the 1994 summit language could not have been more opaque: "We expect and would welcome NATO expansion that would reach to democratic states to our East, as part of an evolutionary process, taking into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe."[13]

U.S. policy throughout the cold war was to encourage "differentiation" among the Soviet satellite nations, to reward those countries that moved away from Soviet policy in the direction of greater foreign policy and economic independence, internal liberalization, and respect for human rights, while withholding benefits from countries that did not. However, NATO outreach has never been able to differentiate between those nations clearly on a path toward the alliance and all others, as far east as Kyrgyzstan. Statesmen, legislators, and policy elites have managed to stretch ever outward the boundaries of conceptual paralysis. Would not NATO enlargement create a new dividing line, or could NATO enlargement, which would erase some old dividing lines, be combined with partnership for those not yet ready to join or who may never join NATO? Is NATO only a "contract to go to war," or is the alliance the most reliable embodiment of like-minded democratic nations, providing internal as well as external balance in Europe, and the anchor for the indispensable trans-Atlantic link that does not require a threat to flourish? Is Central Europe peripheral to U.S. security interests or a vital strategic region that, solidly entrenched in both NATO and the European Union, would surely benefit from the same security and economic relationships forged within Western Europe after World War II thanks to NATO and the Marshall Plan? Can the benefits of drawing closer to NATO and its values be met by the PFP alone, or are there additional benefits in NATO and its collective defense pledge that should be shared by others who can meet the same political and military standards and duties as the NATO allies? Certainly, apart from the notable exceptions of German defense minister Rühe and Danish defense minister Hans Haekkerup, Canadian and European ministers have not consistently and publicly matched the United States in advocating early NATO enlargement. Indeed, the remarks of some European officials suggest that "burying the legacy of Yalta" is no more than an administrative process, and that the initiative for a wider alliance came solely from NATO aspirants.[14]

Likewise, no Canadian or European parliament has matched the activity of the U.S. Congress, which since 1994 has passed annual legislation to facilitate the transition of Central European nations to full NATO membership and to

[12] "The Future Tasks of the Alliance (Harmel Report)," in NATO Information Service, *NATO: Facts and Figures* (Brussels: NATO, 1989), p. 403.

[13] See "Partnership for Peace: Invitation," *NATO Review*, Feb. 1994, p. 28.

[14] See Martin Sieff and Ben Barber, "NATO in no hurry to grow, Britain's Defense Chief says," *Washington Times*, Jan. 24, 1996.

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prod the Clinton administration to keep up the momentum. In both houses of Congress, vast majorities (six to one in the Senate and five to one in the House) passed the July 1996 NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act. That legislation identifies the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia as having made the most progress toward meeting NATO eligibility criteria. The act also cites the Baltic states, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Moldova, and Ukraine as potential candidates. President Bill Clinton did not mention specific candidates for early membership when on October 22, 1996, he proposed that as America's goal the first group of new NATO members be admitted by 1999 (the alliance's fiftieth anniversary). But the summit is challenged to make that decision.

NATO acknowledges that EU enlargement is a parallel process; and one of the conditions for NATO enlargement, as NATO announced in September 1995, is a commitment to economic liberty, social justice, and environmental responsibility. The union is to begin accession negotiations in 1998 with some of the ten Central European nations who know, by virtue of their Europe Agreements, that they are heading toward EU membership, probably sometime after 2000. But the PFP, although a valuable process for preparing for new NATO members, guarantees nothing.

This NATO-EU enlargement disconnect persists and must be removed, even if each organization makes its own decisions based on its own criteria and at its own speed. It is important to underline meaningful and specific political and military NATO membership criteria, rather than linking NATO enlargement to prior agreement on some other important but unrelated issue—be it Turkish EU or WEU membership, a NATO-Russia charter, or alliance restructuring. For example, 1996 was acknowledged as buying time for enlargement because of the Russian presidential elections. Yet President Boris Yeltsin himself began raising possible compromises in March that year—months before the election. French foreign minister Hervé de Charette argued that agreement on principles and general directions of NATO restructuring should precede enlargement, but there is no reason why the restructuring debate should make new memberships hostage to its vicissitudes. As Senator John McCain (R-Ariz.), chairman of the Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness, argued in June 1996:

> For all the anticipated salutary effect of the establishment of the CJTF, its establishment does not address the central purpose of NATO or reinforce its sustainable rationale. NATO's purpose remains the maintenance of a stable balance of power in Europe. And it can do this only if it expands Eastward. . . . Leaving States beyond the lines risks future conflicts in Europe.[15]

A common assertion is that ratification by the Congress and the concerned European and Canadian legislatures may not be assured. It is true that some Democratic members of Congress have argued against arriving at early decisions

[15] Senator John McCain, remarks at the SACLANT [supreme allied commander Atlantic] seminar, Norfolk, Va., June 27, 1996.

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on enlargement and identifying the first candidates. One was the former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), now retired. These representatives and senators claimed, among other things, that Russia would as likely be provoked as deterred, that "picking winners and losers" would make the former complacent and the latter discouraged, that the costs would be very high, that because of declining defense resources Central European security would have to be guaranteed primarily by nuclear forces, or that there was no "immediate security threat" requiring NATO enlargement[16]—the last claim taking an ahistorical view of NATO's raison d'être. However, the large bipartisan votes in favor of the NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act would suggest that the 105th Congress will maintain the momentum. Moreover, the majority of Americans support NATO enlargement—"derived from a desire to be inclusive and remove the divisions of the Cold War, more than for a concern *about a potential threat*"—*and even believe that a stable and peaceful Russia* could also one day join NATO.[17]

Furthermore, cost studies such as the 1996 RAND Corporation analysis show that initial enlargement by four countries would cost only an additional 1–2 percent of current NATO defense spending ($40 billion). And that would include new members' contributions over fifteen years for a land and air power-projection capability, which would encourage current allies to adapt their capabilities to missions beyond defense of their own territory or those of immediate present NATO neighbors.[18]

Enhanced Partnership

The third and final element of NATO's transformation concerns PFP enhancement. The alliance seeks to avoid any sense of isolation on the part of countries not invited to early participation in NATO by enhancing the political and military dimensions of the PFP. That would mean involving PFP members at the initial planning stages, to prevent what a Swedish PFP liaison officer has claimed is a pattern whereby "NATO leads and dictates, and the [PFP member] follows."[19] The fact that participation in IFOR by PFP members actually leap-frogged the limited non-combat activity of the PFP program naturally calls for bringing the PFP and the real world into line, even if certain members, Russia included, have not taken full advantage of the existing PFP cooperation menu.

[16] See House Committee on International Relations, *National Security Revitalization Act, Report together with Additional and Minority Views* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, Feb. 6, 1995); Senator Sam Nunn, "The Future of NATO in an Uncertain World," Speech to the SACLANT seminar, Norfolk, Va., June 22, 1995; Paul E. Gallis, *NATO: Congress Addresses Expansion of the Alliance,* Congressional Research Service Issue Brief, June 7, 1996; and Editorial, *New York Times,* Oct. 25, 1996.

[17] *Americans on Expanding NATO,* Program on International Policy Attitudes, University of Maryland, College Park, Md., Oct. 1, 1996, p. 2.

[18] Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler, and F. Stephen Larrabee, "What Will NATO Enlargement Cost?" *Survival,* Autumn 1996, pp. 5–26.

[19] Brooks Tigner, "NATO Members Consider Expanded PfP Participation," *Defense News,* Oct. 14, 1996.

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Washington must, nevertheless, be alert to three potential difficulties surrounding NATO outreach outside enlargement.

Allies are more than partners for peace. Becoming a more active PFP member and becoming a NATO member are different matters. U.S. deputy secretary of defense John White acknowledged that "the PFP program is not a true alternative for NATO enlargement,"[20] and one can question how a "super PFP" would change this assessment so long as the Article 5 collective defense commitment and associated planning are withheld. Moreover, if the intent is "to narrow the distinction" between being an ally and being a PFP member,[21] will NATO and NATO nations in their bilateral or multilateral cooperation efforts be able to differentiate in terms of attention and resources between those heading towards NATO and those who are not in such a position? In other words, will NATO recognize that the "PFP should be structured differently for candidate members than for others"?[22] For example, Estonia proposed after the NATO Berlin ministerial that the alliance should name all aspirant countries as prospective members (in theory, any European state is a possible member, but naming countries could be seen as forcing NATO's hand) and enter a "Partnership for Security" with them that would continue after the first invitations were extended. In June 1996, Lithuania proposed a like concept, termed "Atlantic Partnership," whose members, comprising only those PFP members who intend to join NATO, could participate in exercises, including collective defense on their territory. Yet, would such a distinction prove manageable or necessary? Might it detract from the interest nations such as Austria, Finland, and Sweden have shown in the PFP but who do not for now see themselves as potentially joining NATO, or would these concerns be secondary to the political signal nations who may not be admitted early feel they require from the alliance so as not to be perceived as being abandoned or left to some Eastern sphere of influence?

A new League of Nations? Might two different security regimes be coming into existence? Will the PFP serve as the foundation for a collective security system entailing defense against aggression from within the circle, "an autonomous security support structure,"[23] while an enlarged NATO becomes an inner circle within that system? Are the two compatible? Will the "marginal view" earlier in this decade that NATO could transform into a pan–European League of Nations be revisited,[24] such that new NATO members might share with

[20] Office of the Public Affairs Advisor, U.S. Mission to NATO, "Transcript: White Interview by Lithuanian TV," *Washington File,* June 24, 1996, p. 20.

[21] Gebhardt von Moltke, "NATO and European Security," *Central European Issues,* Spring 1996, p. 15.

[22] Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler, and F. Stephen Larrabee, "NATO Expansion: The Next Steps," *Survival,* Spring 1995, p. 15.

[23] "Russia: East Europe Moves Toward Joining NATO Viewed," Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Central Eurasia,* Sept. 10, 1996, p. 11, from *Pravda* (Moscow), Sept. 5, 1996.

[24] David Law, "The OSCE and European Security Architecture," presentation at the conference on OSCE and Regional Security in the CIS, organized by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Queen's University (Kingston, Canada) and the International Center on Conflict and Negotiation (Tbilisi, Georgia), Tabakhmela Conference Center, Georgia, July 1–5, 1996.

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present NATO members uncertainty regarding what kind of organization they belong to?

Russia. Whatever NATO differentiation has existed has been in Russia's favor because of its size and capabilities, with only Russia and Ukraine having been offered a "special" or "enhanced" relationship with NATO outside the PFP. Former defense secretary Perry and others have spoken of a "super" or "pragmatic" NATO-Russia partnership, building on the "Summary of Conclusions of Discussions between the North Atlantic Council and Foreign Minister of Russia Andrei Kozyrev" concluded on June 22, 1994. That document provides for information sharing on politico-security issues, political consultations on issues of common concern, and cooperation in operations such as peacekeeping. That was followed by a document on "Areas of Pursuance of a Broad, Enhanced NATO/Russia Dialogue and Cooperation" on May 31, 1995, fleshing out the summary of conclusions, including information sharing on "specific issues of importance to European security, including evolving concepts of national security, military doctrines/strategies and the European architecture of security."[25] Since then, NATO has been awaiting a Russian response to an alliance proposal of September 26, 1995, for a political framework for NATO-Russia relations, elaborating "basic principles for security cooperation as well as for the development of mutual political consultations."[26] The alliance stated it aimed to conclude this framework by the end of 1995, but a year later Russian officials were still claiming that not all allies took the exercise seriously, that a new European security system could not have only NATO as its core, that a legally binding agreement with specific provisions was required to allay Russian concerns about enlargement, and that modernization of the CFE Treaty would be, in the words of Russian foreign minister Yevgeny Primakov, "the main indicator of the seriousness of our partners' intentions."[27] The foreign minister could not have been more transparent: "A whole range of issues which directly affect us should be discussed with our participation and the decisions should be taken on the basis of a consensus," which is to say, allowing for a Russian veto.[28]

Perry explained in Moscow on October 17, 1996, that a "pragmatic partnership" meant that when Russia and NATO did not agree they should proceed as friends, but when they did agree they should work together as partners: "The expansion of NATO is only a threat to Russia if NATO is a threat to Russia. NATO is not a threat to Russia, and Russia is not a threat to NATO. In fact, NATO today is building a circle of security for all of Europe. And we want Russia inside that circle."[29] U.K. defense secretary Michael Portillo suggested

[25] "Areas of Pursuance of a Broad, Enhanced NATO/Russia Dialogue and Cooperation," *NATO Review,* July 1995, p. 35.

[26] "Hand Over of NATO Proposals to Russia," NATO Press Release, Sept. 25, 1995.

[27] "Russia Reaffirms Its Opposition To NATO Plan," *Wall Street Journal Europe,* Jan. 9, 1996.

[28] *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,* Former Soviet Union, Oct. 12, 1996, from ITAR-TASS, Oct. 10, 1996.

[29] Office of the Public Affairs Advisor, U.S. Mission to NATO, "Transcript: Perry Moscow NTV Interview October 17," *Washington File,* Oct. 18, 1996, p. 29.

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that this new relationship would include planning together for joint military missions, consultations, and cooperation in countering terrorism, drug trafficking, organized crime, and weapons proliferation—some of these being, of course, issues that have nothing to do with the alliance at present. This menu could be formalized in a charter and accompanied by a revised CFE Treaty, according to Portillo.[30] Yet Russian defense minister Igor Rodionov has a different perspective:

> No one can convince us otherwise: NATO is a relic of the Cold War. . . . NATO's highly-propagandized peacekeeping role is all too obviously a sham. The bloc's continuously growing military potential gives us no cause to believe the slogans of peace persistently declared by NATO leadership. . . . Expanding NATO's zone of responsibility eastward would result in a situation reminiscent of the Cold War.[31]

On December 18, 1996, Rodionov reverted to the "unacceptability" language at a meeting with NATO defense ministers. He argued that NATO enlargement would deprive Russia of the "buffer zone" that had arisen after the end of the Warsaw Pact and the withdrawal of Soviet troops, and that had "reduced the risk of armed conflict." Even with an adaptation of the CFE Treaty, Rodionov maintained, NATO enlargement would upset the strategic balance.[32]

All of that should prod the West to ask whether the signing of a NATO-Russia charter would add much to what is a growing, productive relationship being built in IFOR and the "16+1 consultations." Why should another document be necessary, much less a precondition to enlargement decisions?

The pursuit of the best possible NATO-Russia relationship is inherently desirable. But that should be no obstacle to facilitating enlargement—for example, by adapting the CFE Treaty, which was based on two alliances, or by new allies' pursuing confidence-building measures, such as barring nuclear and foreign conventional forces from their territory.

However, should perpetually singling out Russia invite third-party mischief in NATO business, it would raise real concerns about appeasement, certainly in the mind of this author. NATO's future will be bleak indeed if its member governments treat the security concerns and integrative aspirations of the Central European states as secondary or even irrelevant in the face of the latest pronouncements from Moscow.

The Road Ahead

Looking toward 1997 and beyond, NATO will be challenged to continue ensuring its relevance—for none can replace it—in stabilizing Euro-Atlantic

[30] Michael Portillo, "European Security, NATO and 'Hard' Defence," Speech at the Royal Institute for International Relations, Brussels, Oct. 23, 1996.

[31] Col. General Igor Rodionov, "Russia and NATO: Life After Bergen," *Moscow News*, Oct. 3–9, 1996.

[32] Press conference, NATO headquarters, Brussels, Sept. 18, 1996.

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relations on a wider basis. NATO restructuring, enlargement, and the development of enhanced partnership should be seen as roughly concurrent goals, although surely all details will not be settled by the time of the alliance summit. If there is an attempt, for whatever motive, to make restructuring, improving the NATO-Russia relationship, and enlargement sequential steps, then the West may run a clear and present risk of undermining through hesitation trans-Atlantic relations, confidence in Western purpose, and the political and moral basis of the Atlantic alliance. Congress will be watching closely.

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America's Alliance Anxieties

The Strange Death of Dual Containment

by Harvey Sicherman

On September 3, 1996, U.S. military force was used once again to attack Iraq, and once again the American president declared victory over Saddam Hussein. White House spokesmen explained how the discharge of $50 million in cruise missiles had humiliated the dictator in front of his troops, punished him for seizing a Kurdish city, and deterred him from future attacks on Kuwait. A few diplomatic squalls notwithstanding, Secretary of State Warren Christopher also took the occasion to assert that the international coalition against Iraq remained healthy.

That was the Clinton administration's version of events, and it was free of defects save in one respect: it was inaccurate. Saddam had not been humiliated; his punishment was not serious. Instead, the United States had suffered a grievous blow, made all the worse by the bungling that preceded it and the incomprehension that followed. For not only had the Kurdish autonomy zone been abandoned, the entire U.S. policy of dual containment in the Gulf had been seriously undermined. U.S. allies, upon whose support that policy depended, now question American wisdom and resolve as never before, and they are beginning to drift toward accommodation of both Iraq and Iran.

How could this happen? After all, the United States and its allies still hold Iraq in a straitjacket of sanctions, economic restrictions against Iran have recently been tightened by unilateral American action, U.S. military power is still supreme, the Saudi kingdom and Gulf states (especially Kuwait) still need protection, and no one argues about the vital interests at stake. Yet despite all that, a breach has indeed developed between U.S. objectives and reality so wide as to defeat American purposes. Saddam is stronger, the mullahs in Iran are not changing their policies, the policy of containing both Iraq and Iran is visibly dying, and the United States seems unable to save it. And the reason is not hard to find: dual containment, a delicate flower planted in the aftermath of the war in the Persian Gulf, could not provide a permanent solution to the area's underlying dilemmas. It bloomed brilliantly for a season, and the Clinton

Harvey Sicherman is president of the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He served as aide to Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr. and as a consultant to Secretaries of State George P. Shultz and James A. Baker III. An earlier version of this article appeared in the December 1996 issue of *Commentary* under the title "What Saddam Hussein Learned from Bill Clinton."

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administration mistook it for a perennial, not an annual, mishandling its cultivation in the process. The sad result is that American military forces may well be needed again to redeem a barren diplomacy.

Victory and Defeat

Dual containment emerged after more than a dozen years of bipartisan U.S. blunders that had been redeemed only by the war in the Persian Gulf. First the Democrats helped to bring about Khomeini's Iran by failing to uphold the shah; then the Republicans helped to bring about Saddam's Iraq by tilting its way during the Iran-Iraq war. Nor was America's reputation improved by its misreading of Saddam before he seized Kuwait. The best that could be said was that America's Arab friends also misread the matter and the man.

The international coalition organized by the United States to defeat Iraq was formed from very unpromising material. Only the brazenness of Saddam's ambition could distract these states from their own quarrels. Merely to list the "allies" of 1991 proves the point: an inner ring comprising Saudi Arabia, the small Gulf states, Egypt, Syria, and Turkey; an outer ring consisting of Great Britain, France, Germany, and Japan; Mikhail Gorbachev's Soviet Union acquiescent rather than allied; and Israel compliant if not quiet. Both the inner and outer coalitions wanted to beat Saddam but feared the dismemberment of Iraq because, for better or worse, they saw Iraq as a barrier against Iran, as confirmed by the long Iran-Iraq war. Many Arabs also saw in Saddam the last best hope of eventually defeating Israel, a sentiment the dictator carefully cultivated in the run-up to war.

In these circumstances, President George Bush and Secretary of State James Baker worked wonders. They kept the coalition together long enough for even the reluctant Pentagon to get ready to fight. They rallied a majority in Congress to support a large and risky counteroffensive. They got their coalition partners to pay for the war. They kept Israel out. They warned Iran to refrain from seizing part of Iraq for itself. And above all, they retained direction of the war for the United States. The only task they did not perform was to manage the war itself. That was assigned to Generals Colin Powell and Norman Schwarzkopf, because Bush believed that they should be left alone to do their work.

So it was that as the astonishing air and ground campaigns destroyed the Iraqi army in and around Kuwait, the president was not prepared to second-guess his military advisors when they told him Iraq was beaten. The memoirs and recollections of Baker, Powell, and Schwarzkopf state clearly that the war was brought to an end because U.S. military objectives had been achieved with few allied casualties, and because no one wanted to march to Baghdad. Powell's chivalry also played a part: he would not preside over the slaughter of beaten men struggling up the highway of death from Kuwait City

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in panic and mayhem.[1] In any case, Washington expected Saddam to be overthrown quickly in the wake of the disaster.

Second-guessers have since debated whether the United States should have "gone to Baghdad" to finish off Saddam once and for all. But that was never a serious proposal. No responsible leader in Washington or the other coalition capitals argued for such a step. None wanted the United States to occupy Iraq, and none wanted Iraq to break up. Rather, the real failings in the U.S. policy were the military mistakes that left Saddam a mobile military force and the political illusions about Saddam's longevity. Powell and Schwarzkopf had indeed destroyed much of the Iraqi army, but not so much of that portion that mattered most to Saddam. When the smoke cleared, the dictator still commanded a substantial force of Republican Guards and other ground forces (some 100,000 soldiers had not been committed to the Kuwaiti theater) possessed of tanks and an estimated five hundred helicopters.[2] The latter were allowed to fly civilian missions as part of Schwarzkopf's cease-fire terms, but even after Saddam violated the terms no action was taken against the helicopters.[3]

Almost no Arab government has been overturned by a popular uprising.

The political errors magnified the military oversights. It seemed reasonable (to Americans) to conclude that such a thorough defeat would lead to Saddam's overthrow. But that is not the way of the Arab Middle East. King Farouk's army was defeated in the war for Israel's independence in 1948; four years passed before he was thrown out, corrupt and tired of rule. Israel could have marched into Cairo in June 1967 but did not, confident of Gamal Abdel Nasser's downfall. He died three years later, still president of Egypt. Virtually no Arab governments have been overturned by popular uprisings; the Arab street celebrates coups but does not make them. What is more, Saddam's regime rests on the supremacy of certain Sunni tribes, who might turn him out only if they saw themselves threatened by his survival in power.

Thus, when Bush called for the "people" of Iraq to overthrow Saddam, he was talking in a vacuum. The only "Iraqis" interested in toppling Saddam were Kurds in the oil-rich north and Shiites in the south. But a successful Kurdish revolt might have led to an independent Kurdistan, shredding the maps of Iraq, Turkey, and Iran, while a successful Shiite revolt would have redounded only to the benefit of Iran. The only act that might have brought about an intact Iraq free of Saddam would have had to come from the Sunnis themselves, the very clans that profited from the regime and whose members filled the

[1] See James A. Baker III with Thomas M. DeFrank, *The Politics of Diplomacy* (New York: G.P. Putnam and Sons, 1995), pp. 409–10; Colin Powell with Joseph E. Persico, *My American Journey* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1996), pp. 507–13; and General H. Norman Schwarzkopf with Peter Petre, *It Doesn't Take a Hero* (New York: Bantam Books, 1992), pp. 465–72.

[2] For a detailed analysis of Iraq's post–Persian Gulf War military, see Michael Eisenstadt, *Like a Phoenix from the Ashes? The Future of Iraqi Military Power*, Policy Papers, no. 36 (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1993).

[3] See Schwarzkopf with Petre, *It Doesn't Take a Hero*, p. 489.

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ranks of the unbloodied Republican Guards. Hence, the American failure to do more harm to those elite forces combined with political illusion to give Saddam literally a fighting chance.

He wasted no time in seizing it. The Shiites were the first to be repressed, and no one stood against it because Iran had encouraged anti-Saddam Shiites on its side of the border to reenter Iraq. The United States eventually established a "no-fly" zone that kept Iraqi aircraft away from the Kuwaiti border but hardly helped the Shiites. Kurdistan was different. Rightly fearing a slaughter after their uprising against Saddam's officials, the Kurds fled en masse to the dubious safety of the mountains on the Turkish border, creating a huge problem for a key member of the coalition. Thus was born Operation Provide Comfort. An American-led air and ground force deterred the Republican Guards while international assistance enabled the Kurds to return home. That was taken a step further when the United States extracted another U.N. resolution forbidding the repression of Iraqi citizens.

With these actions Washington engaged in much more than simply deterring Saddam from attacking his neighbors. Under American auspices the Kurds were free of Baghdad but caught between international sanctions against Iraq and Saddam's blockade of their area. They needed international generosity to survive and some political purpose to justify a government. A local administration was set up and preparations made to elect a Kurdish authority. Soon thereafter, a broader-based Iraqi National Congress in exile was organized for the purpose of ousting Saddam. On July 29, 1992, its leaders met with Baker, who advocated "a democratic, pluralistic government" and promised American support to those Iraqis who opposed Saddam's tyranny.[4] Washington was now pledged to help overthrow the dictator.

Meanwhile, the Bush administration pursued new security arrangements in the Gulf. It began its quest by excluding Iran, the remaining hostile power in the region, from any security regime whatsoever. After all, Iran had wrecked Jimmy Carter's presidency and bedeviled Ronald Reagan's, and Bush had no intention of giving Tehran a chance to spoil his victory. Instead, American diplomats used the critical months following the war to test the limits of Arab cooperation. Their idea was to relieve the United States of the burden of defending Kuwait in perpetuity by stationing in the Gulf an Arab deterrent force, consisting primarily of Egyptians and Syrians. Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak and Syrian president Hafiz al-Assad showed their hands, however, when they offered, at high cost to the hosts, contingents too small to defend against Iraq but large enough to meddle in Gulf politics. Even in the delirium of goodwill that suffused Arab councils following the war, the Gulf rulers had no difficulty rejecting this scheme. Washington was disappointed, Cairo and Damascus unsurprised. Kuwait instead sought and received a bilateral arrangement with the United States.[5]

[4] "Baker Meets Iraqi Dissidents," *Facts on File,* July 30, 1992, p. 550.
[5] "Kuwait: U.S. Defense Pact Signed," *Facts on File,* Oct. 17, 1991, p. 791.

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Saddam's survival and the stillborn Arab security regime suggested that the Americans were either not so bright or so dangerous after all. The ayatollahs had feared that the humbling of Saddam was a prelude to their own, but by the end of 1991, the U.S. military had largely left the Gulf without Iran having had to make any concessions. Instead, in March 1992 Tehran advanced, seizing the island of Abu Musa that had previously been administered jointly by Iran and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Then, in September 1992, Iran declared full sovereignty over the strategic Tunb islands as well, which were also subject to a UAE claim. The UAE protested, but Washington did nothing.

A Brilliant Beginning

Despite a less-than-glorious final year, the Bush administration passed to its successor a commanding international position thanks to the end of the cold war and the victory in the Gulf. Bill Clinton and his team took office in January 1993, optimistic about world events. Democracy and free markets were on the march, and the caravan of progress was subject only to occasional ambush by what National Security Advisor Anthony Lake later called "backlash states." But such highwaymen could presumably be tamed by collective action through the United Nations and its weapon of choice, economic sanctions. No one, least of all the former Carterites who populated the National Security Council (NSC), the State Department, and the Pentagon, expected U.S. military forces to be widely engaged.

Southwest Asia, however, was full of unfinished and explosive business. The Gulf in particular was beginning to drift out of control as the inner and outer coalitions wondered about U.S. purposes, the wisdom of continued sanctions on Iraq, and apprehension over Iran. A certain amount of cynical anti-Americanism could be heard, epitomized by an Arab conspiracy theory that purported to explain Saddam's survival. According to this version of events, Washington actually *wanted* Saddam to endure so that local states would still need America's services, thus permitting the United States to dominate the Gulf. How else to explain why mighty America had not hunted him down and strung him up? The message behind this fable was clear: the American-sponsored effort to unseat Saddam was not serious.

The Clintonians lost little time in answering the call to clarify their intentions. The new policy, as explained by Martin Indyk, the NSC senior director for Near East and South Asian affairs, in a speech on May 18, 1993, was called "dual containment." Indyk sketched a region "finely balanced" between would-be peacemakers and extremists. In the past, the United States had to rely on either Iran or Iraq to avoid hostile domination of the Gulf, but then Saddam's defeat and the demise of the Soviet Union made this dangerous game unnecessary. Instead, the United States might rely on its superior military position and coalition of allies from the Persian Gulf War to contain both Iraq and Iran. Thus, Iraq was to be sanctioned until it complied with U.N. resolutions, including the destruction of weapons of mass destruction, and was no longer

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"in a position to either threaten its neighbors or suppress its people with impunity."[6] The United States would also support the Iraqi National Congress organized to represent Sunni, Shiite, and Kurdish Iraqis.

As for Iran, America did not oppose Islamic government per se, but rather Tehran's support for international terrorism, quest for weapons of mass destruction, and abuse of human rights. Indyk also declared a link between "east and west" to the effect that success or failure in the Gulf would help or hinder the Arab-Israeli conflict and vice versa. Lastly, he described a "structural imbalance" between the measures taken against Iraq and the less-severe ones against Iran. That would have to be fixed lest the progress made in containing Iraq redound to Iran's advantage.

Dual containment committed the United States to holding the ring against the two most powerful states in the Gulf. That was new. Even the British during their long ascendency over the region had always counted on a neutral or friendly regime in either Baghdad or Tehran. The word "containment" also summoned up the successful long-term policy against the USSR, with its explicit purpose of forcing a change in policy or a change in regime. In Iraq's case it was "containment-plus" because Washington would not be satisfied with good behavior from Saddam. It wanted him out.

The new strategy, repeated in fall 1993 by Clinton and reiterated in 1994 by Lake, turned the temporary blockade of Iraq in the wake of the Persian Gulf War into a permanent policy. If necessary, the United States would simply dominate the Gulf until its denizens learned to behave. It was a stark commentary that even after the defeat of Iraq a pro-Western local balance could not be obtained by Washington's traditional "over-the-horizon" stance that the Saudis and others preferred. Moreover, the United States could never do what the policy required unless two conditions were fulfilled. First, decisive U.S. military power had to be available on short notice, and Washington had to be prepared to use it. Secondly, the key members of the war coalition had to support a strategy of containment directed against both Iraq and Iran.

These conditions were problematical, especially over the long haul. On the military side, Clinton had intended to accelerate and deepen Bush's scheduled defense cuts. Fewer aircraft carriers, air squadrons, and army divisions meant more of a stretch if there should be a serious crisis elsewhere in the world. In any event, the Pentagon wanted more equipment pre-positioned to ease costs and logistical problems. All of that increased the significance of bases in Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the Gulf emirates. That, in turn, underscored the need for coalition solidarity. The inner Arab coalition had been desperately unhappy about the war, about needing the help of infidels, and about choosing sides at all. They certainly did not want outright confrontation with Iran and preferred to revert to the careful balancing acts they had performed before Saddam's "madness." The assumption of Turkish acquiescence to the dictates

[6] Martin Indyk, Address at the Soref Symposium, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, D.C., May 18, 1993.

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of dual containment was particularly dubious. The economic burden of shutting down Iraq's economy had fallen heavily on Turkey. A compensation fund arranged by the United States eased this burden during the war but was not renewed. Continued sanctions on Iraq also hurt the heavily Kurdish southern part of Turkey, already upset by refugees, factional strife, and the attacks of the Marxist Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partia Kartia Kurdistan—PKK).[7]

The outer coalition states were even less likely to play along with dual containment. Russia was eager to collect some $6–8 billion owed it by Iraq. France had important commercial interests shut off by U.N. sanctions. For these states, the U.N. Security Council's bimonthly reviews of measures against Iraq were opportunities to argue for a "way out" of an otherwise endless blockade. Meanwhile, France, Russia, Germany, and China, among others, remained eager to do business with Iran, where no U.N. sanctions applied. So the U.S. desire to fix the "structural imbalance" lamented by Indyk would require heavy diplomatic lifting indeed. Given the odds against the Persian Gulf War coalition's conforming to the dictates of dual containment, the strategy would need more than its share of both good management and good luck to work for long.

The economic burden of shutting down Iraq's economy fell heavily on Turkey.

In the spring of 1993, however, these troubles were over the horizon. Dual containment seemed a brilliant model of "cheap hawkery." First, the United States fought off a fitful Franco-Russian effort to reward Saddam for partial compliance with U.N. weapons searches, but only thanks to Saddam himself, who underestimated the tenacity of Rolf Ekeus, the Swedish civil servant in charge of the U.N. commission charged with dismantling Iraq's missile, nuclear, biological, and chemical establishments.[8] Grudging revelations about the unexpected magnitude of Saddam's quest for nuclear weapons exposed the shocking incompetence of previous international inspections. Secondly, the military costs of dual containment were minimal at the start. About 15,000 U.S. military personnel were posted in the region, including a single aircraft carrier that was normally stationed in the Indian Ocean even before the Persian Gulf War. Some two hundred aircraft patrolled the no-fly zones in the north and south from Turkish and other Gulf states bases. Thirdly, the U.N. sanctions against Iraq appeared so effective that an international humanitarian clamor arose to ease the plight of ordinary Iraqis. Saddam did find enough hard currency to import approximately $2 billion of goods, about two-thirds of the prewar total,[9] and new fortunes were made by those well enough connected (especially his own family) to engage in smuggling. But after two years of frenzied rebuilding of

[7] See, for example, Eric Rouleau, "America's Unyielding Policy Toward Iraq," *Foreign Affairs*, Jan./Feb. 1995, pp. 59–72.

[8] See R. Jeffrey Smith, "U.N. Aide Links Iraqi Troop Thrust to Frustration on Disclosure," *Washington Post*, Oct. 27, 1994.

[9] See Patrick Clawson, *How Has Saddam Hussein Survived? Economic Sanctions, 1990–93*, McNair Paper 22 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Aug. 1993).

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bridges and repairing other war damage, the government exhausted its ability to provide wage support, and the economy hit bottom.

The United States also appeared to make headway in organizing an Iraqi opposition. That was tricky, because the Sunnis, Kurds, and Shiites who shook hands for photographers had very different ideas of a future Iraq minus Saddam. The Iraqi National Congress had to operate in the Kurdish areas, and the Kurds were suspicious of the entire effort. They had been betrayed by the shah and the Americans in the 1970s, and they remembered Henry Kissinger's admonition that "foreign policy is not social work." Mustafa Barzani, the father of one of today's two main Kurdish faction leaders, had been the victim in that play.

Washington was willing to build up the Kurds to a point and promoted a legislative election in May 1992. After reviewing the situation, the Clinton administration made clear to the Kurds that it would continue to support Bush's policy: no statehood or a serious military force—lest that induce Iraq's breakup or a violent Turkish reaction—but otherwise encouragement for the Kurds to play a major role in assisting the Iraqi National Congress against the hated Saddam.[10]

The End of Cheap Hawkery

Satisfied with dual containment thus far, Lake publicly analyzed criticisms of the strategy and asserted in March 1994 that "the Clinton Administration is, nevertheless, confident that we can sustain this situation for some time, in large measure because we have an understanding with our regional friends about the common threats and how to deal with them."[11] Lake recognized the lack of firm consensus on disciplining Iran or signs of Saddam's imminent fall but counselled patience in the spirit of George Kennan's classic containment doctrine. No sooner did dual containment become a strategy for the long haul, however, than its longevity came into serious question. The first blow fell in May 1994 when the Kurdish factions made war on each other. Predictably, the 1992 election had produced a split between Massoud Barzani's Kurdistan Democratic Party and its main rival, Jalal Talabani's Patriotic Union of Kurdistan; each viewed the other as a greater threat than Saddam. The autonomous zone slid into anarchy as both sides sought money and arms. It took months for American diplomats and the Iraqi National Congress to patch together a cease-fire.

Then on October 7, 1994, Saddam suddenly reinforced the 50,000 Iraqi troops stationed in Basra, twenty miles from Kuwait, with two Republican Guard divisions poised to attack southward. It was an army not much inferior to the invasion force that overran Kuwait in 1990. This maneuver, coming just when France and Russia were arguing for an easing of sanctions, seemed idiotic.

[10] Stephen Kinzer, "History's Losers Fight Neighbors and Each Other, Often Assisted by Foes," *New York Times*, Sept. 4, 1996.

[11] Anthony Lake, "Confronting Backlash States," *Foreign Affairs*, Mar. 1994, p. 49.

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Perhaps, as Rolf Ekeus suggested, Saddam was imitating the North Koreans by making trouble in the hope of being placated.[12] But whatever the dictator's motives, his move caught the cheap hawks with their feathers down. Of the 200 U.S. aircraft available only 18 were configured for ground attack, and less than a division of American troops barred the way on the ground. The president decided on a major reinforcement, and by October 12, 40,000 U.S. troops, 28 ships, and 650 aircraft were on the scene or en route, and an additional 150,000 soldiers were on alert. This quick reaction, coupled with a diplomatic push, permitted the United States to win its fight to maintain sanctions. On October 15, the U.N. Security Council (over Russian objections) condemned the Iraqi deployments and warned Saddam not to make new military movements, south or elsewhere. The Republican Guard divisions retreated, the crisis abated, and American diplomats congratulated themselves on another victory for dual containment.

Below the surface, however, the incident was deeply troubling. The October "surprise" cost more than half a billion dollars, and the coalition was restive.[13] There was no guarantee against that happening again and again. When Washington sought payment to cover its costs and permission to pre-position equipment, for the first time it encountered resistance.

The fabled wealth of Arabia was largely dissipated. Saudi Arabia had overspent for years, eating up its reserves, and the Persian Gulf War forced it to borrow money. Kuwait had barely recovered from the war. All the Gulf states were underwriting the Arab-Israeli peace process. The shock of the war aroused popular protest against semi-absolute rulers who had failed to foresee or avert the calamity and then had been forced to rely on foreign troops to save them. That was especially acute in Saudi Arabia, where the idea of Christian soldiers using the country to attack other Muslims was repugnant.

Above all, there was a new question about how and when the United States would use force. Saddam had put his Republican Guards in a vulnerable position that could have justified an American attack, which in turn might have badly hurt a critical prop of the regime. But Clinton did not attack; he deterred at the cost of half a billion dollars. The era of cheap hawkery was over.

Iran Uncontained

These difficulties were soon overshadowed by a squall originating on the other side of the Persian Gulf, where Iran was not well "contained" at all. The United States had attempted to correct the "structural imbalance" by mounting new pressures that involved the outer ring of the war coalition—Great Britain and France—and others never part of it, such as Russia and China. Washington created a major incident with China over a ship supposedly bearing equipment for Iranian missiles. (None was found; Iran bought missiles from North Korea

[12] Smith, "U.N. Aide Links Iraqi Troop Thrust."

[13] Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. Plans to Keep Planes and Tanks in the Gulf Area," *New York Times*, Oct. 14, 1994.

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instead.) A similar contretemps arose over Moscow's plans to sell nuclear reactors to Tehran (the same sort the United States was offering to North Korea in order to prevent that country from building a nuclear weapon). Once again, American pressure brought no results. It could be argued that in these cases Washington simply lacked the leverage to do the job. But two other cases were less excusable. In the fall of 1994, the Iranians took advantage of Saddam's surprise to pull one of their own: they installed anti-aircraft and Scud missiles on the islands they had seized two years earlier and by early 1995 had put several thousand troops ashore in what amounted to a direct threat to shipping and, conceivably, U.S. forces in the Gulf.[14] Secretary of Defense William Perry criticized the buildup, but no further action was taken.[15]

Congress, however, was agitated. While American oil companies were forbidden to buy Iranian oil for U.S. consumption, they were permitted to sell it abroad. To Washington's acute embarrassment, this trade amounted to $3.5–4 billion a year, a sizable transaction that helped Iran deal with its economic distress. The uproar over this discovery grew louder still when Conoco disclosed a $1 billion deal to develop off-shore fields with Iran, a deal the company had carefully cleared in advance with the administration. Reacting to the outcry, Clinton issued executive orders on March 15, 1995, forbidding U.S. companies to buy and sell Iranian products, even abroad.[16] Senator Alfonse D'Amato (R-N.Y.), who called the entire embargo against Iran a myth, had offered legislation in January 1995, which eventually became law a year and a half later, imposing penalties on foreign companies doing business with Iran and Libya—to the consternation of Great Britain, France, and others.

Aided by the backlash to an Iranian assassination campaign against the regime's opponents in Europe, the Salman Rushdie *fatwa*, and evidence of Iran's nascent nuclear weapons program, the United States began more earnestly to organize a coalition against Tehran. Israel, too, was demanding that something be done about both the nuclear program and Tehran's aid to the Hizbollah terrorists, who were attacking Israeli forces along its border with Lebanon. In June 1995, at the G-7 Halifax summit, the United States persuaded the participants to ask "all states" to refrain from helping the Iranian nuclear program and other activities such as terrorism.[17] Iran also became the subject of the New Forum, twenty-eight countries that pledged at the Hague not to sell weapons or high technology to Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea.

All of this activity did not spare the Clinton administration from new expressions of indignation over the apparent holes in its containment of Iran.

[14] See, for example, Harold Hough, "Iran Targets the Arabian Peninsula," *Jane's Intelligence Review,* Oct. 1996, pp. 458–61; Michael Eisenstadt, *Iranian Military Power: Capabilities and Intentions* (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Aug. 1996).

[15] "Iranian Military Build-up Reported," *Facts on File,* May 4, 1995, p. 314.

[16] "Clinton Bars U.S. Firms from Iranian Oil-Production Deals," *Facts on File Yearbook 1995* (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1996), p. 206.

[17] "Group of Seven Leaders Meet; Jobs, Crisis Funds Top Issues," *Facts on File Yearbook 1995* (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1996), p. 443.

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One of the more interesting breaches occurred in Bosnia, where the Clinton administration, so tardy in coming to the aid of the Bosnian Muslims, grew so anxious to save Sarajevo in 1994–95 that it watched silently as Iran shipped arms and adherents to help the faltering Bosnian military effort. This Iranian "beachhead" won Tehran some close allies in the increasingly Muslim Bosnian government and, after the Dayton Accords, alarmed NATO commanders with the threat of terrorism.[18] Should the war in the Balkans resume and Iran be invited by a beleaguered Muslim government to come openly to its aid, the United States will face some drastic choices.

Another curious hole in the containment of Iran was revealed on October 27, 1994, shortly after the Iraqi war scare, when Clinton journeyed to Damascus to meet with Assad. By that time U.S. diplomats were fixated upon the Israeli-Syrian negotiations—Washington's special "account" in the peace process. But the Syrian capital also lay at the junction of dual containment and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Assad allowed Iran to arm the Hizbollah to disturb Israel's security zone and northern border. Syria also had unresolved disputes with Turkey and was the refuge from which the PKK leadership launched its occasional raids into Turkey.

American diplomacy proved wholly unable to remove either of these thorns. The Israelis were less restrained and struck Lebanon hard in 1993 and again in 1996, forcing Clinton and Christopher to become deeply involved in trying to contain Hizbollah. But in spite of American protests, Assad would not yield his links with Iran or allow Hizbollah to go under. Washington concluded that only a Syrian-Israeli peace deal could solve this problem. While Syria remained on the terrorism list, the United States refrained from open criticism. When Clinton convened the Sharm al-Sheikh conference in April 1996 to condemn the terrorism against Israel, which threatened the reelection of Shimon Peres, he fingered Iran but not Syria. Assad himself refused to attend.

False Dawn

As the Clinton administration struggled to contain Iran it was comforted by apparently good news on the Iraqi front. At last, in mid-1995, there seemed to be a real crack in the regime, the kind that promised an Iraqi-led overthrow of Saddam. It had been exceptionally difficult to organize such a campaign because Saddam himself often planted false dissidents to probe for disloyalty, a Stalinist tactic followed up by sudden murderous purges. It seemed there was always a spare Iraqi general or two making the rounds in London hinting darkly of opportunities and leaking enough accurate information to tempt an intrigue. On August 8, 1995, however, several Mercedes sedans swept through the Iraqi-Jordanian border checkpoints bearing Saddam's crown jewels. Hussein

[18] See Chris Hedges, "Foreign Islamic Fighters in Bosnia Pose a Potential Threat for GI's," *New York Times,* Dec. 3, 1995; John Pomfret, "Arming the Bosnians: U.S. Program Would Aid Force Increasingly Linked to Iran," *Washington Post,* Jan 26, 1996.

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Kamel, his son-in-law; Kamel's wife, Saddam's oldest and favorite daughter, Raghdad; Kamel's brother Saddam; and his wife, Rana (another daughter of Saddam's), had all fled Iraq together. The story of their flight was worthy of a Renaissance intrigue, replete with envy, greed, violence, and lust, including drunken shootouts by Saddam's son Uday and murderous rages by Saddam himself. It had everything except a serious political angle—it was about who ran Iraq, not how it was run. Still, analysts of tribal politics knew that the defections were a real disaster for Saddam. If he could not control his own house, by what right could he control his country?

While Kamel revealed unknown details of Iraq's quest for weapons of mass destruction to alarmed intelligence officials, his very presence in Jordan meant an important change. The Hashemite kingdom had been a significant Iraqi ally before the war and still offered a trading outlet. Saddam demanded that King Hussein return his family. The king refused. Then he added injury to insult by joining the anti-Iraq coalition with a formal declaration that the time had come for change in Baghdad.[19]

Twice the Jordanian monarch tried to pull together the Iraqi National Congress, the Kurds, and Kamel into a broad organization capable of effective action. But Kamel himself had a long record of crimes that made him unfit to lead, and the congress could not gain Barzani's support for military action from Kurdistan. The tragic sequel is well known. Kamel soon demonstrated that he had not been chosen to marry Saddam's daughter on account of his brains. The defectors' expenses and embarrassment mounted until the sons-in-law gave final proof of their folly by returning to Iraq on February 23, 1996, relying for their safety on Saddam's oath to his granddaughters that he would not harm their fathers. He did not, leaving it instead to tribal elders, suitably inspired, to avenge the family honor.

What had appeared to be the beginning of the end for Saddam proved to be no such thing. So the frustrated CIA, in January 1996, agreed to join British, Saudi, and Jordanian intelligence in supporting a "National Accord." This group boasted a membership of former Iraqi officials with the violent skills presumably needed to overthrow the regime.[20] Their efforts were given more impetus by King Hussein, who believed Saddam had been shaken by Kamel's defection and subsequent murder.[21]

No Comfort for Turkey

While the administration busied itself with clandestine action and sanctions diplomacy, it did not seem to grasp that its neglect of a key coalition

[19] "Senior Iraqi Army Defectors Given Asylum in Jordan; Son-in-Law Calls for President Hussein's Ouster," *Facts on File Yearbook 1995* (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1996), pp. 589–90.

[20] R. Jeffrey Smith and David B. Ottaway, "The CIA's Most Wanted Man," *Washington Post National Weekly Edition*, Sept. 23–29, 1996.

[21] "Iraq: Defectors Slain after Returning Home," *Facts on File*, Feb. 29, 1996, p. 127.

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ally—Turkey—was weakening a cornerstone of dual containment. Of all the members of the inner coalition, none has had a more dramatic experience since the war in the Persian Gulf than this NATO ally. Ankara emerged from the cold war seemingly a big winner. Moscow's empire was gone, Russia had retreated to its borders of Peter the Great's time, and the Turkic peoples of Central Asia were free to determine their destiny. Turkey also guarded the key northern flank in dual containment; its influence and military bases were essential to U.S. objectives; and then president Turgat Ozal had done the United States a valuable service when he threw his reluctant country into the war against Saddam. And yet, within four years, Turks had good reason to ask what had been gained.

On April 17, 1993, Ozal died suddenly, and his successors quarrelled and botched the economy. In Central Asia, the Turks were outbid by the Russians in Azerbaijan's war with Armenia. Most troubling, Turkey's application to enter the European Community was advanced grudgingly by NATO allies clearly uninterested in bringing the country along. That was compounded by the Bosnian crisis. Although the Turks contributed troops, they could not sway Washington, London, or Paris to act early and forcibly against the Serbs. Lastly, and most important, the United States seemed indifferent to Turkey and blind to its geopolitical value. American diplomats had plenty to say about Turkey's human-rights failures but apparently little interest in fending off Greek or Armenian lobbyists demanding congressional punishment of Turkish wrongs, past and present. Turkey's annual aid package was cut, then refused by Turkey itself because of the insulting conditions Congress attached to it.[22]

The United States cannot be blamed for the corruption and political infighting that allowed the self-proclaimed Islamist Necmettin Erbakan and the Welfare (Refah) Party to gain power with only 20 percent of the vote in 1995–96. But the administration can be faulted for failing to take up Turkey's cause either in Europe or on Capitol Hill. It did not answer Ankara's call for help until a crisis and then did too little too late. Still, every six months the United States asked Turkey to renew Operation Provide Comfort, an operation that provided less and less comfort to the Turks. Overall, then, the cost of dual containment for the Turks had risen and risen: the Iraqi sanctions harmed the Turkish economy, the autonomy zone provided a safe area for PKK attacks, and there was no end to Saddam.

In 1995, even before Erbakan's election, Turkey began to take an independent tack. First, the Turks recruited Israel to help their cause in Washington and followed it up with cooperation between the two air forces. Neither Assad's angry attempt to bring Egyptian and Saudi pressure against Turkey nor Erbakan's criticisms deflected the Turkish generals from their deal with Israel. More troubling to Washington was Ankara's changing attitude toward the Kurds. The Kurdish minority in Turkey had long been subject to aggressive "Turkification," suspected as they were since Atatürk's time of wanting to secede. Perhaps only Ozal had enough prestige to allow the Kurds more leeway without

[22] "House Curbs Aid to Turkey," *Facts on File,* Aug. 1, 1996, p. 533.

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provoking a popular reaction. But now he was gone, and his successors resolved to press the war against the PKK in what proved to be an expensive but unsuccessful campaign.

By 1996, relations between the United States and Turkey boiled over. The Turks wanted economic compensation for the sanctions or else a resumption of the oil trade. They wanted order on the border or else a free hand to "fix" the PKK. They wanted relief from the U.S. Congress, the Human Rights Bureau of the State Department, and meddling Europeans. They wanted above all to belong to the favored circle of post–cold war American allies and to the European Union. Not all of that was possible, but enough of it might have been achieved had the Clinton administration set out to get it. It did not, and when Erbakan's election finally got Washington's attention, it was too late.

Disaster in Kurdistan

That was the setting for the final and fatal turn of events in Kurdistan. Through much of 1996, the Clinton administration thought it saw real progress toward bringing Saddam down. One sign was Jordan's accession to the coalition. Another could be read in Saddam's agreement finally to sell oil under U.N. conditions. That was worth $1 billion a year and would benefit Iraq's middle class. Lastly, the National Accord promised to foment a more effective internal opposition to Saddam than the faction-ridden National Congress. All of these factors led the CIA to tell the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in May 1996 that Saddam's regime was losing ground.

The very next month Saddam emptied the CIA's black bag by quashing the National Accord's coup preparations in a way that suggested he had penetrated it from the start. That was a sudden and severe setback. But he was after even bigger game in Kurdistan, where the rival factions had reached a violent impasse. Talabani fielded fewer troops and held less ground, but he dominated Irbil and a bulge of territory nearest the 36th parallel (the no-fly zone). He seemed to have reached a convenient deal with the Iranians. In return for a quantity of heavy weapons and probably a few "spiritual guides," he allowed the Iranians to raid an anti-Iranian group that had been troubling the border area. But the Iranian raid, like Tehran's actions in the south at the end of the Persian Gulf War, was not enough to provoke an American response. Instead, Washington tried again to bring the Kurdish factions together. The Iraqi National Congress saw an opportunity to rebuild its bridge with the administration following the defeat of the National Accord and offered to monitor a cease-fire as it had done a year before. But the United States never came up with the several million dollars needed to lubricate the scheme—the CIA claimed it could not cover the bet because it was not "covert," and everyone else pleaded poverty. Worse yet, Barzani's request for heavy arms to offset those of his rival was turned down.[23]

[23] Smith and Ottaway, "The CIA's Most Wanted Man."

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Washington had either tired of the Kurdish problem or forgotten what it was all about. The president and his men were therefore surprised to find Iraqi tanks massing to attack Irbil. The October 1994 U.N. resolution authorized an attack against such forces, but Clinton preferred threats to action, warning Saddam not to move north. Then Barzani himself invited Saddam north. That disastrous revelation was soon followed by another: neither Saudi Arabia nor Turkey would permit U.S. aircraft based in their countries to be used against the Iraqis.

Thus, when Saddam's forces suddenly seized Irbil on August 31, 1996, with approximately 30,000 troops, Washington's paralysis was complete. The Iraqi National Congress and the CIA operational base were overrun, and Saddam's agents went house to house rounding up and shooting opponents with a precision that further suggested that the CIA's operations had been compromised. The CIA agents and a small U.S. military detachment escaped. Many members of the Iraqi National Congress were later rescued. Many others were not.

Surprised and shaken, the Clinton administration went through a reprise of earlier tactics. Cruise missiles were launched, not against the tanks or the Republican Guards, but against the expendable Iraqi air-defense system in the south. Air, sea, and ground reinforcements were ordered up at the cost of tens of millions of dollars as a prelude, not to a bombardment of significant Iraqi targets, but to the wholesale abandonment of Kurdistan. Meanwhile, the U.S.-led coalition was absent; Paris was nasty, dismissing U.S. action as election-year American bravado; Riyadh was ominously silent; and Kuwait, initially uninformed about U.S. reinforcements, balked before agreeing to host additional troops.

It was all bungle piled on botch. The Clinton administration had failed to compose the Kurdish quarrel, failed to halt the Iranians, failed to preempt Saddam, failed to consult the coalition, and failed to explain its actions to Congress. Now it reaped its reward. As in 1994, the American rhetoric escalated. Perry uncharacteristically huffed and puffed about a "disproportionate" response when Iraq began rebuilding its air defenses, but Saddam, having learned by now to back off, promised not to challenge the no-fly zone (for the time being).[24] Clinton declared it a victory simply to extend the no-fly zone farther north and implied that Saddam should not have forces there. Christopher declared that to be a strategic defeat for Saddam and tried to patch things up with Paris. It fell to Assistant Secretary of State Robert H. Pelletreau Jr. to seek "explanations" from Barzani.

No one was fooled about the real damage. The Kurdish autonomy zone had become meaningless and indefensible. Saddam had taken a long step toward recovering the Kurdish areas with Kurdish help and in spite of American warnings. Even CIA Director John Deutch confessed to a Senate committee in September 1996 that the Iraqi dictator was "stronger" than before.[25] And the

[24] Thomas W. Lippman, "Learning to Live with Saddam Hussein," *Washington Post National Weekly Edition*, Sept. 30–Oct. 6, 1996.

[25] R. Jeffrey Smith, "Iraq Stronger Since August, Deutch Says," *Washington Post*, Sept. 20, 1996.

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new no-fly zone may prove to be less than meets the eye. Saddam is not likely to leave the American edict unchallenged, especially if he returns to the zone in a piecemeal fashion, forcing the United States into either a useless game of tit for tat or a massive response to a petty provocation. For this latest crisis has made clear that the coalition, especially the vital inner coalition, does not see the containment strategy in the same light as Washington. The Egyptians, Saudis, Kuwaitis, and Turks will not go to war for an autonomous Kurdistan, and they are unlikely to support more American pin-pricking in response to Saddam's nibbling tactics. In their view, both Iraq and Iran have gained ground from this latest episode. Thus, five years after the great but incomplete victory over Saddam, American prestige in the Gulf is vastly diminished and the coalition itself, inner and outer, is visibly frayed.

A Clarifying Act of Violence

The essence of American policy as expressed by dual containment was to finish off Saddam while holding Iran at bay through a combination of U.S. military power and coalition leadership. As noted earlier, such a strategy, pivoting on the Arab Gulf states, might have been sound in the short run but would have been increasingly difficult to sustain even if the Clintonians had not bungled their opportunities for decisive military action and mishandled key coalition partners.

Neither Saddam nor the ayatollahs will be forgiving of these lapses. Dual containment has impeded Iraq's recovery and cost the Iranian clerics, always hard up, a great deal of money. But that means only that the United States is likely to face increasing, not decreasing, pressures from Baghdad and Tehran. Saddam, once he has consolidated control of Kurdistan, will turn to the no-fly zone. He still withholds critical inspections from Rolf Ekeus, and he will try to loosen sanctions further in cooperation with U.S. allies who covet his oil.

As for Iran, three local U.S. allies in the region are acting to force Washington's hand. The Saudis may finger Tehran for the bombing of the U.S. Air Force barracks in Dhahran. Israel's prime minister has already injected a note of urgency about the Iranian nuclear program and the supply of weapons through Syria to the Hizbollah in Lebanon. And Turkey's commercial dealings with the regime, despite the administration's tightening of sanctions, threaten to open another coalition quarrel when Washington can least afford it.[26]

These growing pressures are likely to produce a clarifying act of violence soon. The next time the United States takes effective military action to destroy important assets in Iraq, Iran, or both, dual containment may be raised from its deathbed. But Saddam or the ayatollahs would have to do something very

[26] Jonathan C. Randal, "Iran Fights Back at U.S. Moves to Isolate it," *Washington Post*, Aug. 9, 1996.

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bad and very dumb before the United States could exert massive force with support from Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, Egypt, and Turkey.

There is an alternative to the expensive and increasingly moribund strategy of dual containment, and that is simply the balance of power. It was tried for twenty years after the 1970 British withdrawal from the Gulf, and for ten years it worked because the shah acted as the U.S. surrogate. After his fall it failed, and for ten years the Gulf suffered two disastrous wars because America had no surrogate there. The only workable balance of power is one that counts on either Baghdad or Tehran to be mindful of the basic Western interest in access to oil not monopolized by one or the other, which in turn means independence for Saudi Arabia and the sheikdoms. But is there the slightest chance that either Iran or Iraq would cooperate, given their hostile regimes? And which of the two is more dangerous, needing to be "balanced" the most? As an eminent scholar of the region once pointed out to a secretary of state in a private briefing, U.S. strategy toward Iraq and Iran must be pursued in strictly geopolitical terms precisely because neither regime has the least claim on U.S. sympathies. On this basis alone, therefore, the United States is drawn inevitably towards Iran: larger, more powerful, more stable, and better located than Iraq, and with a popular pro-American sympathy that seems rekindled as the Islamic revolution decays.[27]

Growing pressures will likely soon produce a clarifying act of violence in the Gulf.

Some analysts, despite the sorry record of U.S.-Iranian relations since 1979, have begun again to argue that Tehran is the real prize of the Gulf and that the corrupt clerical regime is ready to do business in order to keep Saddam at bay and develop commercial ties. Unfortunately, the mullahs apparently still need to portray the United States as the enemy and to promote terrorism in order to demonstrate their Islamic zeal. A U.S. démarche to Tehran now would be viewed as a sure sign of American weakness, and on the Arab side of the Gulf it could only strengthen Saddam's argument that he is needed to offset Iranian ambitions.

The only effective way out of this box is to use the waning policy of dual containment as the transition to a Gulf security regime that demands respect for U.S. interests, if not genuine friendship. That means a deliberate decision by Washington to use the next good excuse to strike Saddam as hard as possible, making clear to the inner coalition that Iraq's rehabilitation—without Saddam—is the best way to restore a natural equilibrium to the Gulf that would require less of a U.S. military presence. The United States must also hold up to Tehran the potential to improve relations under very careful rules of quid pro quo, while not ruling out military force if these are not respected.

This policy should be pursued under guidelines that apply the lessons learned from the strange death of dual containment, including:

[27] See Robert D. Kaplan, *The Ends of the Earth: A Journey at the Dawn of the 21st Century* (New York: Random House, 1996), pp. 173–242.

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There is no such thing as cheap hawkery. Overwhelming rhetoric supported by underwhelming force is a bluff that will be called.

The other fellow may not sit still. Washington did not anticipate that the more successful its containment, the more Baghdad or Tehran would try to break out. Lack of imagination left the administration late and uncoordinated in response.

Shoot to kill. The failure to use force decisively was most egregious in Saddam's case, where twice—in October 1994 and August 1996—Washington had both justification and opportunity to hurt his most precious assets, the Republican Guard and military infrastructure.

Allies need tender loving care. Dual containment required a high level of diplomatic coordination with both the inner and outer coalitions. That, in turn, demanded sophisticated analysis of what the traffic would bear. Though aided occasionally by acts of bad faith and aggressive behavior from both Iraq and Iran, the administration neglected key coalition members, especially Turkey. To fix that will require a major effort in Ankara, but done in such a way that Erbakan and his party are not major beneficiaries.

To sum up: The point has been reached in the Gulf where the use of American force may be the only way to redeem a failing diplomacy. Because pressures are mounting for the United States to loosen strictures on both states, a "shift" in favor of Iran, if done out of weakness, would probably hasten Saddam's recovery without achieving much in Tehran. Washington can only wait upon Saddam or the ayatollahs to do something so dangerous to the region that the United States can again arouse a coalition and bring about decisive change. In 1990, Saddam did America the favor of challenging it at a time when U.S. military power was still on a cold war footing. Unfortunately, another act of clarifying violence may be needed before the United States can successfully resume the task of organizing Gulf security.

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America's Alliance Anxieties

Superpowers Don't Do Windows

by John Hillen

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, American foreign policy thinkers have been striving to define a role for the United States in the post–cold war world. Their proposals have ranged from "strategic independence" on the isolationist pole to "assertive multilateralism" and "benevolent hegemony" on the interventionist pole. The sheer volume of labels and taxonomies, far from suggesting a wealth of ideas, is clear evidence of what Jonathan Clarke dubbed America's "conceptual poverty."[1]

Nonetheless, the majority of proposed post–cold war strategies appear to seek a sensible course that lays out an active international role for the United States as a global superpower while avoiding the dreaded specter of the "global cop"—wasting American lives and resources, tilting at windmills, and minding everyone's business but its own. Robert Tucker has called this quest for the middle road "the great issue of American foreign policy today. It is the contradiction between the persisting desire to remain the premier global power and an ever deepening aversion to bear the costs of this position."[2] Another way to understand it is to consider Americans' desire for a reasonable policy of global engagement: one that preserves American involvement in global activities that benefit the United States but does not squander U.S. resources on global gendarmerie.[3] As former secretary of defense James Schlesinger noted, "The reality of the post-Cold War world is that the U.S. has limited political capital for foreign ventures. . . . The clear inference is that we should husband

[1] Jonathan Clarke, "The Conceptual Poverty of U.S. Foreign Policy," *Atlantic Monthly,* Sept. 1993, pp. 54–66.

[2] Robert W. Tucker, "The Future of a Contradiction," *The National Interest,* Spring 1996, p. 20.

[3] See the results of polling in John E. Rielly, ed., *American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1995* (Chicago, Ill.: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1995), p. 6; *An Emerging Consensus: A Study of American Public Attitudes on America's Role in the World* (College Park, Md.: Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland, July 1996), p. 5. See also Steven Kull, "What the Public Knows that Washington Doesn't," *Foreign Policy,* Winter 1995, p. 104.

John Hillen is a defense policy analyst at the Heritage Foundation. He is also a former officer in the U.S. Army, a decorated combat veteran of the war in the Persian Gulf, and author of *Blue Helmets in War and Peace: The Strategy of UN Military Operations* (Brassey's Inc., 1997).

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that political capital for those matters that are of vital interest to the United States."[4] To that end, Washington must promote a new security compact for America's alliances, for without substantial reworking to accommodate recent geopolitical and military trends, America's alliance system threatens to be a burden rather than a boon. Specifically, the system should demarcate a division of labor that takes advantage of allies' differing interests and military capabilities, with the fundamental dictum for the United States being "superpowers don't do windows."[5]

Currently, America's military alliances take many different forms. In its strictest sense, an alliance is a commitment for mutual military support against some external actor(s) in a specified set of circumstances.[6] Conversely, collective security organizations like the United Nations, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) are not military alliances. Formal alliances are usually based on treaties and can range from highly institutionalized multilateral arrangements like NATO, to dormant multilateral arrangements such as the Rio Treaty, to active bilateral defense alliances as those with Korea and Japan, to latent bilateral agreements such as that with the Philippines, to de facto bilateral alliances like that of Australia and the United States, to moribund multilateral alliances like the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization.

The United States also maintains informal military alliances based upon other types of security cooperation, including the supply of military training and equipment, basing rights for U.S. troops or pre-positioned equipment, military training exchanges, and combined military exercises. These informal alliances can, in times of need, become frameworks for establishing coalitions, as demonstrated by the informal alliance between the United States and its partners in the Persian Gulf. Lastly, the United States participates in some de facto military alliances in cases where the U.S. national interest is so obvious that a commitment to the defense of an ally is implicit, even absent a formal defense agreement. That is the case with countries such as Israel and Taiwan.

The United States needs this flexible array of alliances to protect its interests around the globe. But however extensive and varied they may be, U.S. vital interests are finite. So, too, are U.S. resources. Hence, the critical questions that any new strategy must address are where, when, why, and how the United States ought to be willing and able to intervene militarily—and where, when, why, and how it ought *not* to be willing to deploy its forces. In the post–cold war world, perhaps the best metaphor for the proper U.S. role in alliances is the role the Mayo Clinic plays in health affairs, or the FBI plays in law enforcement. That is, the United States should take the lead in the

[4] Harry Summers, "Achilles Heel of Keeping the Peace," *Washington Times*, Oct. 17, 1996.

[5] This organizing imperative was summed up by the former chief of the Central Intelligence Agency's Afghan Task Force. When asked why the CIA had no intention of sorting out the squabbles of Afghan tribal leaders after the organization had been so active in helping to evict the Soviets from Afghanistan, the agent replied that "superpowers don't do windows." Jonathan Clarke, "Don't Keep U.S. Troops in Bosnia," *Los Angeles Times*, July 8, 1996.

[6] See Stephen Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987).

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hierarchy of global security, but within a cooperative system in which allies play supporting roles. The Mayo Clinic and the FBI undertake only those essential duties that are in keeping with their unique talents and resources, leaving routine health care and law enforcement to local hospitals and police. For otherwise, those elite agencies would not only drown in minutiae and waste their resources, they would soon lose their capacity to perform the challenging tasks for which they were formed.

If the United States is to avoid both damaging isolationism and wasteful activism in foreign affairs, it must recognize that it cannot and should not attempt to do everything. That means America should focus on security problems in its "jurisdiction," leaving its allies and like-minded states to play the roles of local doctor and cop. The United States also must recognize that it, and it alone, can perform the unique, expensive, and demanding task of deterring or defeating major-power aggression in any region of the globe. To maintain the skills necessary to execute this function requires strategy, doctrine, training, and force structure focused on deterrence and war fighting, not on peacekeeping missions. Lastly, the United States must realize that a failure to be prepared to combat serious security threats will sooner or later have consequences so catastrophic as to dwarf the problems of muddling through a Bosnia-, Haiti-, or Somalia-type mission.

The U.S. Defense Posture and Strategic Strain

Unilateral disarmament is a recurring pattern in American history, and the post–cold war years are no exception. Since 1991, the U.S. military has suffered at least a 35 percent decrease in both force structure and defense funding. As a result, the force is the smallest fielded by the nation since 1940.[7] Unfortunately, these slashing cuts have occurred only on the supply side. On the demand side—commitments overseas—the military has actually been saddled with new responsibilities. In short, the U.S. armed forces, like so many downsized institutions, are being asked to do more with less, leading to two severe consequences. The first is a disparity between stated U.S. security commitments and the forces fielded by the nation, which has been the focus of recent intense debates.[8] The second is the resulting strain (on both personnel

[7] The 1997 end-strength goal for the active-duty military is 1.418 million. *FY 1997 Budget Briefing* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense [hereafter, DOD], Mar. 4, 1996), slide 14. The next-lowest active-duty military strength number since 1940 was 1.444 million in 1948. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, *National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 1997* (Washington, D.C.: DOD, Apr. 1996), p. 160.

[8] See Baker Spring, *Will Clinton Pay the Price for America to Remain a Global Power?* Backgrounder, no. 1083 (Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, May 16, 1996); Andrew Krepinevich, *Bottom-Up Review: An Assessment* (Washington, D.C.: Defense Budget Project, 1994); Don Snider, Richard Betts, Andrew Krepinevich, et al., "The Coming Defense Train Wreck and What to Do About It," *The Washington Quarterly*, Winter 1996, pp. 89–131. There are also several critical reports by the General Accounting Office [hereafter, GAO], including *Bottom-Up Review: Analysis of Key DoD Assumptions*, Jan. 31, 1995, and *Future Years Defense Program: Optimistic Estimates Lead to Billions in Overprogramming*, July 29, 1994.

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and matériel) the armed forces suffer as they attempt to compensate with an accelerated operational tempo. Their effort to do so has deprived the armed services of a prudent balance among current operations, training, readiness, and funding for future operations and equipment, owing primarily to overseas deployment requirements for the myriad missions they are asked to perform. For instance, on any given day in 1996 the army had some 105,000 soldiers permanently stationed overseas and another 40,000 on temporary duty in some sixty countries.[9] This demand, coupled with reductions in force size, means that many soldiers are deploying at a rate 300–400 percent higher than during the cold war. In a time of relative peace, nearly 15 percent of active-duty army soldiers are deployed on twelve-month hardship tours of duty. A General Accounting Office (GAO) investigation in fact found that some army units were deployed more than 210 days per year.[10]

The U.S. military is approaching "burnout."

The other services face similar dilemmas. Expressing his concern about the high operational tempo, the U.S. Air Force chief of staff set a target of a maximum of 120 days of temporary duty per unit. That target was drastically exceeded by many units, including airborne warning and control system units (average of 136 days), RC-135 units (168 days), combat air controllers (160 days), EC-130E units (175 days), and some electronic-warfare units that spent more than 300 days annually on deployments.[11] The navy has also exceeded its budgeted operations tempo for the past several years and predicts that it will do so again in fiscal year 1997.[12] With the decline in the number of its warships, the navy has been forced to "gap" the assignment of aircraft carriers and other warships, meaning that other forces must forgo routine training, maintenance, and rest in order to cover the gap left by the absence of a carrier. That happened in the spring of 1996, when the USS *Nimitz* was rushed from the Persian Gulf to cover the Taiwan-China crisis, requiring the United States to deploy a squadron of air force F-15s to Jordan to continue coverage of the no-fly zone over Iraq. Even more recently, the USS *Enterprise* left the Adriatic in September 1996 to reinforce the U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf during the latest confrontation with Saddam Hussein. The sudden absence of the *Enterprise* forced the land-based aircraft supporting the implementation force in Bosnia to make up for the hundreds of weekly sorties flown by the carrier-based aircraft.

These requirements are literally wearing out men and matériel, and former Pentagon planner Robert Gaskin has noted that the military is "approach-

[9] DOD, *Defense Almanac* (Washington, D.C.: DOD, 1996), p. 18; G.E. Willis, "On the Road Again," *The Army Times*, July 1, 1996.

[10] GAO, *Military Readiness: A Clear Policy Is Needed to Guide Management of Frequently Deployed Units* (Washington, D.C.: GAO, Apr. 1996).

[11] Ibid. Additional information from author's interview with the U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff Operations Group, Washington, D.C., Aug. 1996.

[12] Chief of Naval Operations, *Department of the Navy FY 1997 Budget* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, 1996), p. 2-2.

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ing burnout."[13] The high rate of current operations has strained budgets, equipment, and units to the point where all services have canceled required wartime training exercises. In one such instance, peacekeeping support duties in 1995 forced three air force fighter wings to cancel critical combat training exercises.[14] As a result of these trade-offs, 28 percent of the services' frequently deployed units are not "combat ready."[15]

Moreover, the Department of Defense (DOD) is unable to invest in the recapitalization of the armed forces. Procurement accounts have dropped some 70 percent in the past ten years, precipitating a 1996 rebellion by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who begged Congress to restore $20 billion in funding for new weapons systems. In the meantime, the current stocks of equipment are wearing down with heavy use. The C-130 aircraft supplying the Bosnia mission are at least twenty-six years old and are flying at twice their normal use rate. European-based C-130s had to be supplemented by a squadron from North Carolina because, in the words of one aircraft commander, the European-based squadron "ran their aircraft into the ground." New C-130s are not expected until 2005 at the earliest.[16] Overall, projected DOD budgets continue to live off the capital investments of the Reagan-era military buildup. As a result, by 2005 all of the tanks and most of the U.S. military aircraft will be older than the soldiers and pilots using them.

Lastly, the strain on the armed forces is lowering morale and the quality of military life. The GAO investigation noted that "officials in major commands revealed pronounced concerns about personnel problems such as divorces . . . and lowered retention."[17] The drop in retention rates is especially worrying, given the time and money spent training service members. In 1995, the navy failed to reach its target on first-, second-, and third-term re-enlistments.[18] This problem was somewhat ameliorated by the shrinking force structure but threatens to become acute when the navy finishes its post–cold war drawdown.

History suggests that military powers should use the breathing space between major conflicts to replenish their military stocks, train (and rest) their personnel, and aggressively experiment with new doctrines and equipment. Instead, the U.S. military is being driven into the ground by an already high operating tempo compounded by a series of peripheral peace operations. Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.) has recognized that this effort is "stretching our military [to] the verge of the breaking point." He noted that

[13] Art Pine, "U.S. Military Highly Rated, But Strains Begin to Show," *Los Angeles Times*, Mar. 19, 1996. See also Steven Komarow, "Smaller Forces, More Missions Add Up to GI Stress," *USA Today*, Oct. 8, 1996.

[14] Author's interview with U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff Operations Group.

[15] GAO, *Military Readiness*, p. 12.

[16] Bryan Bender, "Bosnia Mission Highlights Need for Improved C-130, Pilots Say," *Defense Daily*, Oct. 9, 1996.

[17] GAO, *Military Readiness*, pp. 3, 13. See also Leonard Wong, Paul Bliese, and Ronal Halverson, "Multiple Deployments: Do They Make a Difference?" (paper presented at the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society Biennial Conference, Baltimore, Md., Oct. 21, 1995).

[18] Tom Philpott, "Is the Navy Now Too Small to Meet the Challenges of an Unstable World?" in *Seapower Almanac*, ed. Jim Hessman (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Navy League, Jan. 1996), p. 6.

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> at some point somebody needs to stand up and say there is a minimum size to being the world's only superpower, and we have gotten smaller than that in terms of our regular units, and we have an obligation to insist on a military in which people can serve without being burned out by the sheer constancy of their being used.[19]

Diverging Military Competencies

Since the end of the cold war, U.S. allies, especially in Europe, have increasingly debated the need to develop capabilities for military operations that do not rely so heavily on the United States. In general, Washington has welcomed this movement towards greater self-reliance, although the Bush administration initially sent conflicting signals about European-only defense initiatives such as the Franco-German Corps and the Western European Union (WEU). The growing enthusiasm for U.S. allies' assuming a greater share of regional security burdens was clearly expressed in 1991 when then European Union president Jacques Delors triumphantly proclaimed that solving the Bosnian crisis would prove to be the "hour of Europe."

Unfortunately, the rhetoric has not matched reality. As Professor Eliot Cohen has noted,

> Two seemingly contradictory trends seem to be at work: a formal effort to develop more independent forces that can operate outside traditional frameworks and operational environments, on the one hand, and on the other increased dependence on the United States in key areas of military power.[20]

The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) recently concluded that "without the US, European NATO member-states do not have the capability to mount a combined arms operation of more than 30,000 troops, with air and naval support, capable of engaging in a full-scale military conflict outside NATO borders."[21] Moreover, the core competencies of the American military and those of America's allies are diverging. While the United States focuses on deterrence and war fighting, many of its allies are refocusing their shrinking militaries on peacekeeping and operations other than war.

As with the United States, monetary concerns are a driving force behind the changing military capabilities of many U.S allies. While Korea and Japan have increased their defense spending since the end of the cold war (Japan markedly so), America's European allies have cut defense spending as a percentage of GDP by an average of one-third.[22] Most of these cuts have been

[19] Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich, Address at the Center for Security Policy's annual award dinner, Washington, D.C., Sept. 18, 1996.

[20] Eliot Cohen, "The U.S. and Alliance Strategies" (paper presented at the 38th annual conference of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Dresden, Germany, Sept. 1–4, 1996).

[21] International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1996/97* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 32.

[22] Statistics taken from 1991–96 annual editions of International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

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precipitated by the stringent fiscal requirements of EU monetary integration. (As of September 1996, only Luxembourg and Ireland met the Maastricht treaty conditions of having a budget deficit that is less than 3 percent of GDP and a national debt that is less than 60 percent of GDP.[23]) Given these spending cuts, many European militaries have recently changed from the conscript system to all-volunteer forces, a move that typically halves the size of a force. And in the absence of a clear and present danger from a major power, many allies have shifted their focus away from territorial defense. Canada's new defense minister recently stated, "I am a peacekeeper, not a warrior"[24]; and at an August 1996 ceremony to celebrate the end of conscription in the Netherlands, the Dutch defense minister noted that "the draft no longer fitted with the army's role in a world where peacekeeping has taken over from combat."[25]

Moreover, with few exceptions, European allies are not investing in strategic airlift and sealift; strategic logistics systems; space-based command, control, communications, and intelligence (C^3I) networks; and modern weapons systems based on revolutionary advances in information technology—capabilities that allow for power projection and sustained war-fighting campaigns.[26] The percentage of European defense spending devoted to research and development is half that of the United States, and expenditure on procurement is equally low. Many European defense analysts have noted that the decision not to invest in expensive systems has relegated their nations to reliance on the United States in campaigns outside of Europe and war-fighting contingencies even within Europe.[27] Yet only a few Europeans, mostly defense industrialists, have criticized the lack of investment.[28]

Hence, the divergence between U.S. and allied military capabilities grows ever more acute. The United States holds both a qualitative and an enormous quantitative advantage over its allies. For example, the United States is the only member in its many security alliances that possesses large aircraft carriers, long-range strike aircraft, stealth aircraft, a network of space-based C^3I satellites and sensors, advanced aerial surveillance and reconnaissance systems, global lift capabilities, strategic logistics systems, and advanced weaponry based on information technology and the nascent "revolution in military affairs." However, Philip Gordon of IISS has noted that "this dependence isn't unpleasant

[23] Fred Barbash, "Europe's Quest of Common Currency by 1999, Proving Divisive but Fervent," *Washington Post*, Sept. 23, 1996.

[24] Howard Schneider, "Canada's Military Under Attack," *Washington Post*, Oct. 5, 1996.

[25] "Dutch End Military Draft," *International Herald Tribune*, Sept. 1, 1996.

[26] See R.L. Kugler, *U.S.–West European Cooperation in Out-of-Area Military Operations: Problems and Prospects* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 1994); Ronald Asmus, Richard Kugler, and Stephen Larrabee, "What Will NATO Enlargement Cost?" *Survival*, Autumn 1996, pp. 5–26.

[27] See Philip H. Gordon, "Recasting the Atlantic Alliance," *Survival*, Spring 1996, pp. 50–51; Rick Atkinson and Bradley Graham, "As Europe Seeks Wider NATO Role, Its Armies Shrink," *Washington Post*, July 29, 1996.

[28] See, for example, Robert Bussiére, "A Europe of Security and Defence," *NATO Review*, Sept. 1995, pp. 31–35.

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enough to inspire the Europeans to do what they have to do to get around it."[29]

Consequently, many U.S. allies, particularly the European ones, though they remain valuable as political partners, are of rapidly diminishing use as military partners in war-fighting coalition operations such as the war in the Persian Gulf. The United States dominated the military force structure of that thirty-one-state coalition, providing not only the high-tech weaponry and logistics support but also more than 70 percent of the ground troops. The only other members with ground forces of comparable quality, Great Britain and France, had to scramble to mobilize a division and large brigade, respectively.[30] The United States also provided 76 percent of the in-theater combat aircraft and two out of every three warships, including all six coalition aircraft carriers. The command and support functions for launching air strikes also came predominantly from U.S. forces—on January 20, 1991, the third day of the air campaign against Iraq, every electronic warfare aircraft in theater was American. In addition, only American warships and a few British frigates had the technology necessary to operate together in the dangerous waters of the northern Persian Gulf.[31] The political value of the broad coalition aside, the basic management philosophy behind the distribution of coalition forces was to take advantage of the special capabilities that each state brought to the table. For Germany, Japan, and Kuwait that meant money; for Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states it meant money, basing, and national infrastructure; and for Islamic countries such as Egypt, Syria, and Morocco it meant political support and limited military contributions.

With decreasing support available from allies, the United States must continue to fund, provide, and train large forces for the war-fighting capabilities needed to protect the vital interests of America and its allies. That is why America's regional allies must take the lead in future Somalias, Haitis, and Bosnias—missions of regional peacekeeping, crisis management, and humanitarian relief—so as to leave the United States free to focus its energies on global power projection and large-scale combat operations.

Diverging Interests

American partnership with regional powers expected to play the role of "the cop on the beat" is not a novel idea. The Nixon Doctrine rested in part on such devolution of responsibility to certain states, like Iran under the shah, on the assumption that these locally powerful allies could spare the United

[29] Atkinson and Graham, "As Europe Seeks Wider NATO Role." See also Brooks Tigner, "Europeans Resist AGS Fast Track," *Army Times*, Oct. 14, 1996.

[30] See Jeff McCausland, *The Gulf Conflict: A Military Analysis*, Adelphi Paper 282 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1993).

[31] DOD, *The Conduct of the Persian Gulf War* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1992), pp. 70–81. See also Department of the Navy, *The U.S. Navy in Desert Shield and Desert Storm* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1991).

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States the need to intervene directly. But in those days of cold war, a commonly perceived threat made for a confluence of interests between the United States and its allies. Today the situation is very different, and as the Iraq crisis of September 1996 highlighted, even a Saddam Hussein is not enough to ensure common cause in a key region. If anything, the latest round of confrontations with Iraq underscored an historical truism: alliances and coalitions tend to weaken as soon as the perception of threat diminishes. Thus, in comparison with his aggression against Kuwait and threat to the entire Arabian peninsula, Saddam's limited assault on an Iraqi Kurdish faction in August and September of 1996 elicited vastly different responses—the unilateral U.S. cruise-missile strike was unsupported or openly criticized by close allies such as France, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia. Similarly, during the cold war, the overwhelming threat posed by the Warsaw Pact was the centripetal force holding NATO together. Today, absent that unifying threat, the stakes in local crises such as that in Bosnia are different for the United States and Europe. Bosnia may be the primary European security problem and it may touch the vital national interests of European powers, but it is not a primary concern of the United States, and the large U.S. engagement there serves only to erode the sole superpower's ability to discharge its primary functions.

What are those functions? They are to prevent, deter, or confront security challenges of the first order—from the world's great military powers such as Russia and China—and of the second order—from aggressive and well-armed rogue regimes such as those in Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. Bosnia, while a compelling issue, is a third-order security challenge on the periphery of U.S. interests, and the U.S. commitment to do the heavy lifting for a peacekeeping force there only misconstrues the true American role in European and global security. The United States should be involved militarily, but in a supporting rather than a lead role.

So far, most post–cold war security challenges have been well below the threshold of a major-power threat necessitating significant U.S. involvement and leadership. It follows that regional devolution should be implemented in handling local threats. That is, allies closest to the problem and whose interests are most affected should be the prime movers in mitigating the threat and should not be overly dependent on an ally that may have little interest in addressing the crisis. An "all-for-one and one-for-all" approach to every security dilemma, no matter what size, does not make sense for U.S. alliances. Instead, Washington must promote structures, like NATO's new combined joint task force (CJTF), that empower regional allies to tackle local crises. As Owen Harries writes,

> In deciding when to deploy [military force], Washington should practice the sound federal principle of subsidiarity—that is, allowing problems to be handled at the level closest to the problem. This way, a sense of responsibility can be developed throughout the international system and the United States can reserve its own intentions for the great issues involving its vital interests, acting as a balancer of last resort rather than a busybody and bully.[32]

[32] Owen Harries, "Dole's Calculated Pragmatism," *New York Times Magazine*, Sept. 22, 1996.

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However, America's cold war military alliances still dominate the international arena, and until other security apparatuses emerge, U.S.-led alliances are often the default mechanism for responding to local problems. In Bosnia NATO was called upon to solve the crisis, and the United States was thereby thrust into the political and military lead. But such quasi-military missions in areas of marginal importance are unpopular with the American public and offer little return for the investment of scarce national security resources. Many Americans question the utility of alliances in which the imperative of leadership forces the United States into operations and actions it might not otherwise undertake. That was the case in Bosnia, where preserving the credibility of NATO and the United States became the motivation for what Clinton administration officials characterized as a regrettable mission, the U.S.-led intervention.[33] Clearly, the alliance and U.S. leadership were not functioning as the means to the ends of U.S. foreign policy, but became the end in themselves.

The confluence of these trends does not augur well for the continued management of international peace and security through an enduring alliance system. Alliances are intended to be a cost-effective means of protecting and promoting American interests. But the United States is no longer able to discriminate among security priorities, and the alliance system is hampering the effectiveness of U.S. national strategy. To reverse this slide, the United States must take charge of reforming the system instead of mistaking defense of the status quo as a manifestation of leadership.

Moreover, U.S. alliance leadership should not become a shibboleth for crisis management worldwide. Much as domestic policy analysts have questioned the utility of federal leadership in areas such as education and welfare, American foreign policy leadership should recognize a similar imperative in the global security hierarchy and not use America's leading role to usurp the responsibility, or discourage the capability, of alliance partners to take decisive action on minor regional affairs. Heeding these caveats, Washington should promote a security compact built on the following two principles.

Focus on Collective Defense

The majority of security challenges in the post–cold war world are likely to be local crises requiring a protracted yet low-level military commitment. The United States should not squander its power on these tangential missions, though they may be the media rage of the moment. Rather, it must focus on deterring and defeating major-power threats (such as state-to-state aggression) in key regions.

With the exception of the U.S. role in North and Central America, Washington's commitment to regional security in Europe, the Middle East, the

[33] See John Pomfret, "U.S. Builds Arc of Alliances to Contain Serbia's Power," *Washington Post*, Dec. 19, 1995.

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Persian Gulf, East Asia, and the Western Hemisphere is one of collective defense, not collective security. An alliance of collective defense (such as NATO) is a collaborative effort to defend against threats to the balance of power in a region through precisely focused missions.

An alliance of collective security (such as the United Nations, OSCE, or ASEAN), on the other hand, provides a forum through which members can organize cooperative responses to various problems of peace and security, not just major-power threats. Collective security missions are broadly defined, sometimes anticipate problems, and can encompass non-military efforts as well as limited or quasi-military interventions, including humanitarian intervention, support to nation building, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement. Collective security does not offer the same unambiguous goals as collective defense and often results in disputes among alliance members, as seen in the imbroglio among NATO allies about the U.N. mission to Somalia in 1993.[34] Overall, these alliances tend to be substantially less cohesive and decisive than those of collective defense.

The critical distinction between collective defense and collective security has been lost in recent years, especially in Europe, where local problems have thrust themselves onto NATO's agenda in the "threat vacuum" left by the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Using NATO for peripheral, ambiguous, and inconclusive security missions, such as that in the Balkans, could eventually erode U.S. public support for an American role in Europe. "Bring the boys home" will be the rallying cry if the raison d'être for an American military presence in Europe becomes policing local troubles on behalf of prosperous European allies.

Make the U.S. Role Unique and Decisive

With few exceptions, no U.S. allies have global security responsibilities. (Great Britain and France do, albeit in a more limited fashion.) Thus, as the world's only superpower with a full range of such commitments, the United States should play a unique and decisive role in its military alliances, and not needlessly duplicate the capabilities of its allies.

During the cold war, America and its allies had qualitatively similar operational capabilities for territorial defense. While the United States had more forces and unique strategic capabilities, America's allies were able to field interoperable capabilities on the battlefield (tactical aircraft, artillery, tanks, personnel carriers, and, in the case of Great Britain and France, nuclear weapons). But the evolution of core military competencies has altered this calculus. A new security compact should focus U.S. military capabilities on missions of deterrence

[34] See Kenneth Allard, *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned* (Washington, D.C.: NDU Press, 1995), pp. 56–57.

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and war fighting where the presence of U.S. forces can alone provide the decisive edge.

In some cases the United States can make a decisive contribution with only a limited deployment of small but special capabilities (e.g., logistics or intelligence assets) that multiply the effectiveness of a coalition otherwise dominated by allies. The United States should be enthusiastic about providing a limited but decisive edge to an operation led by allies so long as it does not undermine the U.S. ability to meet more important security commitments elsewhere. In broader missions, such as the war in the Persian Gulf, the United States might be called upon to dominate the force structure, command-and-control arrangements, and operational planning. In management guru Peter Drucker's words,

> Effective leaders delegate a good many things; they have to or they drown in trivia. But they do not delegate the one thing that only they can do with excellence, the one thing that will make a difference, the one thing that will set standards, the one thing they want to be remembered for. They do it.[35]

Leadership in the alliance system naturally devolves on the United States, owing to the major-power security guarantee that only America can deliver and the enormous power it can bring to bear. Along with the unique and decisive military capabilities it can deploy for almost any operation, these constitute the immutable pillars of U.S. leadership in military alliances, a role that cannot be delegated. But a failure to delegate any responsibilities risks turning the alliance system into what political scientist Benjamin Schwarz calls a "wasting proposition" that needlessly siphons off American resources.[36]

The United States therefore must not feel trapped into leading all ambiguous missions. A Herculean effort to provide the preponderance of resources in every alliance would only sacrifice U.S. resources and determination, while giving its allies carte blanche to concentrate on "productivity, market penetration, wealth, and innovation: the kind of power that matters most in today's world."[37]

Fixing the Alliances

If the United States is to counteract the trends eroding the alliance system and avoid being bankrupted by trying to play clinician, cop, and social worker to the world, it must insist on a fair apportioning of responsibilities and costs with its allies. Washington must devise new approaches to some alliances, reject the proposed restructuring of others, perhaps conclude some new ones,

[35] Peter Drucker, "Not Enough Generals Were Killed," *Forbes ASAP,* Apr. 8, 1996, p. 104.

[36] Benjamin C. Schwarz, "The Arcana of Empire and the Dilemma of American National Security," *Salmagundi,* Winter/Spring 1994, p. 195. Schwarz's case is a variant of the theme of "imperial overstretch" raised in Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New York: Random House, 1987).

[37] Ronald Steel, *Temptations of a Superpower* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995), p. 5.

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and in every case subject its alliances to scrutiny designed to determine how they can best support American interests.

Europe. In post–cold war Europe and the Mediterranean, NATO remains the premier fact of life in the security arena. And even with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the collective defense of Europe is an enduring American interest. Moreover, NATO's unprecedented levels of institutionalization and cooperation make it the most credible, functional, and useful military alliance of all time. As the war in the Persian Gulf highlighted, the work that has gone into NATO standards, interoperability, and defense cooperation can be an enormous advantage in operations outside of NATO as well.

Nonetheless, the continued success of the alliance will depend on the will and ability of NATO's European (and Canadian) members to practice increased self-reliance in local missions. This shifting must in turn be bolstered by mechanisms such as the combined joint task force, an organizational framework that will allow European allies to borrow NATO resources for European-led missions. The CJTF was proposed by the United States in 1993 and finally approved by NATO in June 1996. It need only be taken off the drawing board and put into practice.

Once implemented, the CJTF structure will allow NATO and Europe to abandon the cold war paradigm of "all-for-one and one-for-all" by tailoring packages for specific missions. A CJTF operation can be composed of almost any mix of allied units and led by either an American (as in NATO's war-fighting structure) or European commander. An operational force can even be formed outside of NATO and led by other European security organizations, for example, the WEU or the OSCE. In that case, the CJTF could temporarily "lease" NATO units that would be "separable but not separate." A CJTF would also allow non-NATO European states to contribute troops, as many have done for the implementation force in Bosnia.

The U.S. ambassador to NATO, Robert Hunter, called the CJTF "the first significant change in the way the alliance does business since 1966" (when the French left the military structure of the alliance).[38] Not only does the CJTF's flexibility permit allies with the greatest interest in local crises to take the lead and help to equip them for the necessary missions, it can be equally valuable to NATO's traditional task of providing a credible combat capability to deter a major-power threat in Europe. For once the CJTF is put in charge of handling lesser security dilemmas, the United States will be freed to concentrate on its singular role as NATO's war-fighting leader. That is why the CJTF must not be allowed to atrophy in the committee rooms at NATO headquarters but should manage the follow-on force in Bosnia through 1997 and beyond. The United States might still contribute support capabilities to this European-led CJTF, but the bulk of the troops would come from NATO allies. In 1998, any residual Bosnia force would become entirely European. It would still be a CJTF, but it

[38] "NATO Acquires A European Identity," *The Economist*, June 8, 1996, p. 51.

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would be led by a European organization and would no longer be officially connected with NATO.

Of all the U.S. alliances, both formal and informal, NATO is most in need of reform aimed at a clear division of labor. America's NATO allies are prosperous and democratic states. Though they chose to cut defense spending, cut capabilities, and follow ineffective half-measures in Bosnia for four years, they are more than capable of handling European peacekeeping missions with support in key areas from the United States. Mechanisms such as the CJTF will allow European allies to pick up the slack in missions like Bosnia, freeing the United States for more important security tasks.

East Asia. During the cold war, the U.S. bilateral alliance with Japan was the cornerstone of American strategy in East Asia. The alliance remains critical today, especially because China and North Korea pose two of the most salient threats to peace in a region of increasing importance to U.S. national security. Over the years, however, many have criticized the structure of this relationship.[39] Some observers believe that the United States pays too much to maintain some 47,000 troops in Japan when many Japanese (especially the Okinawans) want the troops to leave. Others argue that the Japanese take advantage of America's security blanket to invest would-be defense funds in economic production that eventually harms the United States in unfair trade deals. Still others maintain that in a major-power crisis in East Asia, the Japanese would not support U.S. combat operations unless Japan itself were attacked.

All these points deserve consideration in an ongoing reassessment of the U.S.-Japanese alliance. Nonetheless, the basic structure of the alliance serves America well. The U.S. mission in the alliance focuses on collective defense, while Japan's Self-Defense Force is committed to defending Japan and the sea lanes out to one thousand nautical miles from the home islands. U.S. military forces based in Japan also deter regional threats, as they did in March 1996 when the deployment of two U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups to the area around Taiwan convinced China that the United States was still determined to hold Beijing to its promise not to pursue coercive unification. And with Japan contributing more than $5 billion to the basing of U.S. troops and facilities, the alliance is by far the best cost-sharing arrangement with any ally. (The Clinton administration maintains that it would be more expensive to base those troops back in the United States.)[40]

In April 1996, the United States and Japan concluded additional defense cooperation arrangements that would marginally increase Japan's role in Asian security affairs. These steps were intended to make Japan a better partner in regional contingencies, and not to precipitate a reevaluation of each country's distinct role.

[39] See, for example, Ted Galen Carpenter, *Paternalism and Dependence: The U.S.-Japanese Security Relationship*, Policy Analysis, no. 244 (Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, Nov. 1, 1995).

[40] DOD, *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region* (Washington, D.C.: DOD, Feb. 1995), p. 24.

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But many observers dismissed these steps as cosmetic and still call for Japan to assume an even greater Asian security role. Yet traditionally a fully militarized Japan with a unilateral defense policy has been destabilizing to the region. Moreover, Japan's remilitarization would not further the alliance goals of the security treaty and could even work against U.S. strategy in the Asia-Pacific region. The United States therefore should not ask Japan to assume the role of deterring major-power conflict in the region. In East Asia, as elsewhere, the job of confronting threats to the balance of power is uniquely America's. But Washington should encourage Tokyo no less than London, Paris, or Bonn to contribute to regional missions. Japanese participation in the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Cambodia in 1993 was a valuable first step. So long as Japan does not assume a grand strategic role, or build weapons or intelligence systems conducive to grand strategy, its Asian neighbors need not fear—and may in time welcome—a Japanese "cop" on the local police force.

No power but the U.S. can provide a reassuring military presence in Korea.

The U.S.–South Korea alliance, by contrast, is more narrowly conceived since it exists to defend against a sole scenario: invasion of South Korea by North Korea. Some critics have questioned the presence of the 34,000 American troops in Korea, labeling them redundant given the large size of the South Korean defense forces. However, the United States does not maintain ground troops in Korea because South Korea needs another infantry division to defend itself. Rather, U.S. ground troops are the embodiment of a commitment to peace in what is perhaps the most volatile corner of the great-power international system. It is there, on the borders of Korea, that Russia, China, Japan, and the United States meet. It is there that a rogue regime possesses the capability, and perhaps the intention, of lighting the fuse of a great-power war. Were the United States to withdraw, no other power could provide a reassuring presence. Indeed, any effort by Russia, China, or Japan to do so would risk sparking the very conflict it was meant to repress.

The Middle East. Ad hoc coalitions drawn from de facto alliances are not only useful but preferable to formal de jure alliances like NATO in regions comprised of disparate states divided by religion, ideology, and geopolitics. The United States maintains such a "coalition in waiting" in the Persian Gulf, where security agreements with Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf states are marked by low-key defense cooperation agreements regarding basing privileges, defense training and supply, and combined military exercises. Though there is no treaty requirement—and little in the way of positive inducements to alliance—it is well understood that the negative inducement to unity afforded by the threat of Iraqi (or Iranian) aggression suffices to preserve the balance of power implicit in the strategy of "dual containment." Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states provide invaluable ports, bases, supplies, and key infrastructure. Germany and Japan chipped in billions to help finance the war in the Persian Gulf and would be asked, in need, to do so again. NATO allies and others provide air, sea, and ground assets to complement the U.S. forces. Islamic countries such as Egypt,

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Syria, Morocco, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and others contribute forces that may have been militarily irrelevant to past coalitions but were politically vital.

Local allies aside, the Gulf is clearly a case where the United States must be directly engaged by reason of its own interest—oil, most obviously, and the desire to shelter Israel and friendly Arab states from regional chaos—and by reason of the threat from rogue regimes known to crave missiles and weapons of mass destruction. But in the Middle East, no less than in the Balkans, the United States cannot assume responsibility for deterring or punishing the equivalent of "street crime"—for instance, the violence among rival Kurdish factions. For to try to do so and fail would destroy the superpower's credibility, while to deploy the forces needed to succeed would once again erode the strapped U.S. military's ability to perform its indispensable war-fighting mission. That is why the United States must take vigorous and immediate steps to support local allies, Turkey above all, in assuming leadership roles in the Middle East.

Elsewhere. There are, to put the point bluntly, no other regions of the world in which U.S. vital interests are directly threatened at present or will be in the near future. There are, therefore, no other regions of the world in which U.S. military forces need be engaged through a military alliance. That is not to say that a future Russian (or Chinese) thrust into Central Asia would not be a scary signal that American power may have to be invoked. But Americans are not prepared to die for Tajikistan, and Washington certainly cannot broker an effective alliance in that region. U.S. diplomatic offices may be of use in South and Southeast Asia, but the American public is not willing, nor is the U.S. military prepared, to ally with or coerce India, Pakistan, or China (or Vietnam) in case of regional strife. Africa is very much on the map of charitable Americans but is completely off the map of the Pentagon. Latin America, of course, remains a U.S. bailiwick, but everyone is happier when needed interventions are performed by Canadians or regional states rather than by "Yankee imperialists."

But if the United States refrains from entering military alliances and takes no more than a supporting role in ethnic and religious conflicts or humanitarian disasters in most of the Third World, who will undertake these tasks? It is simply up to regional powers, with or without cooperation from the United Nations, to walk the beats in their neighborhoods. To the extent those powers need occasional U.S. assistance in logistics, intelligence, or other specialized capabilities, let them seek U.S. help, rather than vice versa. Let them ask Washington for an "alliance" or understanding, instead of the other way around. And the candidates for the roles of local leaders are obvious. In Latin America, the standouts are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela. In South Asia, India and Pakistan have no choice but to mend their fences or prepare to suffer forever. In Africa, the present prospects for regional leaders of any sort are dim. In the ex-Soviet world, the only possible policeman is, yes, Russia, assuming that unhappy country proves willing and able to take its place as a responsible regional power in league with the West. Filling out this roster of local "G.P.s" and "cops on the beat" may take many decades. But if there is to be a new world order, that is how it will come about, not through increased and indiscriminate American intervention, but through precisely the opposite.

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That is so, first, because an America whose military chases every ambulance will soon be unable to prevent the big calamities and, secondly, because it will soon exhaust Americans' tolerance even for seeing to little contingencies.

That does not mean the United States will not participate in lesser interventions that have clear goals and a chance for success. It also does not preclude aggressive U.S. diplomatic and economic strategies for those areas where the United States does not have a military alliance. Regional devolution, as an alliance strategy, merely means that all members should box at their own weight level to get the most out of the team.

Conclusion

Most Americans would agree that the United States must be active in the world, but not so active that the effort wastes American resources and energies in interventions that yield little or no payoff and undermine military preparedness. The need for a policy of highly selective engagement is all the more acute owing to the numerous security challenges that the United States must address with a shrinking pool of military resources. There is just no alternative, therefore, to reforming U.S. alliances in ways that forestall further confusion about the U.S. role in minor post–cold war security challenges. The way to begin is simply to announce to America's allies and partners the criteria that will define when, where, why, and how the United States might choose to use military force and, by implication, the situations in which it will expect its partners to assume leadership. In other words, America proclaims that "superpowers don't do windows," so if you want your local windows washed, you had better gear up to do them yourselves.

Such an "agonizing reappraisal" might shock some, especially in Europe, but it is based on a commonsense recognition that there is a hierarchy in international security composed of local military powers, regional powers, global powers, superpowers, and entities such as alliances and international organizations. The hierarchy conduces to order rather than chaos when each constituent part has roles and responsibilities that match its interests and capabilities. If an organization tries to do too much, it fails. That has been evident for the past few years with the United Nations. Similarly, if the United States attempts to do too much, as it does now, its forces become overstretched and lose sight of their most significant roles.

Consequently, the United States should focus its security policies on major threats such as other great powers or rogue regimes that can upset the balance of power in key regions. America's allies should take the lead in local crisis management, peacekeeping, and humanitarian relief operations. History shows that another major conflict is never far away and is usually unpredictable. The United States is the only nation capable of forestalling or fighting that conflict. It must remain focused on doing so, for that is the task no one else can do.

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

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The IMF through a Mexican Lens

by Ian Vásquez

A political cartoon that appeared in Mexico's popular *Proceso* magazine in 1995 typified the widespread confusion about the role of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the Mexican economy. It depicted President Ernesto Zedillo as an impoverished street person hawking IMF books on neoliberalism. By linking market reforms to IMF intervention the cartoon perpetuated the erroneous idea that the fund is in the vanguard of international capitalism, incessantly advancing economic liberalization.

It is ironic that the IMF, the World Bank, and other post–World War II international organizations—whose creators distrusted the ability of the unfettered market to promote global economic development—are so strongly associated with classical liberal policy changes in developing countries. However, the perception is understandable when these organizations' officials never tire of professing that multilateral agencies are "critically" important to opening economies. During the annual World Bank–IMF meetings in October 1995, for example, Lawrence Summers, deputy secretary of the U.S. Treasury and former chief economist at the World Bank, claimed that the mission of the international financial institutions "over the past half-century has been to support the developing world's evolution to a market economy."[1]

Free-market economists, however, have long believed that multilateral lending agencies hamper economic prosperity.[2] For instance, Milton Friedman stated, "I strongly oppose any increase in the IMF's quota and prefer to move in the opposite direction to see how we can dismantle the IMF and get rid of it."[3] According to Sir Alan Walters, a former economic advisor to British prime

[1] Lawrence H. Summers, "An IFI Question: Are Multilaterals the Solution?" *Wall Street Journal*, Oct. 12, 1995. See also International Monetary Fund (hereafter, IMF), "Ten Common Misconceptions about the IMF," n.d., p. 3.

[2] See Roland Vaubel, "The Political Economy of the IMF: A Public Choice Analysis," in *Perpetuating Poverty: The World Bank, the IMF, and the Developing World*, ed. Doug Bandow and Ian Vásquez (Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, 1994), p. 37.

[3] Quoted in ibid. See also Milton Friedman, "'No' to More Money for the IMF," *Newsweek*, Nov. 14, 1983, p. 96.

Ian Vásquez is the director of the Project on Global Economic Liberty at the Cato Institute and co-editor of *Perpetuating Poverty: The World Bank, the IMF, and the Developing World* (Cato Institute, 1994).

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minister Margaret Thatcher, "The ideal solution would be to abolish the Fund and the Bank."[4]

In Mexico, the recent peso crisis, following years of bold liberal reforms, revived the debate about the proper role of international lending agencies in that country's economy. Michel Camdessus, the managing director of the IMF, called the peso debacle the first crisis of the twenty-first century and responded by promising Mexico an unprecedented $17.8 billion. That loan was the fund's largest ever to any country, and it exceeded the sum of IMF lending to all countries in 1993 and 1994.[5] Moreover, the credit was only part of a $50 billion bailout package, to which the U.S. Treasury pledged an extraordinary $20 billion.

The plight of the peso also generated much contention but ultimately little understanding of the virtues and defects of the market, which many blame for both causing the crisis and stymieing its resolution. Those reasons alone justify a sober analysis. But an evaluation is even more critical because events in Mexico, unlike those in most other developing countries, seem to have disproportionate international repercussions. One need only recall how Mexico's August 1982 announcement that it could not meet its debt-service obligations triggered the world debt crisis. In the mid-1990s, officials at the IMF and the U.S. Treasury greeted Mexico's most recent financial crisis as an opportunity to expand the resources and influence of the fund. But before the world's governments give the IMF new powers, ostensibly to deal with Mexican-style crises, it is important to examine the fund's record and understand the lessons of Mexico.

The IMF Yesterday and Today

The IMF is funded by national governments and lends only to governments, primarily those of poor countries. Established in 1944, the fund originally promoted international trade and exchange-rate stability in the post–World War II era. Because of their "faith in the virtues of deliberate international monetary cooperation,"[6] the fund's architects sought to discourage the proliferation of free exchange rates. Rather, under a system of fixed exchange rates, the IMF would provide temporary loans to countries suffering from balance-of-payments difficulties.

World trade did expand steadily in the postwar era, and some economists credit the IMF for that increase. Others express doubts about the IMF's success in its first few decades of operation. Economist Leland Yeager, for example,

[4] Alan Walters, *Do We Need the IMF and the World Bank?* Current Controversies, no. 10 (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, Sept. 1994), p. 22.

[5] Allan H. Meltzer, "End the IMF" (paper presented at the Cato Institute's 13th Annual Monetary Conference, Washington, D.C., May 25, 1995), p. 6.

[6] Leland B. Yeager, *International Monetary Relations: Theory, History, and Policy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), p. 355.

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asserts that the fund's exchange-rate system may actually have distorted "patterns of resource allocation, production, and trade," and suggests that the rise in post–World War II trade can be explained by other factors. He argues that the growth of international trade represents largely a recovery from the disruptions caused by the Great Depression and the two world wars.[7] It was only in the mid-1970s that global trade as a share of the global economy regained the levels it had enjoyed in 1913.[8]

In 1966 Yeager observed, "It is questionable whether the Fund has even yet established real confidence in currencies. Rate adjustments sometimes occur; and when they do, they are likely to be sharper—20 or 30 percent over a weekend—than those characteristic of fluctuating rates."[9] Historian Francis Gavin described the postwar international monetary system as "unworkable from the start." The combination of fixed exchange rates, domestic autonomy, and liberalized trade, capital flow, and convertibility policies precluded non-politicized solutions to balance-of-payments problems. According to Gavin, the system "promptly began to break down" once major European governments introduced currency convertibility in 1958.[10]

When the system of fixed exchange rates finally collapsed in the early 1970s, so did the IMF's official mission. Instead of closing down, however, the fund doubled its lending from 1970 to 1975 and has been finding new functions for itself ever since. In the 1970s, for instance, the IMF reasoned that it must lend to poor countries affected by high oil prices. Then in the 1980s, the agency became deeply involved in the world debt problem and as a result received increased funding. And the fall of the Berlin Wall produced even more potential clients, leading to yet another substantial increase in IMF resources in 1992.

Conditionality

Whether its stated purpose is to manage a country's debt crisis, move a socialist country to the market, or provide easy credit to the government of a poor nation, the IMF makes loans on the condition that recipient governments undertake certain policy measures. In theory, at least, such conditionality is intended to improve a nation's economy.

In practice, however, the fund has been largely unable to enforce its conditions. The economic targets it sets (e.g., inflation rates, size of the deficit) are frequently ignored entirely or prove overly optimistic. Jeffrey Sachs, who stated that most IMF agreements "are now honored in the breach," is among many economists who have observed that adherence to conditionality is far

[7] See ibid., 2nd ed., 1976, pp. 404–5.

[8] Paul Krugman, *Growing World Trade: Causes and Consequences*, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1995), p. 330.

[9] Yeager, *International Monetary Relations* (1966), p. 356.

[10] Francis J. Gavin, "The Legends of Bretton Woods," *Orbis*, Spring 1996, p. 185.

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from strict.[11] As a result, some governments uninterested in genuine reform have received generous IMF subsidies for years. Decades of being on the IMF dole have not prevented Zaire or Sudan, for example, from maintaining extensive state control over their economies. Of course, the fund sometimes discontinues credit to countries that blatantly disregard their agreements, and recipient governments sometimes introduce policy changes consistent with IMF recommendations. But in cases where the fund cuts recipients off, it usually resumes lending after receiving further promises that more credit will produce real reform. And government policy changes are often cosmetic or half-hearted, precluding the possibility that credit will lead to sustained economic growth.

University of California Los Angeles economist Sebastian Edwards, formerly the World Bank's chief economist for Latin America, evaluated the IMF's role in resolving the debt crisis of the 1980s as follows:

> In many cases, by approving stand-by programs whose targets everyone knows will not be met, the IMF is participating in a big charade; it is implicitly saying that . . . there is a high probability that the country will attain balance-of-payment viability in the near future. For many countries this is not the case and everybody knows it.[12]

Rather than promote economic reforms in the developing world, IMF loans have allowed politicians in recipient countries to postpone the introduction of necessary policy change. Governments that receive such aid often find it easier to avoid making the politically difficult decisions required by liberalization. So as it turns out, conditionality provides little incentive to reform. Indeed, as Fred L. Smith Jr. of the Competitive Enterprise Institute put it, the opposite incentive seems to take hold.

> One is reminded of the sinner in a small boat in a storm, praying to God that if he was saved, he would give up his wicked ways. But when out of nowhere a ship appears, he calls out, "Wait a minute, I think I'll be O.K." Third World politicians, like most politicians, prefer to delay pain.[13]

Hence, the IMF finances regimes—both authoritarian and democratic—throughout the developing world that practice all manner of interventionist schemes. India is but one example of a client state that used the international aid to support its Soviet-style five-year plans. The fund has, in effect, subsidized the types of policies and institutions responsible for poor people's misery in the first place: trade protectionism, state-owned monopolies, stifling regulations, extensive bureaucracies, price and exchange-rate controls, government-run marketing boards, investment restrictions, and so on. It is not surprising, then,

[11] Sachs and others are cited in Doug Bandow, "The IMF: A Record of Addiction and Failure," in *Perpetuating Poverty*, p. 18.

[12] Sebastian Edwards, "The International Monetary Fund and the Developing Countries: A Critical Evaluation," in *IMF Policy Advice, Market Volatility, Commodity Price Rules and Other Essays*, ed. Karl Brunner and Allan H. Meltzer, Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy (Amsterdam: North Holland, Autumn 1989), p. 39.

[13] Fred L. Smith Jr., "The Politics of IMF Lending," *Cato Journal*, Spring/Summer 1984, p. 226.

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that it is difficult to identify IMF success stories. In fact, the IMF appears to have helped turn poor nations into loan addicts. A review of its "temporary" loans is particularly revealing: through 1993, eleven nations had been relying on IMF aid for at least 30 years; thirty-two countries had been borrowers for 20–29 years; and forty-one countries had used IMF credit for 10–19 years.[14]

Bad Advice

While no country can be said to have achieved self-sustaining growth because of IMF aid, it would be wrong to assume that poor economic performance should be blamed on the fund's weak enforcement abilities. (Some countries do, after all, apply IMF recipes.) Rather, the lending agency suffers from a more fundamental problem: it gives bad advice.

The IMF, of course, denies imposing measures on developing countries. Instead, it ostensibly allows recipient governments to determine how they will meet the fund's macroeconomic goals. And because agreements between the IMF and recipient countries are usually confidential, the fund's exact prescriptions in each case are generally unknown. However, countries that receive IMF aid typically impose certain measures.

Wage and price controls are two such prescriptions consistently employed in Mexico and backed by the fund, especially since the onset of the 1980s debt crisis. It is not unusual for the lending agency to sponsor policies like these, as it freely admits: "in many instances, Fund-supported programs have accommodated such nonmarket devices as production controls, administered prices, and subsidies."[15] These "stabilization measures" try to reduce inflation by dictating the costs of goods and services. Not only does that top-down approach misdiagnose the principal causes of inflation (monetary and fiscal policies), but it destroys people's purchasing power and creates a scarcity of goods.

Nonetheless, a certain degree of wage and price controls has been part of many IMF-backed economic plans for Mexico since 1982, beginning with the "Program of Immediate Economic Reorganization" and including the 1995 "Agreement of Unity to Overcome the Economic Emergency."[16]

The approach has not enjoyed much success, however. While the 1982 stabilization program initially reduced inflation, in no year did inflation drop to IMF expectations. By the time the program collapsed in 1985 and the fund suspended credit, the inflation rate was 63.7 percent, compared with the IMF's

[14] IMF, *Annual Report* (Washington, D.C.: IMF, various years).

[15] IMF, "Ten Common Misconceptions about the IMF," p. 8.

[16] See Nora Lustig, *Mexico: The Remaking of an Economy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1992), pp. 28–60; Banco de México, *The Mexican Economy* (México, D.F.: Banco de México, 1995), p. 113; and Steve Hanke, "Reflections on Exchange Rate Regimes: A Tale of Two Pesos" (paper presented to the Mont Pèlerin Society, Jan. 16, 1996, Cancún, Mexico), p. 15.

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projection of 18 percent.[17] The situation in 1995 was similar. The IMF originally required 19 percent inflation for the year, but the real rate reached 53 percent.[18] And while the economic pacts of December 1987 and the early Salinas administration did succeed in cutting inflation, they did so with the help of a stricter monetary policy, trade liberalization, and deficit reduction measures—all of which the Mexican government undertook out of economic necessity brought on by previous policy failures.

Taming inflation becomes more difficult when government officials can use IMF credit to bolster inflationary monetary and fiscal policies. That was certainly true of Mexico in the early to mid-1980s, when structural reforms were not even officially contemplated and, according to Mexican economist Luis Rubio, "everything was done to reduce current spending as little as possible."[19] In the mid-1990s, with IMF help, the Mexican government continues to support money-losing enterprises and an array of government programs that do little to alleviate poverty.

Raising taxes on poor citizens will not make Mexico prosper.

Yet another policy promoted by the IMF and endorsed by governments unwilling to cut excessive spending is an increase in taxes. Mexico took such advice in 1982 and, despite poor results in that trial, again in 1995, when it raised the value-added tax by 50 percent. While higher tax rates, never known to stimulate investment, aim to close a budget deficit, it is difficult to imagine how a country like Mexico can become prosperous when the government tries to seize even more of impoverished citizens' wealth.

Perhaps the most pernicious aspect of IMF intervention, however, is the fund's mercantilist obsession with reducing deficits in a country's current account, which measures the income from transactions with other countries in merchandise sales (trade), services, and investments.[20] The IMF takes a negative view of such deficits and a positive view of surpluses. It is in fact a common trait of politicians and the popular press to portray trade and current-account deficits as bad and surpluses as good. For example, in describing "advances" in Mexico's IMF-backed program, *Washington Post* journalist Todd Robberson writes, "The $1 billion trade deficit Mexico *suffered* with the United States for the first half of 1994 turned into a $6.9 billion surplus for the first half of 1995."[21] Yet there is nothing inherently harmful about incurring such deficits, since in

[17] Lustig, *Mexico,* p. 35, table 2-3.

[18] Banco de México, *The Mexican Economy,* p. 113; Craig Torres, "The Banking Disaster in Mexico Whipsaws an Ailing Economy," *Wall Street Journal,* Jan. 25, 1996.

[19] Luis Rubio, "Stability and Stabilization in Mexico: A Historical Perspective," in *Money and Markets in the Americas: New Challenges For Hemispheric Integration,* ed. James A. Dorn and Roberto Salinas-León (Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 1996), p. 84. In 1985, Mexico's budget deficit was 9.6 percent of gross domestic product; the IMF's original target for that year was 3.5 percent. See Lustig, *Mexico,* p. 35, table 2-3.

[20] For a discussion of the balance of payments and the current and capital accounts, see Herb Stein, "Balance of Payments," in *Fortune Encyclopedia of Economics,* ed. David Henderson (New York: Warner Books, 1993), pp. 511–13.

[21] Todd Robberson, "Mexico's Year of Living Chaotically," *Washington Post,* Dec. 1, 1995. Emphasis added.

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and of themselves they say nothing about the welfare of a nation. In an open economy, citizens benefit from choosing the best goods and services at the lowest prices offered either at home or abroad. That freedom implies that at times a country's citizens in the aggregate will buy more from foreigners than foreigners buy from them, producing a deficit. At other times, the changing desires and conditions of countries' residents will reverse that situation. And as Adam Smith pointed out long ago, countries gain from trade whether or not they experience surpluses, because free trade allows nations to increase their wealth through specialization, improvements in efficiency and competitiveness, and acquisition of goods at the lowest costs.

Needless to say, in a world characterized by free international commerce, not all countries can have trade surpluses at the same time. Nor should many countries wish to experience current-account surpluses since the flip side of a current-account deficit is an inflow of investment funds. If a nation buys more than it sells, after all, it must find a way to finance those purchases. A country with current-account deficits attracts private domestic and foreign money because it is seen as a good place to invest. As long as those investments are voluntary, come from the private sector, and operate in a market environment, they will tend to be productive. In fact, all wealthy nations, with the exception of England, grew rich by borrowing private capital from abroad.[22] On the other hand, poor countries have not grown rich by relying on subsidies from foreign governments or by adopting mercantilist economic policies.

Critics may claim that Mexico's high current-account deficit in 1994—7.7 percent of gross domestic product—caused the subsequent peso crisis that now justifies multilateral loans. But it was not the size of the deficit that led to the peso collapse. More recent experience shows that size need not be a factor. Economist Alan Reynolds explains that

> most of the "Asian Tigers" actually began with import-led growth. South Korea, for example, ran enormous current-account deficits nearly every year for three decades up until 1986—amounting to 9% of GNP in 1961, more than 12% in 1974, and 9.5% in 1980.[23]

He further observes that had South Korea or Japan followed IMF-style advice, it is doubtful those countries would be as prosperous as they are today. Japan, for instance, reduced taxes and experienced large trade deficits with the United States for years before becoming an economic powerhouse.

Vaclav Klaus, prime minister of the Czech Republic, ardent critic of multilateral agencies, and the man who has made his country the most economically successful transition story of the former communist bloc, also recognizes the importance of nonintervention.

[22] David Osterfeld, "The World Bank and the IMF: Misbegotten Sisters," in *The Collapse of Development Planning*, ed. Peter J. Boettke (New York: New York University Press, 1994), p. 204.

[23] Alan Reynolds, *The IMF's Destructive Recipe of Devaluation and Austerity*, Hudson Institute Executive Briefing, Mar. 1992, p. 10.

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> The combination of a deficit in the trade balance with a surplus in the balance of payments is a quite natural phenomenon of the early post-transformation stage. So this is not a paradox, it is a paradigm. It is quite natural that with the visible acceleration of economic growth and especially the growth of industrial output and construction, you will have an acceleration of imports.[24]

Thus, open trade and investment did not cause Mexico's economic problems. Likewise, the country's crisis will not be solved by manipulating trade and current-account balances. In the end, it was not the current-account deficit per se but rather its dubious composition (much of Mexico's borrowing was in the form of short-term government bonds that allowed the government to spend irresponsibly during an election year) that brought about Mexico's crisis. Of course, the Mexican government's policies, particularly its populist fiscal and monetary measures of 1994, are directly responsible for the country's perilous borrowing and spending pattern. To be sure, international monetary officials recognize the importance of the composition of a country's current-account deficit. But they nevertheless insist that such deficits "are dangerous if they are too big"[25] and then arbitrarily set a "safe" limit for current-account deficits ranging anywhere from 3 to 5 percent of GDP.

A country as poor as Mexico, if it wishes to develop economically, should not be an exporter of capital as it has been under the IMF-backed program. That is not to say that the Mexican government should not be concerned with paying back its debts to the private sector. Ultimately, Mexico must honor its debt by running current-account surpluses. But the best strategy to achieve that end is to grow itself out of the debt, rather than compounding the damage of past policy mistakes by following the fund's antigrowth measures. The IMF's intervention, as will be discussed later, supplants less-painful market innovations and solutions to the peso crisis. And, as is the case with most IMF programs, the intervention only delays recovery and keeps the debt unnecessarily high.

Politicization

Unfortunately, it will be difficult for Mexico to unburden itself of IMF intervention. That is because the fund is a highly politicized institution, despite its fervent denials. After Mexico announced that it could not repay U.S. banks in 1982, for example, President Ronald Reagan (previously critical of the IMF) successfully called for an increase in resources, referring to the fund as a "critical linchpin of the world economy."[26] Assistant U.S. Treasury Secretary Marc Leland

[24] Vaclav Klaus, "Fastest Privatization Process," interview by Kevin Done and Vincent Boland, *Financial Times,* Nov. 22, 1995.

[25] Lawrence Summers, "Summers on Mexico: Ten Lessons to Learn," *The Economist,* Dec. 23, 1995, p. 47.

[26] Quoted in Smith, "The Politics of IMF Lending," p. 215.

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later put it more bluntly when he called the IMF a "convenient conduit for U.S. influence."[27]

It is doubtful that Washington would have lobbied for the IMF to bail out a country with which the United States did not share a border and in which U.S. banks did not have so much invested. The bailout of Mexico in the 1980s was almost as much a bailout of U.S. banks as of the Mexican government. In effect, the policy converted debt owed to commercial banks into debt owed to the multilateral agencies. As multilateral lending agencies increased loans to Mexico and other Latin American countries, commercial-bank lending to the region dried up. Average annual net transfers from those banks to Latin America were minus $26.4 billion between 1982 and 1986.[28] From 1985 to 1988, under Washington's IMF-led debt strategy for the Third World, official creditors paid out $700 million per year more than they collected, while private banks received $17 billion more annually than they disbursed.[29] (As many economists have observed, a large reason why major commercial banks made so many risky loans to Third World governments in the first place was an implicit understanding that rich-country governments would bail the banks out were adverse conditions to arise.[30])

Nor are claims that the IMF strategy helped avert an international financial disaster convincing. The only banks in possible danger from a Mexican default were a few large U.S. banks, including Citibank and Bank of America. To be sure, the sovereign lending practices of many U.S. banks put them in a delicate position. In 1982, the loans that the nine largest American banks extended to the forty major developing countries that were not part of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries amounted to 222 percent of the banks' capital, or about $60 billion. But not all of that debt was in doubt because some of the major borrowers, most notably South Korea and other Asian countries, had little difficulty repaying their debts. Nevertheless, the largest U.S. banks had concentrated lending in Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil (the largest debtor countries), providing them with more than $30 billion in credit by 1982.

Rather than address the crisis by funneling money through the governments of Mexico and other debtor nations, a more efficient policy would have been to allow U.S. banks to borrow directly from the U.S. Federal Reserve Board at a penalty. The central banks of rich nations have long been set up to act as the lenders of last resort to their commercial banks—a role that the IMF did not need to duplicate. As economist Deepak Lal and others suggested at the time, "The fear that bank failures triggered by Third World defaults could lead to another Great Depression, is only reasonable if it is assumed that the

[27] Quoted in Vaubel, "The Political Economy of the IMF," p. 45.

[28] See Sebastian Edwards, *Crisis and Reform in Latin America: From Despair to Hope* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 24.

[29] Melanie S. Tammen, "The Precarious Nature of Sovereign Lending: Implications for the Brady Plan," *Cato Journal*, Spring/Summer 1990, p. 248.

[30] See, for example, Deepak Lal, "The 'Debt Crisis': No Need for IMF Bailout," *Wall Street Journal*, Apr. 27, 1983.

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national authorities would allow bank failures to affect their national money supplies."[31] Another, more prudent alternative to an IMF bailout—proposed at the time by George Champion, former chairman of Chase Manhattan Bank, and William Simon, former U.S. secretary of the Treasury—would have been a move by commercial banks to increase their loan-loss reserves and write down the value of their troubled loans.[32] Instead, the IMF strategy helped not only U.S. banks but also all other Third World country creditors that were not endangered by default.[33]

The IMF intervention did more than just remove the need for commercial banks to privately renegotiate their loan terms with sovereign borrowers. By injecting itself into the crisis, the IMF made a bad situation worse by failing to restore banks' confidence in countries adhering to IMF programs. In 1988, Camdessus complained that

> net lending (from commercial banks) has remained negligible. . . . What is of concern is that assembling financing packages for countries that are making a genuine effort has remained difficult and is often subject to extended delay.[34]

In a review of the 1980s, Francisco Gil Díaz, a high official in Mexico's Finance Ministry, also complained about private banks' behavior despite Mexico's compliance with goals set by multilateral lending agencies: "Fresh money was supposedly provided with each negotiation, but foreign banks provided resources with one hand and took them away with the other."[35] The IMF thus needlessly thrust Western taxpayers into a problem that would have been better resolved privately, exacerbating and politicizing an already precarious situation. Moreover, the attention paid to highly indebted countries was disproportionate coming from agencies purportedly interested in helping all poor countries. The highly indebted countries had average per capita incomes of $1,430 (in 1987), while the average per capita incomes of the poorest nations (primarily in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa) were about $290 and $500, respectively.[36]

In short, the debt crisis of the 1980s proved that the IMF was thoroughly politicized. Did the fund at least succeed in liberalizing Mexico's economy during that time? Apologists for the IMF would answer yes—after all, from 1982 to 1987, Mexico reduced the number of its state-owned enterprises from 1,150 to 617. But many of those privatizations involved small companies, and many

[31] Lal, "The 'Debt Crisis.'" See also Robert E. Weintraub, "How Threatening Is the World Debt?" *Wall Street Journal,* May 16, 1983.

[32] William E. Simon, "Cut Off the International Loan Lushes," *Wall Street Journal,* Apr. 6, 1983.

[33] Vaubel, "The Political Economy of the IMF," p. 44. See also Peter Bauer, *The Development Frontier: Essays in Applied Economics* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991), pp. 57–58.

[34] Quoted in Oxford Analytica Staff, *Latin America in Perspective* (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1991), p. 307.

[35] Francisco Gil Díaz, "Tax Reform Issues in Mexico," in *World Tax Reform: Case Studies of Developed and Developing Countries,* ed. Michael J. Boskin and Charles E. McLure Jr. (San Francisco, Calif.: International Center for Economic Growth, 1990), p. 266.

[36] Kenneth Rogoff, "Third World Debt," in *The Fortune Encyclopedia of Economics,* p. 754.

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public enterprises were simply merged while the large state-owned enterprises went untouched. In fact, despite the divestitures, the output share of public enterprises in the economy actually rose during that time.[37] And public enterprises were also responsible for the majority of Mexico's foreign debt, with twenty-seven enterprises accounting for 85 percent of that debt at the outset of Mexico's fiscal crisis.

It is a shame that IMF-led debt renegotiations allowed Mexico to avoid widespread privatization, which would have been a big step toward resolving that country's crisis. In the end, IMF lending dragged out the economic debacle, and liberalization finally took place only at the close of the "lost decade" despite, not because of, the IMF.

Establishing a Moral Hazard

In contrast to its 1982 experience, Mexico's current peso crisis has occurred in the context of freer trade and a far more liberal economy. The previous debt disaster was caused by public indebtedness and increased state activity in economic affairs. This time, a debt-driven crisis was not supposed to happen. Nevertheless, it did, and the United States and the IMF responded as they have in the past. Indeed, this marks the fourth time in the past twenty years that both the U.S. Treasury and the fund have rescued Mexico City during election-year currency crises.[38] Each time, the bailout amounts have increased. In 1976, the United States and the IMF began lending Mexico $1.2 billion after outgoing president Luis Echeverría tripled his country's foreign debt. Next, in 1982, Washington and the IMF gave Mexico more than $1.8 billion after President José López Portillo quadrupled the foreign debt and created a fiscal deficit of 17 percent of GDP. (According to Mexican intellectual Enrique Krauze, the administrations of Echeverría and López Portillo were the most irresponsible in all of Mexican history.[39]) Then in 1988, the fund and the United States lent Mexico more than $3.5 billion following a devaluation. And as mentioned, the 1994 devaluation brought promises of $20 billion from Washington and $17.8 billion from the IMF.

Though previous IMF programs have not had long-term success, Washington and the fund continue to respond to economic crises in the same manner. Such a predictable reaction brings a moral hazard: the very fact that the Mexican government expects an official bailout if things go wrong encourages financial distress. Investors become less cautious about their investments, and policy-

[37] Lustig, *Mexico*, pp. 105, 170 n. 31.

[38] This discussion relies largely on W. Lee Hoskins and James W. Coons, *Mexico: Policy Failure, Moral Hazard, and Market Solutions*, Policy Analysis, no. 243 (Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, Oct. 10, 1995).

[39] See Enrique Krauze, "México, la dictadura perfecta?" (Mexico, the perfect dictatorship?), in *El Desafío Neoliberal: El Fin Del Tercermundismo en América Latina* (The Neoliberal Challenge: The End of Underdevelopment in Latin America), ed. Barry B. Levine (Bogotá: Grupo Editorial Norma, 1992), p. 185.

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makers can afford to behave irresponsibly, knowing they will not be held accountable for their actions.

In all four episodes, the principal cause of instability was poor monetary policy born of the government's election-year concerns. The latest instance was particularly devastating because Mexico had recently achieved impressive market-oriented progress. Nonetheless, the moral hazard was already in place. Partly as a result, Mexican policymakers not only failed to tighten monetary policy when necessary, they also increased spending by 11.6 percent, resulting in an unreported budget deficit of 4.7 percent of GDP in 1994.[40]

The Current Crisis and Beyond

Political violence in 1994 also had a role in the peso crisis, but at best it only aggravated the underlying conditions that led to that crisis. Despite what some have insisted, the violence cannot be blamed for Mexico's economic turmoil. The March assassination of ruling party presidential candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio caused only a temporary decline, albeit a sharp one, in foreign exchange reserves (which fell from a peak of $29 billion in February and then remained stable at more than $16 billion from July through October of that year). The rebel uprising in Chiapas, which broke out in January, had little effect on capital flows.

The real root of the crisis was official Mexican policy at the time, which was complicated by the government's commitment to a pegged exchange rate dating back to the IMF-backed "Pacto" of 1988. Under that arrangement, the government agreed to use the exchange rate as an anchor to stabilize the currency while it undertook other economic reforms. But that type of structure is difficult to maintain. Capital inflows produced by liberalization and a more reliable currency tend to drive up the value of the currency. To offset currency pressure and maintain the given exchange rate, the central bank must purchase foreign exchange reserves. Then to counter the resulting increase in the monetary base and avoid inflationary pressures, the authorities must in turn sell a certain amount of securities.

The Bank of Mexico followed precisely that script when the country began experiencing large capital inflows in 1989. With such substantial inflows, Mexico needed to keep selling securities. Yet, as economist James Meigs observed,

> To sell more Mexican bonds in the domestic market, the Banco de México would have to offer a higher yield or some other inducement. . . . The higher risk-adjusted yield

[40] For an analysis of Mexican monetary policy, see Allan H. Meltzer, *A Mexican Tragedy* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, Jan. 1996). For fiscal deficit figures in 1994, see Jonathan E. Heath, "Reflections on Mexico's Devaluation: The Debate over Economic Policy in 1994," in *Money and Markets in the Americas*, p. 131; U.S. General Accounting Office, *Mexico's Financial Crisis: Origins, Awareness, Assistance, and Initial Efforts to Recover* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, Feb. 1996), pp. 62–63.

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> on Mexican bonds then would provide incentive for investors and speculators . . . to transfer more dollars to Mexico to buy bonds, thus increasing the capital inflow that the Bank was trying to sterilize. At times, the Banco de México was like someone trying to bail out a boat with water leaking in almost as fast as it could be bailed out.[41]

The difficulty of successfully maintaining that arrangement also led Milton Friedman in 1992 to warn against its inflationary and destabilizing potential, and to recommend that Mexico adopt a free exchange rate.[42]

Despite its complexity, the government's policy appeared to be successful until 1994, when capital outflows began in the wake of Colosio's assassination. The Bank of Mexico responded by selling reserves to defend the exchange rate and buying securities to prevent a drop in prices. The government decided to attract foreign capital, not by raising interest rates—which would have slowed the economy during an election year—but by issuing *tesobonos* or short-term dollar-indexed bonds. Mexican authorities claim they were hesitant to raise interest rates for fear of jeopardizing the stability of the banking system. It is difficult to imagine, however, that Mexican banks would have been worse off than they have been after the peso crisis had interest rates been raised in 1994. Moreover, the Mexican banks were in precarious financial conditions because of government policy to begin with. The reprivatization of the banks in the early 1990s was carried out as a means to raise revenue for the government. That market's protection from foreign competition raised the banks' sale prices by about three times their market value. Not only did the reprivatized banks enter the market overly indebted and protected, but their new private owners had to reorganize highly bureaucratized and inefficient institutions.

By November 1994, foreign investment in *tesobonos* represented 70.3 percent of total foreign investment in Mexican government securities, up from 6.4 percent in January of the same year.[43] In effect, the government successfully drew foreign capital without significantly raising interest rates; but it did so by increasing its liability to dangerous levels.

Unfortunately, Mexican monetary and fiscal policies remained loose even after the August presidential elections. When as a result the real value of the peso started to fall, the Mexican central bank once again began spending its reserves in November to strengthen the peso and maintain the pegged exchange rate. The assassination of another ruling party official, José Francisco Ruiz Massieu, and further unrest in the state of Chiapas in the fall and winter, only exacerbated the conditions established by inconsistent expansionary and exchange-rate policies. Government policies ultimately proved unsustainable as reserves fell too low to continue defending the exchange rate. Moreover, the

[41] James Meigs, "Mexican Monetary Lessons," *Cato Journal*, Winter 1997.

[42] See Hiram Ordóñez Morales, "Necesario Liberar la Paridad Cambiaria del Peso Frente al Dólar: Friedman" (Friedman: It's Necessary to Liberalize the Peso-Dollar Exchange Rate), *El Economista* (Mexico City), May 20, 1992. For a more complete critique of fixed exchange-rate systems, see Milton Friedman, "The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates," in *Essays in Positive Economics* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 157–203.

[43] U.S. General Accounting Office, *Mexico's Financial Crisis*, p. 64.

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loss of reserves and inevitable devaluation eliminated the government's ability to repay the dollar-indexed bonds coming due in 1995.

To make matters worse, Mexico initially devalued its currency by 15 percent rather than move immediately to a free float. By setting another arbitrary exchange rate without undertaking corresponding policy measures that could restore confidence—such as restricting spending or credit—the government essentially subsidized the currency's flight. As economist Arnold Harberger noted, that policy was

> an invitation to what we call one-way speculation (in which the speculator has virtually no downside risk). . . . Those who got their money out at an exchange rate of 3.9 pesos per dollar were clear . . . winners in that situation. Mexico's taxpayers, the Mexican people, were the losers.[44]

Preventing Future Disasters

The fund's intervention has once again precluded a less-expensive market solution to the classic problem of possible default. Mexicans would be far better off were the government forced to deal directly with its private creditors. Without the IMF or U.S. Treasury, both Mexico City and its creditors would have had an incentive to renegotiate the country's debts, because both parties' alternatives would have been far worse absent official sources of finance. That would have meant extending the payback period on bonds, perhaps by a number of years, and introducing serious privatization and institutional reform in exchange for continued credit in the interim. In effect, such restructuring would amount to private conditionality based on real reform.

Fortunately for Mexico, such an arrangement would be entirely feasible, since the country was never really insolvent; it is a resource-rich nation with substantial wealth still controlled by the government. The privatization of the national oil monopoly (PEMEX) alone could repay the country's official foreign debt. Of course, that measure would be politically difficult to introduce because PEMEX has historically been a symbol of Mexican sovereignty, and many people have vested interests in maintaining the monopoly. At the onset of the peso crisis, no important politician even suggested such a move because they all were confident that the international community would "rescue" Mexico. Given that reality, reform-minded officials would have been politically naïve to call for privatization.

Even more challenging than divestiture schemes are essential institutional reforms to prevent inflationary policies during future elections. Those might include creating a currency board or making the central bank a rules-based, accountable institution along the lines of the successful New

[44] Arnold C. Harberger, "Mexico's Exchange Rate Crisis: Executive Summary," document prepared for Bancomer, Oct. 1995, p. xvii.

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Zealand model.[45] Of course, the IMF claims it already imposes strict conditionality that promotes privatization and other reforms. But the fund's involvement is not much different than in the past. By late 1996, the government retreated from plans to privatize the oil monopoly's petrochemicals division, and the ruling party essentially rejected market liberal economic reforms at a major convention.

The IMF also argues against a private solution on the grounds that market participants alone cannot address a crisis of this magnitude. In that view, Mexico's most recent crisis differs substantially from that of the last decade, when debt exposure was limited to a few major banks. Today, holders of Mexican bonds represent thousands of creditors, who cannot possibly sit at a negotiation table with the Mexican government, much less come to an agreement among themselves. However, that argument overlooks the ethical dilemma of using taxpayer money to bail out thousands of private investors whose risky investments did not pay. It also ignores the historical record of how nations throughout Latin America resolved their debt crises prior to the existence of the IMF. Then, debt restructurings were negotiated through bondholder committees. Peru's debt repayment problems in 1876, for example, were solved because bondholders financed the country in exchange for reform and revenue from Peru's main export, guano. In another instance, Brazil's payment difficulties in 1931 led to negotiations with bondholders that ensured both continued funding and a reduced debt burden.[46]

The IMF has learned little from previous crises.

In a world without an IMF, real conditionality and reform would evolve. Bondholder committees would negotiate debt, while the bonds themselves could be traded in the market, taking on a value that reflected people's confidence in the negotiations.[47] Naturally, commercial banks would also play a role in negotiating debt. University of Mannheim economist Roland Vaubel notes that "the extent to which, and the terms on which, a country can borrow in the market will crucially depend on the policies which it is expected to follow. In the market, conditionality is automatic, perfect and unavoidable."[48] Sadly, the IMF has ruled out such alternatives, and it has learned few, if any, lessons from previous experiences.

Nor does the fund appear to be fading quietly into the night. On the contrary, IMF officials have been advocating an increase in funding. As Camdessus explained, the "basic strategy is simple: strengthen [IMF] surveillance to prevent

[45] For a discussion on reforming the central bank, see Hoskins and Coons, *Mexico,* p. 12. For a discussion of the currency board option, see Steve H. Hanke and Kurt Schuler, "Monetary Systems and Inflation in Developing Countries," in *Money and Markets in the Americas,* pp. 235–60; Roberto Salinas-León, "Problems and Prospects for a Mexican Currency Board," in *Money and Markets in the Americas,* pp. 327–40.

[46] Tammen, "The Precarious Nature of Sovereign Lending," pp. 245–46; Carlos Marichal, *A Century of Debt Crises in Latin America: From Independence to the Great Depression, 1820–1930* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. 124–25, 219–24.

[47] See Rory Macmillan, "New Lease of Life for Bondholder Councils," *Financial Times,* Aug. 15, 1995.

[48] Roland Vaubel, "The Moral Hazard of IMF Lending," *World Economy,* Sept. 1983, p. 298.

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future crises, and, if a crisis occurs, strengthen the IMF to allow it to do what it did for Mexico."[49] Although that proposal—which was endorsed at the June 1995 G-7 Halifax summit and at the 1995 and 1996 annual IMF meetings—sounds straightforward, it raises a host of complex questions whose answers create more problems than they solve. The IMF's plans to increase its surveillance of countries' economic and financial conditions, make relevant data public, and provide an early-warning system to prevent or announce potential crises would essentially turn the fund into more of a credit-rating agency than it already is, a function it has performed poorly in the past. Some have even called for the IMF to audit the figures countries release and publish a "watch list" of nations that fail to provide the information the fund requires.[50] But if the IMF did perceive serious economic problems in a given country, how would the early-warning system work? Economist Raymond Mikesell asks, "Who would be warned and when? As soon as the world financial community receives a warning that a country is facing financial difficulty, a massive capital outflow is likely to occur, in which case crisis prevention would be out of the question."[51]

If, on the other hand, the IMF provided aid and advice to a country facing a crisis without disclosing those moves to the public, as some have recommended,[52] it would undermine its role as a reliable rating agency and source of information. Then the failure of but one country under IMF tutelage could discredit the fund in its newfound role. Given that the IMF would not have increased powers to enforce conditionality, and that more aid tends to delay reform, such a failure would likely occur sooner rather than later.

Lastly, it is worthwhile to ask whether or not the IMF can make credible assessments about countries' economic performances. After all, the fund faces a fundamental conflict of interest when it evaluates countries in which its own money is at stake, a problem underscored by the well-recognized institutional incentives to avoid country defaults (in many countries, the IMF has round-tripped new loans to continue receiving payments on old ones).[53] The fund could gain credibility as a surveillance and credit-rating agency only if it ceased lending.

The IMF and the G-7 nations have nevertheless advocated a doubling of the IMF's "General Agreements to Borrow," a special fund now at about $28 billion, which would serve as an emergency financing mechanism to prevent or address future Mexico-style crises. Yet any increase in the IMF's resources would be reckless and unnecessary. Despite assurances of strict conditionality, a safety net for poor countries unavoidably creates moral hazard on a global

[49] "IMF Embarked on Strategy to Adapt to New Global Environment," *IMF Survey*, Aug. 14, 1995, p. 249.

[50] See Lawrence Klein et al., "After Mexico: Emerging Markets, Emerging Crises?" *Orbis*, Spring 1996, pp. 303–4.

[51] Raymond F. Mikesell, "Proposals for Changing the Functions of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)," working paper no. 150, Jerome Levy Economics Institute, Bard College, Annandale-on-Hudson, N.Y., Dec. 1995, p. 39.

[52] Klein et al., "After Mexico," p. 304.

[53] See, for example, Mikesell, "Proposals for Changing," p. 31; Peter B. Kenen, *Ways to Reform Exchange Rate Arrangements* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994).

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scale. As economist Anna Schwartz noted, "The message to the countries that are likely candidates for rescue is, it's all right to mismanage your economy; borrow as much as you can, we won't let you default; and to the lenders, don't worry, we have the money to pay you back."[54] For that reason, the Institute of International Finance also called on the IMF and international community to avoid bailouts of countries in crisis: "The core of crisis response should be strong and convincing policy action by countries to rebuild market confidence and restore market access. . . . As secondary market prices decline, investors will take losses and governments should take action."[55]

To avoid some of the problems associated with the collapse of the peso and bailout of Mexico (the ad hoc response, the infusion of taxpayer funds, and the use of bailout money to rescue private investors) Representative Jim Leach (R-Iowa), chairman of the House Banking and Financial Services Committee, and others have proposed turning the IMF into an international bankruptcy court for countries.[56] It would oversee established bankruptcy procedures to allow distressed countries to receive new capital from private markets while restructuring their debts. But this proposal is also fraught with problems. Unlike a national bankruptcy court, which has the authority to replace a company's management or enforce rulings, the IMF would have no power to enforce its mandates on sovereign governments. It is doubtful that either developing or developed countries would allow an international organization to make decisions usually settled by national governments. That prospect is even more doubtful given that the fund "is not independent of political influence from governments that are interested parties in the negotiations."[57]

Conclusion

In the end, efforts to expand IMF functions exhibit an inherent distrust or misunderstanding of the growth of international capitalism. As one Clinton administration official put it, "It is a whole new set of priorities. Forget everything you learned about how to help developing nations. Now it's Fidelity first."[58] Hence the intense focus on Mexico-style crises, which are believed to destabilize the international financial system. Yet investors always discriminate among markets, as the post-peso-devaluation scene proved. Indeed, Mexico's currency instability posed no more than a modest threat to global finances—a conclusion

[54] Anna J. Schwartz, "G-7 Countries at Halifax Summit Repeat the Mexican Myth" (paper presented at the meeting of the Shadow Open Market Committee, Washington, D.C., Sept. 1995), p. 4.

[55] Letter from Charles H. Dallara, managing director of the Institute of International Finance, to Minister Philippe Maystadt, chairman of the interim committee of the IMF, Sept. 12, 1996, p. 4.

[56] See Jim Leach, "Country Going Bankrupt? Call the IMF," *Wall Street Journal,* Apr. 10, 1995; Jeffrey D. Sachs, "IMF, Reform Thyself," *Wall Street Journal,* July 21, 1994. See also Barry Hager, "When Countries Go Bankrupt," *Journal of Commerce,* May 5, 1995.

[57] Barry Eichengreen and Richard Portes, *Crisis? What Crisis? Orderly Workouts for Sovereign Debtors* (London: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 1995), p. 47.

[58] David E. Sanger, "Do Fickle Markets Now Make Policy?" *New York Times,* Mar. 19, 1995.

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even an IMF report reached by August 1995.[59] Unfortunately, the new missions proposed for the IMF do more than misread the nature of the international capitalist system. Increased authority for the fund would institutionalize moral hazard, delay of market reforms, and special-interest protection in countries it seeks to aid.

As Mexico and the world head into the twenty-first century, market forces, not multilateral lending agencies, should determine international finance and development. All countries, but especially poor ones, would be better off were the IMF retired. It is time the market discipline policymakers instead of the other way around.

[59] See IMF, *International Capital Markets: Developments, Prospects, and Policy Issues* (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1995), p. 10.

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Correspondence

American Anti-Communism

To the Editor:

In his review essay, "The Vindication of American Anti-Communism" (Fall 1996), William Rusher compares *McCarthy and His Enemies,* the 1954 book co-authored by Mr. Rusher's longtime colleague William F. Buckley Jr. and L. Brent Bozell, to "one of those reconstructed dinosaurs that so enraptured moviegoers in *Jurassic Park*" (p. 635).

Mr. Rusher has a point, although I think not the one he intended. The book is indeed prehistoric, in the sense that it was published, as Mr. Rusher notes, in 1954, before the army-McCarthy hearings and the Wisconsin Republican's subsequent censure by the U.S. Senate. And in the more than four decades since it was published, there has been a veritable library of studies bearing on the demagogic senator and what has come to be known as McCarthyism.

One might have expected that if Messrs. Buckley and Bozell wanted, after all these years, yet again to vindicate "Tail Gunner Joe," they would have written a new book taking those studies into consideration instead of merely reissuing an outdated book with an introduction by Mr. Buckley. One might also expect a reviewer to be at least casually acquainted with the recent literature.

One of Joe McCarthy's principal targets—indeed, his principal target, other than the "20 years of treason" he ascribed to the Democratic administrations of Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman—was Owen Lattimore, the Far Eastern expert. In 1954, McCarthy falsely accused him of being a top Soviet spy and the principal architect of American policy in the Far East.

Three years before, the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, headed by Senator Pat McCarran (D-Nev.), targeted Lattimore, Foreign Service officer John Paton Davies, and the Institute of Pacific Affairs in its protracted hearings on domestic communism. Subsequently, Mr. Rusher writes, the full Judiciary Committee, including "the very liberal Warren Magnuson," concluded unanimously that Lattimore had been "a conscious, articulate instrument of the Soviet conspiracy"[1] (p. 633).

[1] Citing Senate Committee on the Judiciary, *The Institute of Pacific Relations,* 82nd Cong., 2nd sess., July 2, 1952, p. 224.

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The report, in fact, was not unanimous, as Robert P. Newman points out in *Owen Lattimore and the "Loss" of China* (University of California Press, 1992).

"One of the many falsehoods about SISS enshrined in our tribal history is that its IPR report was approved by the entire Senate Judiciary Committee," Newman writes.

> William F. Buckley Jr. is the foremost disseminator of this myth. We do not know the precise vote when the report was considered in full committee; however, the minutes of the meeting of Tuesday, July 1, 1952, show that none of the three liberals on the committee voted to approve it. Estes Kefauver was absent, and Harley Kilgore and Warren Magnuson each asked "that it be made a matter of record that he refrained from voting on approval of the report" (p. 395).

Commenting in his *Orbis* essay on a new book on American anti-communism, *Not Without Honor,* Mr. Rusher takes to task its author, Richard Gid Powers. "Powers," he writes, "never tells readers that Lattimore figured prominently in a 1951 Internal Security Subcommittee investigation of the malodorous Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR) and its publication, *Amerasia*" (p. 633).

Mr. Rusher never tells readers that when Lattimore was brought to trial on trumped-up charges of, among other things, perjury and of having been a sympathizer and promoter of communist interests, Federal Judge Luther W. Youngdahl, a Republican of Minnesota, threw the case out of court.

As for *Amerasia,* Mr. Rusher got that wrong, too. *Amerasia* was never published by IPR. It was in fact published and edited by one Philip Jaffe, a wealthy businessman whom historian Bertram D. Wolfe once described as "a sort of super fellow-traveler of the American Communist Party."[2]

In 1945, *Amerasia* made headlines when the FBI arrested Jaffe and five other suspects on charges of communist espionage. One of the suspects was John Stewart "Jack" Service, one of the brilliant China hands who, in the loyalty witch-hunt known as the McCarthy era, would be purged from the Foreign Service. In February 1950, in his famous—or rather, infamous—speech in Wheeling, West Virginia, McCarthy named Service as one of the 57, 81, or 205—the number he actually used never was settled—"card-carrying communists" who, he claimed, had infiltrated the State Department.

The *Amerasia* affair bears examination as a "prelude to McCarthyism," as Professors Harvey Klehr and Ronald Radosh describe it in the subtitle of *The Amerasia Spy Case.* It can fairly be described as the opening shot in the great "who lost China?" debate—a debate that bedeviled American policy toward China for decades and remains relevant today. To McCarthy and his allies, including Buckley and Bozell, the *Amerasia* affair became a cause célèbre, proof that the Roosevelt and Truman administrations were infected with

[2] Bertram D. Wolfe, introduction to *The Rise and Fall of American Communism,* by Philip Jaffe (New York: Horizon Press, 1975), p. 3, quoted in Harvey Klehr and Ronald Radosh, *The Amerasia Spy Case* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), p. 32.

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communist agents at the highest levels who had worked successfully to bring the communists to power in China.

In their book, Klehr and Radosh condemn McCarthy for his false and reckless charges but nevertheless claim to have uncovered what McCarthy, a series of congressional investigations, numerous loyalty hearings, and a herd of right-wing writers charged but never proved: that there was indeed a fix and a whitewash of the *Amerasia* spy case.

The case was sparked by an *Amerasia* article, entitled "British Imperial Policy in Asia," that appeared in February 1945. Reading it, Kenneth Wells, chief of the Southern Asia section of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), predecessor to the CIA, was astonished to find himself reading his own words, lifted from a highly classified report.

Determined to track down this appalling breach of security, the OSS sent a team of agents on a black bag job into *Amerasia*'s offices in New York City. The agents found hundreds of government documents, some locked in briefcases, some just strewn around.

Over the next two and a half months, FBI agents set up surveillance of Jaffe and his assistant, Kate Mitchell. On June 6, one month after the German surrender and two months before Hiroshima, the FBI arrested the six suspects. The case, J. Edgar Hoover would later declare, was "100 percent airtight."

Yet the suspects were never brought to trial. A federal grand jury voted 14-6 to indict Jaffe and Emmanuel Larsen, a minor Navy Department official, not for espionage, but for "conspiracy to embezzle, steal and purloin" government property. It indicted a third suspect, Andrew Roth, a Navy Intelligence lieutenant, by a vote of 13-7. It voted 18-2 not to indict Mitchell, 15-5 not to indict Mark Gayne, a pro-Soviet journalist who had written for such respectable publications as *Colliers* and *Time,* and 20-0 not to indict Service. Jaffe paid a fine of $2,500. Larsen was fined $500; Jaffe paid that, too. The government eventually dropped the case against Roth.

What happened? Why, when President Truman himself had ordered a vigorous prosecution of the case, did the Justice Department pursue the case with such an absence of zeal?

The answer, according to Klehr and Radosh, is that the fix was in. And the main behind-the-scenes manipulator, they write, was none other than that well-known Washington fixmeister, former New Dealer Thomas "Tommy the Cork" Corcoran, with the apparent connivance of T.V. Soong, Chiang Kai-shek's brother-in-law, for whom Corcoran had been acting as an agent.

Klehr, a professor of politics at Emory University, and Radosh, a professor of history at Adelphi University, base much of their argument on recently declassified FBI files. The files reveal that Corcoran (whose telephone the FBI tapped over a period of five years) did indeed intercede with Justice Department officials on behalf of Jack Service.

Yet, as the authors themselves point out, "Service would probably not have been indicted even if Corcoran had never picked up the phone in his behalf" (p. 126).

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Service, who met Jaffe for the first time in the spring of 1945 in Washington, had in fact provided the *Amerasia* publisher with classified documents, many of which he had himself classified. What he had done, as E.J. Kahn wrote in his excellent study, *The China Hands: America's Foreign Service Officers and What Befell Them* (Viking Press, 1975), was no more than what he had been doing as a Foreign Service officer in China. That was to provide journalists with information, which Chiang Kai-shek's censors did everything they could to keep from them.

Klehr and Radosh offer a more sinister slant. Service had, they write, "undertaken a covert campaign to undermine his superiors." That made him, they declare, "guilty of a major indiscretion" (p. 210). A serious charge, indeed.

Why did Tommy the Cork intervene on Service's behalf? (There is no evidence, by the way, that he had any interest in the other five defendants.) One possibility is that he wanted to do a favor to his old New Deal partner Benjamin Cohen and the Truman administration. Another is that he simply felt Service was getting a raw deal. Klehr and Radosh offer a third: that he was acting to protect the interests of T.V. Soong, his client and business associate.

But why would T.V. Soong not want to see six presumably anti-Chiang left-wingers get their just desserts? According to the authors, it may have been because he was afraid that in a trial evidence would come out not only about the corruption of the Nationalist Government but about—horrors—Chiang Kai-shek's "less than exemplary personal life" (p. 124).

If so, T.V. Soong was dumber than anyone thought. By the summer of 1945, much evidence of Chiang's corruption had already emerged, and when the war ended, and with it censorship—Chinese and American—much more would (and did) come out.

In any case, the authors only offer the theory. They speculate, and, as a matter of fact, much of the evidence that the authors offer is speculative. The book is full of such phrases as "he must have realized," "must have had some idea of," "it is likely," "strongly suggests," "possibly," and the like.

After McCarthy made his West Virginia speech, a special subcommittee headed by Senator Millard Tydings (D-Md.) proceeded to investigate his accusations. An earlier investigation, by a House subcommittee headed by Representative Sam Hobbs (D-Ala.), had investigated the *Amerasia* affair in 1946. It produced, according to Klehr and Radosh, a whitewash of the whitewash. The Tydings committee, they assert, spent six weeks on *Amerasia* and did the same.

"The possibility cannot be dismissed," they write, ". . . that Tydings had been warned off from delving too deeply into the *Amerasia* affair" (p. 204). J. Edgar Hoover, they report, had forwarded copies of the transcripts of wiretapped phone calls of Corcoran and Tom Clark, attorney general when the *Amerasia* affair broke and whom Truman had named to the Supreme Court, to Peyton Ford of the Justice Department, "and Ford may well have found a way to let Tydings know that he was veering into dangerous territory" (p. 204).

What could this "dangerous territory" have been? True, a number of Justice Department officials had been, to say the least, less than straightforward

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about their roles in the affair. The possibility cannot be dismissed, however, that they feared the revelation of the FBI's unorthodox methods of investigation—much of the government's evidence had been obtained through black bag jobs and questionable, if not downright illegal, wiretaps and bugs.

It is also true, as the authors point out, that Hoover believed that the FBI's activities during the investigation were lawful. Whether the FBI's own legal experts believed it, however, is questionable. Their position, according to the authors,

> based more on hope than any body of legal precedent, was that the black bag jobs on the *Amerasia* office were not in violation of the Fourth Amendment prohibition against illegal searches and seizure because their sole purpose was to locate and recover stolen government papers (p. 88).

However, two other researchers who had access to FBI files—Athan G. Theoharis and John Stewart Cox, in *The Boss: J. Edgar Hoover and the Great American Inquisition* (Temple University Press, 1988)—quote the FBI's legal counsel as having concluded, on the basis of its own analysis of the law and relevant court cases, that "the evidence was tainted and there is [sic] no definite cases available to substantiate that the evidence secured is admissible" (p. 242).

The possibility also cannot be dismissed that another kind of coverup was going on—J. Edgar Hoover's covering his ass. Ironically, in the course of investigations involving the unauthorized leakage of classified documents, confidential FBI materials were somehow finding their way into the hands of Joe McCarthy and other right-wing probers. And sometimes not: In a phone call to one Justice Department official, Klehr and Radosh report, Hoover "stressed that there was one subject that must not be allowed to come up: the FBI's file on Tommy Corcoran" (p. 183).

Most embarrassing to the bureau if it had. Most embarrassing to the bureau if the extent of the FBI's break-ins and wiretaps of government officials, journalists, and citizens, prominent and otherwise, not to mention Hoover's blackmail of presidents and members of Congress, had been revealed. That would not happen until the mid-1970s, when Hoover was safely dead (he died in 1972).

To be sure, a trial would have been embarrassing to the Truman administration. It would have demonstrated a serious breach in national security. It might also, as the authors suggest, have exposed "the dubious assumptions underlying America's support for the Nationalists" (p. 215), which, in retrospect, might not have been such a bad thing.

But the main reason the Justice Department did not pursue an espionage case was not that officials wanted to cover up evidence of espionage but that they did not think they could prove espionage, and they did not think it worthwhile to try a case of unauthorized possession of documents, many of which should not have been classified in the first place—and even here a case that they plainly felt they might not win.

There was, in fact, no evidence that any of the six accused in the case had ever actually transferred any classified information to Soviet or Chinese

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communist agents, except of course by publishing it in the ultra-left-wing *Amerasia*. As a spy case, *Amerasia,* as the saying goes, had no legs. But as Mark Twain once observed, "A lie can travel halfway round the world while the truth is putting on its shoes."

Leonard Boasberg
Philadelphia Inquirer

The Author Responds:

Mr. Boasberg chooses not to deal with the inconvenient fact that the Senate Judiciary Committee's report on the Institute of Pacific Relations contains no hint that any member of the committee either abstained or dissented from its conclusions. If any senator had so desired, a statement to that effect would have been included in the report as a matter of course. In addition, Senators Warren Magnuson and Harley Kilgore could have indicated any reservations they had about the report after it was issued.

As for *Amerasia,* Mr. Boasberg got that wrong, too. Frederick Vanderbilt Field, a wealthy communist, owned 50 percent of the stock of *Amerasia* and was for more than three years chairman of its editorial board. But according to the Judiciary Committee's report on the Institute of Pacific Relations (with which Mr. Boasberg really ought to familiarize himself), the magazine was "so closely linked into the IPR system that the IPR family ordinarily treated it as simply another of their own publications."[1]

William Rusher

To the Editor:

Leonard Boasberg has a quarrel with William Rusher and has decided to use our book, *The Amerasia Spy Case: Prelude to McCarthyism,* as part of the debate. We made it clear in that book that Senator Joseph McCarthy contributed more heat than light to the *Amerasia* issue. But Mr. Boasberg's description and exegesis of our book is so wide of the mark that we appreciate the opportunity to clarify what our research actually uncovered.

Mr. Boasberg is intent on using the *Amerasia* case to prove that allegations about espionage and a coverup were partisan and demagogic tricks. The *Amerasia* case, he alleges, had nothing to do with espionage. To support his charge, Mr. Boasberg pretends to summarize our book, making us say things we did not and ignoring what we did say that fails to fit his potted history of the case.

According to Boasberg, we are guilty of offering a "sinister slant" on John Stewart Service's activities because we charge that he had undertaken a secret campaign to undermine his superiors by revealing embarrassing material on Chiang Kai-shek and his government. We attribute Thomas Corcoran's

[1] Senate Committee on the Judiciary, *The Institute of Pacific Relations,* 82nd Cong., 2nd sess., July 2, 1952.

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machinations on behalf of Service to T.V. Soong's desire to avoid embarrassing public revelations about Chiang's personal life. We spend a lot of time speculating, and "as a matter of fact, much of the evidence that the authors offer is speculative." Mr. Boasberg then speculates that the real reason for the Tydings committee coverup, which he admits took place, was, in his elegant words, "J. Edgar Hoover's covering his ass." He goes on to spin a theory that the Justice Department had no case because there was no espionage.

It would not be profitable to rehash the *Amerasia* case once again—that was why we wrote our book. But Mr. Boasberg has simply ignored what is new about our book. We provide, for the first time, evidence from FBI wiretaps of the defendants. That evidence indicates that Philip Jaffe, editor of *Amerasia,* had been approached by a Soviet agent and asked to serve as a spy. His contact, a former employee of *Amerasia,* wanted information out of Service's division of the State Department. Jaffe was eager to cooperate. Although the FBI was never able to determine if he had passed on material to a foreign agent, he had several opportunities to have done so. Jaffe was quoted in a wiretapped conversation with another defendant indicating that the espionage was the reason he was so interested in cultivating Service. While there is no evidence that Service was aware of Jaffe's machinations, he was involved in a plot to leak damaging material on Chiang Kai-shek at the behest of Lauchlin Currie, later revealed to have been a Soviet agent. When Service was questioned about his activities and the role of Tommy Corcoran in helping to insure that his leaking remained secret, he lied to a congressional committee.

Moreover, we make it clear that T.V. Soong's desire to avoid a public trial may well have been linked to Service's intention to have General Stilwell testify on his behalf. Stilwell, an American hero who had been under a gag order ever since he had left China, was anxious to discredit Chiang and his government and would have welcomed the opportunity to evade the U.S. government's restrictions on him. Speculation? Certainly, but we also note in our book that it was Service himself who suggested that motivation to us.

Was Senator McCarthy on to something when he insisted before the Tydings committee that there was espionage and a coverup? Yes. Was McCarthy on target when he implied that Service was a communist or engaged in espionage? No. Was it true that a coverup was designed to prevent the emergence of embarrassing material that demonstrated how Service, whatever his motives, had been drawn into a conspiracy to commit espionage? Yes. Did J. Edgar Hoover engage in a coverup? No. In fact, he consistently leaked material to try to expose the one that was being orchestrated by the Justice Department. We demonstrate that several high-ranking Justice Department officials, including at least one attorney general, committed perjury. Presumably a staff writer for the *Philadelphia Inquirer* might regard that as modestly interesting evidence that some people thought there were secrets about the *Amerasia* case worth protecting.

Harvey Klehr and Ronald Radosh
Authors of *The Amerasia Spy Case*

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Review Essays

The Subtext of Huntington's "Clash"

by David R. Gress

The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. By Samuel P. Huntington. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996. 368 pp. $26.00.)

Two incompatible superstitions dominate American political and intellectual life in the post-Soviet era. The first is that America is, and should be, a multicultural society with no more than a few, best-forgotten historical links to the Western civilization that grew in medieval Europe from the three roots of Jerusalem, Athens, and the Teutonic forests. The second is that the Western liberal, capitalist democracies won the cold war because of their economic and moral superiority over Soviet communism, thus confirming America's position as the heartland and leader of Western civilization.

The first belief states that America neither is nor should be part of the West, while the second implies that the West has triumphed to become the only universal civilization. Clearly, both cannot be true, and if Samuel Huntington's macrohistorical tour de force does nothing else, its elaborate, precise, and morally informed exposé of the dangers that both superstitions pose to American democracy, prosperity, and stability makes his latest book worth treasuring.

Huntington's crucial message for American policymakers and pundits is contained in two propositions. The first, addressed to multiculturalists and their more or less well-meaning political promoters, states that "rejection of the [American] Creed and of Western civilization means the end of the United States of America as we have known it. It also means the end of Western civilization" (pp. 306–7). To those who say that this would in fact be a consummation devoutly to be wished, Huntington adds the corollary that a de-Westernized America in a world without the West would assuredly be more violent, less democratic, less egalitarian, and less prosperous than a Western America. The second key proposition is directed at those who believe that history has come to an end and that all nations, societies, and cultures are now, in the image made famous by Francis Fukuyama, moving along a single wagon trail toward the earthly paradise of Western liberal and capitalist democracy. They should

David R. Gress is a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and a research fellow at the Danish Institute of International Affairs in Copenhagen. He is the author, most recently, of *The Evening Country: The Idea of the West and Its Critics* (The Free Press, 1997).

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realize, he says, that "Western belief in the universality of Western culture suffers three problems: it is false; it is immoral; and it is dangerous" (p. 310). The practical implications of both precepts are given in the following warnings, which, if ignored, may spell disaster for millions: "The preservation of the United States and the West requires the renewal of Western identity. The security of the world requires acceptance of global multiculturality" (p. 318).

Huntington is setting Americans an unwonted and radical choice: to make America less of an ideology and more of a country, a nation-state resting on a secure, shared, and respected civilizational identity. It is a choice that the political, media, and academic elites may refuse to make. Looking at the political landscape and the existing agendas of debate, it is hard to see why these elites would choose the West over multiculturalism, especially after having invested much energy, prestige, and status in denouncing the West as inhumane, exploitative, sexist, imperialist, and incompetent. In the 1990s, the West has few convinced defenders in America while its enemies have many: "The best lack all conviction, while the worst / Are full of passionate intensity."[1] Often in the last two generations defenders of Western political morality and institutions have had cause to quote those lines of William Butler Yeats, and rarely with more cause than today.

Yet now there is an unapologetic defender of the West who speaks in the strategic and political idiom of the next century, and his name is Samuel Huntington. For those who have not closely followed his earlier work and thus have mistaken him for a cold war hawk interested only in weapons, power projection, and strategic alliances, his "cultural turn" and somber warnings about Western prospects may seem surprising. But *The Clash of Civilizations* highlights themes that have been implicit in Huntington's writings for forty years. He has always been interested in the tension between change and stability in complex societies, and "why, how, and under what circumstances order could and could not be achieved."[2] If Huntington did not focus strongly on culture and civilization before the 1990s, it was because world politics during the cold war was driven more by ideology and strategy than by culture, and because domestic attacks on Western civilization, particularly within America, had not achieved the volume and effectiveness in politics and the schools that they did in the 1990s.

Both multiculturalists and Western hegemonists are arrogant and self-righteous in assuming that they know how the world works, how it ought to work, and what America's place in it is. Both groups, therefore, commit a cardinal sin condemned by all good international-relations theory: they put their own ideology and preferences above the dispassionate search for truth. *The Clash of Civilizations* is, by contrast, a lesson in humility in the face of a complex and changing reality. This point deserves to be made because when the book first appeared many critics jumped on what they claimed was Huntington's

[1] "The Second Coming," in *The Collected Poems of W.B. Yeats*, ed. Richard J. Finneran, rev. 2d ed. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), p. 187.

[2] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), p. xv.

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own chauvinism on behalf of Western virtues. They accused him of turning Western preferences into absolutes and of wanting to impose them in imperialistic fashion on others. One European reviewer even charged Huntington with being "insufferably intolerant."[3] Such criticism reveals a profound and puzzling misunderstanding of the book's underlying moral purpose. Far from being chauvinist or imperialist, that purpose is to show how to avoid disastrous policies by warning against the dangers inherent in prevalent superstitions, and by proposing an original, realistic model of post–cold war international relations.

Huntington's analysis of world order and disorder in terms of civilizational identities is not just an object lesson in how to approach complex facts with respect and without prejudice. It is an exciting new version for the twenty-first century of what has remained the most productive and insightful tradition in the study of world politics, namely, realism. In the past thirty years, many attempts have been made to save, update, or revise classical realism. Huntington's portrait of a multipolar world order, whose main elements are not sovereign states or military alliances but the great civilizations, and his account of how to preserve that order peacefully challenge powerful and entrenched prejudices. What he says is not true beyond cavil; rather, by presenting an original and unusual picture, he provokes fruitful disagreement. And that, after all, is the one necessary virtue of any theory of international relations that claims to be original.

The Religious Dimension

Huntington's 1993 article, in which he first launched the idea that civilizational identity was the rising force in world politics, surprised many readers.[4] One reason for that was the new and unusual note of skepticism and pessimism they sensed from Huntington. Just two years earlier, after all, he had published *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century,* arguing that the great theme of modern history was the irresistible spread of democratic habits and institutions. The American and French revolutions were the first wave, which launched the idea, if not yet the reality, of popular sovereignty and individual liberty as realistic and worthwhile goals. The second wave followed the Allies' soldiers into Central Europe in 1944–45 and restored to at least part of the ravaged Continent a better and more durable democracy than the self-critical and vulnerable versions it had known in the interwar years. The third wave began in Portugal in 1974, spread across Southern Europe and Latin America, and then, for rather different reasons, burst over Central Europe at the end of the 1980s.

Many people read this interpretation as confirming Fukuyama's idea that liberal democracy and free markets were becoming universal. Yet even in

[3] Tom Buk-Swienty, *Weekendavisen* (Copenhagen), Dec. 27, 1996.

[4] See Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs,* Summer 1993, pp. 22–49.

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The Third Wave, Huntington sounded notes of caution: his analysis was limited to some thirty cases, to the period 1974–1990, and to democracy as a strictly procedural system of choosing governments by contested election. Moreover, Huntington argued that the third wave was not necessarily irreversible, nor did it prove that the world was becoming Westernized. He admitted that a third "reverse wave" might push back democracy, and, anticipating his cultural turn, he remarked that rulers in non-Western cultures, such as Confucianism and Islam, might well suppress "contestation and participation," the crucial elements of procedural democracy. Nevertheless, Huntington ended *The Third Wave* on an optimistic note: "Time is on the side of democracy."[5]

By the time Huntington wrote *The Clash of Civilizations,* this optimism seemed unwarranted. The United States, the European Union, and most major nongovernmental organizations in the West had "enlargement" of democracy and human rights at the core of their foreign, security, and economic aid policies. But "as of 1995 European and American efforts to achieve these goals had met with limited success. Almost all non-Western civilizations were resistant to this pressure from the West" (p. 193). Picking up a line of argument raised, but not pursued, in the 1991 book, Huntington notes that "democratization was most successful in countries where Christian and Western influences were strong" (p. 193). In such regions, the third wave was a fact: "By 1990, except for Cuba, democratic transitions had occurred in most of the countries, outside Africa, where peoples espoused Western Christianity or where major Christian influences existed" (p. 193). This observation implies that Christianity, Western civilization, and democracy are strongly correlated, and that world order and peace would increase as Western-style democracy spread. But by introducing the element of religion, Huntington raised the stakes, not only in the West's relations with the rest, but in the internal Western battles over cultural identity and self-assertion.

Until a few years ago, the idea that Christianity, Western civilization, and democracy were strongly correlated was part of the assumed background knowledge of most educated people in America and of many in Europe. In the multiculturalist atmosphere of the 1990s, however, that claim seems either faintly disreputable or flatly offensive. Nevertheless, if Huntington is right that world order requires the West's survival, that the West will survive only if American elites rediscover and reassert Western identity, and that Christianity is one of the elements at the core of Western civilization, then it follows that a future world order in which peace and prosperity are maximized and the risk of civilizational clashes and wars is minimized requires that American elites shed their aversion to religion. But that, in turn, suggests that the "culture war" inside America is likely to escalate, rendering the United States unable to fulfill the leadership role in the world that history has assigned to it.

The Clash of Civilizations, as previously mentioned, does not mark a radical change in Huntington's work but instead restates long-standing beliefs and concerns in the context of an overall analysis of international politics and

[5] Huntington, *The Third Wave*, p. 316.

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the challenges facing U.S. foreign policy. The major new aspect is that Huntington now speaks not only as a strategic analyst but as a political philosopher, even though the philosophical message remains characteristically muted. He does not say "the West is good, therefore we should strengthen it," but "given certain preferences about the world—peace rather than war, prosperity rather than poverty, knowledge rather than superstition, and freedom rather than tyranny, for the largest number possible—we need to understand the driving forces of future world politics and, in particular, what contribution, nay, what duties Americans have toward promoting a maximum of order and deterring disorder." In the past, Huntington has occasionally revealed his robust notion of what the West can and should do to promote order. One notable instance was his contribution to a 1983 conference of the International Institute for Strategic Studies on "the domestic aspects of Western security."[6] At the time, NATO had made its so-called double decision to deploy new U.S. intermediate-range missiles in Europe in modest response to a substantial and sustained Soviet buildup of such missiles aimed at Western Europe. Reacting to this decision, peace movements throughout Europe, and especially in West Germany, denounced NATO, and the United States in particular, as deluded and bellicose in contrast to reasonable, modest, and peace-loving Soviets. Western leaders thus faced a formidable challenge inasmuch as their opponents seized the moral high ground by deliberately ignoring Soviet provocations and purposes. That was the context in which Huntington, far from acknowledging the moral legitimacy of the peace movement or the Soviet buildup, proposed that Western strategy should aim explicitly at undermining the Soviet empire by threatening offensive conventional retaliation for the purpose of liberating Eastern Europe. Western principles and values were, he implied, inherently superior to those of communism, and NATO need not shrink from asserting them. That position does not seem extreme today (unless one is a multiculturalist), but in 1983 it was radical. Western leaders were cowed both by their countries' domestic peace movements and by the psychological fact of what seemed, at the time, overwhelming Soviet military power. Huntington insisted that the West was worth defending, and worth defending offensively.

The West will survive only if American elites rediscover and reassert Western identity.

He still believes that, as indicated by his observation that the world will benefit from a strong and self-confident West. But *The Clash of Civilizations* marks an important advance in understanding in several ways. First, the analysis is updated for the post–cold war era. The cold war, as Huntington points out, was an anomalous era, not just in terms of traditional international-relations theory, but in the way that ideological and strategic confrontation overshadowed civilizational identity as the source of political mobilization. It was easy, while the Soviet Union existed and dominated the security policies of Western governments, to believe that bipolarity and superpower rivalry had become

[6] Samuel P. Huntington, "Broadening the Strategic Focus," in *Defence and Consensus: The Domestic Aspects of Western Security,* Adelphi Paper 184 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1983), pp. 27–32.

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unchanging, deeply ingrained features of the post-1945 world. Many, although not Huntington himself, equated "Western" with non-Soviet or noncommunist and ignored the civilizational distinctions among the many countries and cultures threatened by Soviet power and the consequences of world war.

Secondly, the new book introduces and asserts the important distinction between civilizational values and universal values. In short, the world needs the West, not because the world is becoming Western, but because the West is an essential part of a global mosaic of civilizations, a sort of cultural balance of power that risks falling into chaos if any one of its important pieces is removed or retires from play. That is what one might call the universal or systemic reason for protecting the West and working for its survival. Those who happen to be Western of course have a second reason, existential for them but merely accidental to others, and that is that Western values, though not universal in any objective sense, are nevertheless "universal" for them because those values are theirs. Hence, Westerners face the dual obligation both to understand all civilizations and their interaction and to cherish and defend Western civilization.

De-Westernization and World Order

The Clash of Civilizations has two faces: philosophy of history and strategic analysis of the post–cold war world. The former is provocative and interesting, if in the nature of things unprovable. But the strategic analysis, which forecasts the global politics of the coming century in terms of a basic argument, can already be tested. This argument "is that culture and cultural identities, which at the broadest level are civilization identities, are shaping the patterns of cohesion, disintegration, and conflict in the post-Cold War world" (p. 20). This statement actually contains two claims. The first is that "civilization identities"—whatever they may be—are permanent and perhaps the most basic elements defining the collective order and political behavior of a social group such as a state, an alliance, or a transnational movement. The second is that whereas "civilization identities" have always been significant for how members of cultures lived, thought, aspired, and fought among themselves, they are now, for the first time, impinging on the prospects for world order: "In the post-Cold War world, for the first time in history, global politics has become multipolar *and* multicivilizational" (p. 21).

Historians and anthropologists may rush to find fault with such a sweeping statement. One can certainly argue that contact among multiple civilizations has always been a driving force of cultural and political change. For example, the interaction between the urban, riverine civilizations of China, India, and Mesopotamia on the one hand and the nomadic cultures of the Asian steppes on the other was a constant underlying dynamic of Eurasian history from the Bronze Age until the eighteenth century and the advent of gunpowder. Furthermore, the capitalist world economy and modern science, both products of the West, are incomprehensible apart from the multicivilizational

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exchanges of the two great ages of discovery: that of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries that marked the geopolitical and geoeconomic Atlantic shift of the West, and that of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when Westerners completed the invention of modern scholarship and philosophy, in part in response to their spiritual and cultural discovery of other civilizations, both in the past and in distant regions of the globe. But Huntington's point is that however important such earlier contacts were for the evolution of one or two civilizations, it is only in the current era that conscious, motivated representatives of several different civilizations interact and choose their political aspirations and methods on the basis of their civilizational identity. It is also only in this era that the political, military, and economic stakes involved in multicivilizational interaction have become mortal. Earlier contacts may have been significant and had profound effects; today's contacts are intense, frequent, dense, and fraught with open or hidden tensions that make them critical factors in and for world order—or against it.

Huntington makes his case for the importance of culture by proposing a number of concepts or perspectives for interpreting contemporary world politics. Some of these are in the nature of case studies, others are philosophical ideas, still others are strategic or political warnings. The key concepts, those most apt to provoke reflection or disagreement, and thereby to stimulate further insight, are the phenomenon of de-Westernization, demographic trends, the roles of Russia and China, and the tension between the concept of "Civilization" and the reality of "many civilizations" that are more or less incompatible.

De-Westernization is, according to Huntington, neither a threat nor a promise, but a fact. There would have been no new, emerging force of world politics for Huntington to write about if the cold war had really ended in Western victory and the prospect of endless Western hegemony. Some will of course deny that de-Westernization is taking place. Indeed, the sharpest criticism of both the 1993 article and this book comes from optimists impermeable to the multiculturalist malaise and impressed by the "overwhelming, triumphant, almost total Western dominance" after the end of the Soviet Union. They will point out, rightly, that "the West is the only civilization which has substantial interests in every other civilization or region and has the ability to affect the politics, economics, and security of every other civilization or region" (p. 81). Western businesses, governments, and organizations control international finance, produce and consume the vast majority of the world's goods, control international trade and transport, and dominate the fastest-growing and most dynamic sectors of science and industry.

Moreover, such critics argue, the modern political, technological, and scientific world remains Western. As societies modernize, no matter what their inherited cultural complexion, they necessarily become more like the West, not only in terms of technology and information, but in their emphasis on individual rights and freedoms. And once people begin asserting rights, whether they be property rights or the right to participate in their government, they are on the trajectory to liberal democracy and free markets, Max Weber and Francis Fukuyama *dixerunt*.

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Ludwig Dehio's Precarious Balance: *Zivilisation* as Development

Gleichgewicht oder Hegemonie. By Ludwig Dehio. (1948; Reprint, with a new introduction by Klaus Hildebrand, Zurich: Manesse Verlag, 1996. 432 pp. About $25.00.) Published in English as *The Precarious Balance.*

The historian Ludwig Dehio grew up in the two farthest corners of pre-1918 Germany: Königsberg and Strasbourg, on the margins of Russia and France, respectively. Perhaps his frontier experiences sharpened his sense of how conflicts of power and civilization reinforce or temper each other. What is certain is that this retiring archivist produced, in the aftermath of World War II, a masterpiece of international history that remains an indispensable primer on the secular forces driving the fate of nations and civilizations.

The Precarious Balance is precise, evocative history of the balance of power in Europe from the fifteenth to the twentieth century. Would-be hegemons repeatedly challenged the balance, but in every case failed to alter it because they could never defeat the powers on the periphery: Great Britain, and later the United States, to the west and Russia to the east. Intervention by one or both of the flanking powers was always the deciding factor in defeating the hegemons and restoring "the freedom of the state system."

But the peripheral powers themselves had different interests and stakes in the struggle. When Russia's leaders defeated a Napoleon or Hitler, they hoped to advance their own centuries-long drive for strategic supremacy, whereas the British interest was to prevent a continental hegemony so as to protect Great Britain's global, commercial, and industrial interests. As what Richard Rosecrance called a "trading state," Great Britain represented power of a different kind than the militarized, centralized might of the continental states.

Behind the surface narrative, Dehio argues three additional points about the shape of the modern world. The first is that Europe's great systemic wars served only to undermine European power itself, propelling British and finally American power to the central stage of world politics. Secondly, British

In the great debate about whether modernization still means Westernization, Huntington is explicit: it does not. The Weberian argument is that character, social structure, and economic growth are interrelated. It was the implausible and, at first, unrewarded habit of early Puritan capitalists of saving their wealth rather than using it to buy power that started the engine of Western growth. Once that engine was running, the obvious advantages of saving and investing encouraged the type of personality that was likely to save and invest. Character, culture, and economics thus joined in a rising spiral. Since the

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and American power arose not from centralized mobilization on the continental model but from economic growth, rooted in Anglo-Saxon notions of liberty, including dissent, pluralism, and small, self-reliant communities. Thirdly, and most relevant today to Samuel Huntington's *The Clash of Civilizations,* the underlying factor in the failure of all continental hegemons, in the global power of the Anglo-American trading states, and in the political decline of Europe is what Dehio himself terms *Zivilisation.* But whereas Huntington defines this Spenglerian term as meaning "mechanics, technology, and material factors" (p. 41), Dehio imagines *Zivilisation* as a moral force: the idea of individual liberty and rights, self-realization, and enlightenment. "The advance of *Zivilisation* . . . is the most obvious expression of a gradual, many-sided and yet consistent development: the transition from the medieval, ascetic struggle to overcome the world to the modern drive to control the world" (p. 181). What Spengler saw as a force for terminal decadence, Dehio sees as an ambiguous product of the "will to life" and power over nature and human society. The American Revolution incorporated its positive moral qualities; the French Revolution, by contrast, harnessed the energies of *Zivilisation* to a program of conquest and "enforced enlightenment" that negated freedom.

If *Zivilisation* is merely the rational maximization of power through science and organization, then its worldwide spread is just another word for Westernization. But Huntington argues that non-Western civilizations will adopt *Zivilisation* as technique while rejecting its moral component: democracy, autonomy, and the self-reliant individual. Western tradition, from Hegel, Marx, and Max Weber to Francis Fukuyama, always held that Westernization of method and content go hand in hand: the "seamless web" argument. Huntington, by contrast, argues that "civilizational identity" can survive Westernization of methods, and from the standpoint of the 1990s he is arguably right. Dehio, writing in 1948, was not sure whether the energies released by *Zivilisation,* both positive and demonic, could be tamed. To be sure, Soviet power has died, but Huntington presents a still larger canvas. Outside the West, others fear *Zivilisation* as content even as they eagerly embrace its technique. Will their attempt to separate the two elements succeed? If so, must conflict result? The struggle continues, but few guides to its stakes and its history are as learned and vivid as Ludwig Dehio's.

distribution of character types, so far as can be determined, is more or less universal, one would expect universal modernization and capitalism to produce eventually a homogeneous world culture that would be a recognizable descendant of the Western culture that originally gave rise to capitalism.

But the late British anthropologist Ernest Gellner, intending to update the Weberian case in several of his last works, arrived at a conclusion that instead supports Huntington's claim that modernization does not mean Westernization. According to Gellner, the modern "mode of knowledge"—that is,

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science and the scientific method—yields statements that are simply true and correct. Either the plane flies because the science of aerodynamics is true or because magical incantations keep it in the air. But, said Gellner, this mode of knowledge reveals nothing about culture, religious beliefs, or civilizational values. It is like the plumbing in a house: a necessary and reliable part of the structure, but less reflective of the owner's values than, for instance, the wallpaper. In other words, knowing the chemical properties of a given substance or the laws of planetary motion do not tell one how to live his life, raise his children, or worship his god.

On whether modernization still means Westernization, Huntington is explicit: it does not.

If Gellner was right that plumbing does not influence, much less dictate, one's wallpaper, it follows that the world is indeed entering an era in which many cultures may share modern traits such as a belief in science, rational methods of administration, and complex institutions without becoming Western. Indeed, as Huntington argues, they will become less Western for reasons that flow from a profound law of human social change—a law not in the sense of science but in the sense of a commonly recognized pattern that recurs under certain circumstances. This is the law of "indigenization," or, to borrow the complete phrase from the British economist and Japan scholar Ronald Dore, "second-generation indigenization." This phenomenon has been a characteristic of non-Western politics during the last generation, and Huntington says it will continue and perhaps even accelerate. Indigenization is the reverse of modernization, in terms of both results and, from a certain point onward, preconditions.

What happens is that the first generation of leaders to modernize in a non-Western culture does so by copying Western culture. They go to Western schools, dress Western-style, attend Western universities, mobilize support, form parties, conduct propaganda, and seize power by aping the techniques they borrowed from the West. The young Jawaharlal Nehru, the first prime minister of independent India, was a perfect example of both this stage of the process and indigenization. At school and university in England in the 1900s, young Nehru was a perfectly assimilated, highly sophisticated young English lawyer—sophisticated in the Western culture that he had imbibed. Decades later, as prime minister, he re-Indianized himself, or rather Indianized himself, because in "second-generation indigenization" the non-Western elite seeks roots it never acknowledged before. Only when the elite has become at least partly Westernized and constructed its national independence using Western methods does it reject these methods.

The spread of Western science, technology, communications, and political ideas thus produces, in one generation, an apparent rise of Western power and prestige, which is then succeeded by de-Westernization. Huntington claims that is happening in many places throughout the world today, particularly in Islamic and Confucian countries, and it is hard to disagree.

De-Westernization is neither a rapid nor a continuous process. "Overall," says Huntington, "the West will remain the most powerful civilization well into

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the early decades of the twenty-first century" (p. 90). The decline of Western power culturally, militarily, politically, and economically may follow an S curve: slow at first, then rapid, then slow again. One measure of de-Westernization, as well as of the chances of conflict during the coming decades, is demography. The population question appears at two points in Huntington's analysis. The first is when he points out the shrinking mass of the West compared with the rest of the world. A common assertion by the "West-is-universal" school is that "the world's language is English" (p. 59). But as Huntington notes, there is no evidence that a growing proportion of the world's inhabitants are speaking English, even though many use it as a lingua franca, a second language necessary for practical communication but not part of anyone's cultural or political identity. The number of people who speak Western languages shrank from 24 percent of the world's population in 1958 to less than 21 percent today, a figure that includes the growing numbers of Spanish-speakers in Latin America, an area that Huntington does not consider part of the West.

Huntington also discusses demographics in relation to the Islamic revival and its potential for causing conflict. Demographers have long pointed out the explosive population growth in many Islamic countries. Although fertility is now declining rapidly, the high rates of the 1950s through 1980s are yielding a huge "youth bulge" of the kind historically associated with conflict and war. "Young people," Huntington notes, "are the protagonists of protest, instability, reform, and revolution" (p. 117). He adds that European data from the last four centuries seem to show that large cohorts of young people correlate strongly with radical movements, social change, revolution, civil wars, and international conflict. Such youth bulges, coupled with the second-generation-indigenization phenomenon and the return of religion, may be the recipe for large-scale conflict.

Core States and Conflict Avoidance

In the 1993 article, Huntington's prediction of conflicts between civilizations provoked the strongest reaction and greatest skepticism. Now in *The Clash of Civilizations*, Huntington distinguishes between two types of conflict that could imperil world order. The first, which he dubs "fault line conflicts," was introduced in his 1993 article but receives much more attention in this book. A fault line conflict occurs "between neighboring states from different civilizations, between groups from different civilizations within a state, and between groups which, as in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, are attempting to create new states." As it happens, "fault line conflicts are particularly prevalent between Muslims and non-Muslims" (p. 208). Huntington's explanation for this propensity is interesting because it is an explanation not primarily in terms of core civilizational values but in terms of the particular conjuncture of events prevailing now and for some decades to come. An exclusively civilizational interpretation focuses on the Islamic notion of "holy war" and the Islamic history of conquest, as well as on the real or alleged grievances of Muslim peoples

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against the West in the twentieth century, for example, the West's support of Israel. While not entirely discounting such long-term factors, Huntington points also to the youth bulge and to another characteristic of the Middle East: the absence in Islamic culture of a strong "core state" of the civilization, such as China within Confucian culture and America in the West. In Huntington's theory of multicivilizational world order, stability and order are best preserved when each civilization has a strong, stable, and generally respected core state. That is a civilizational version of the traditional multipolar balance-of-power theory, in which peace within the system requires that each pole is stable, powerful, authoritative, and therefore predictable.

If core states are important in a multicivilizational balance of power, two important principles for American policy, as well as for the future analysis of world order, follow. First, America should not deliberately offend or destabilize either Russia or China, the core states of the Orthodox and Confucian civilizations, respectively. America should not do those things in any case because its power over the long term will decline, at least relatively, and it would be foolish to create enemies that the United States might not be able to handle. But the main argument for a measured and cool-headed policy toward both Russia and China is that those countries are core states, and core states should be respected.

Secondly, Americans must recover their own Western identity because, for better or worse, they comprise the core state of the West, and the system will not benefit if the United States sinks into balkanized fragmentation. The West needs its core state to provide internal cohesion and energy, but also to act as a leader in dealings with the other civilizations, lest those dealings slide toward the other type of prospective conflict, "core-state wars." No core-state wars have occurred in modern times, so instead of history, in his book's final chapter Huntington offers an account of an imaginary core-state war between the United States and China that is provoked by Vietnam and spreads to the Middle East. The scenario does not prophesy victory for either of the two parties, a Western-Russian-Indian alliance versus an Islamic-Chinese alliance, because, according to Huntington, the outcome of any such war

> would almost inevitably be the drastic decline in the economic, demographic, and military power of all the major participants in the war. As a result, global power which had shifted over the centuries from the East to the West and had then begun to shift back from the West to the East would now shift from the North to the South (p. 316).

The scenario may be implausible, Huntington warns, but the cause of such a war is not: "intervention by the core state of one civilization (the United States) in a dispute between the core state of another civilization (China) and a member state of that civilization (Vietnam)" (p. 316).

The lesson of such a scenario and of the whole analysis in terms of a civilizational balance of powers, therefore, is that "in the coming era . . . the avoidance of major intercivilizational wars requires core states to refrain from intervening in conflicts in other civilizations" (p. 316). This so-called abstention rule would, for example, forbid the United States to intervene to stop a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. A second, equally important rule for those who want to

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preserve world order is the joint-mediation rule, which states that "core states negotiate with each other to contain or to halt fault line wars between states or groups from their civilizations" (p. 316).

The Restoration of Western Identity

Unlike his article of the same name, the title of Huntington's book lacks a question mark, so readers may get the mistaken idea that he is predicting conflict rather than describing what he sees as the requirements for its prevention. His prescription for order has two parts. The first rests on the suggestion that post–cold war global politics is best understood in terms of interacting cultural identities. The precondition of order in such a world is a stable balance of power among civilizations and their core states, and the main threat to order, at least in the short term, arises from Islam, both because it lacks a core state and because it is what Huntington calls a "challenger civilization" with substantial grievances that it can use to mobilize young and eager masses. The second part of Huntington's prescription for order is that the West, although a declining force overall, remains essential for the system's stability, which is why America needs to recover and reassert its Western identity. As he writes:

> If the United States is de-Westernized, the West is reduced to Europe and a few lightly populated European settler countries overseas. Without the United States the West becomes a minuscule and declining part of the world's population on a small and inconsequential peninsula at the extremity of the Eurasian land mass (p. 307).

Restoring Western identity in the United States is a daunting task, though it is one worth undertaking on the purely pragmatic grounds that a weak or disunited core state is a liability for the system. Moreover, as Huntington says, Westerners should work to sustain the West not because it is universal but because it is theirs.

The West may, of course, be ultimately unsustainable. Since all civilizations are human creations, all are mortal. Theorists and philosophers, most but not all of them Western, have over the millennia tried to determine the signs of cultural decline and debated two great questions with which Huntington closes his work: the question of determinism and that of relativism.

Almost no historian today will confess to having read, much less to admiring, the late Arnold Toynbee. Huntington has no such inhibitions. Toynbee suggested that civilizations were the elements of history, the smallest "intelligible fields of study," and that each of them evolved through stages that were similar enough from case to case to yield a general theory of cultural change. The point of inevitable decline observable in all genuine civilizations was when they coalesced into "universal empires." The universal empire of a civilization marked the end of genuine artistic and spiritual creativity. The next stage was decline, which took the form of external invasion, internal dissent and revolution, or—usually—both.

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Huntington may be quoting Toynbee, but he is no determinist and has clearly seen that Toynbee's philosophy is of limited use in the analysis of world order in terms of a cultural balance of power, because, according to Toynbee, at least half of the civilizations within that balance of power no longer exist. Toynbee argued that the Hindu, Islamic, and Chinese civilizations all peaked centuries ago, but Huntington, for good reason, assumes that they are alive and well today.

He notes that

> many things are probable but nothing is inevitable. . . . The central issue for the West is whether, quite apart from any external challenges, it is capable of stopping and reversing the internal processes of decay. Can the West renew itself or will sustained internal rot simply accelerate its end and/or subordination to other economically and demographically more dynamic civilizations? (p. 303)

Huntington is speaking more as a concerned citizen than as a purely objective scholar when he presents his list of "manifestations of moral decline":

> 1. increases in antisocial behavior . . . ;
>
> 2. family decay, including increased rates of divorce, illegitimacy, teen-age pregnancy, and single-parent families;
>
> 3. a decline in "social capital," that is, membership in voluntary associations and the interpersonal trust associated with such membership;
>
> 4. general weakening of the "work ethic" . . . ;
>
> 5. decreasing commitment to learning and intellectual activity, manifested in the United States in lower levels of scholastic achievement (p. 304).

Such a list will not impress a multiculturalist, who will merely assert that what Huntington calls "decline" is in fact the long-overdue end to white-male hegemony, and that what he calls "lower levels of achievement" is simply the retreat of a rationalistic, science-based, white-male-controlled discourse of objectivity. These are relativist objections that no argument can defeat. But the reasons for fighting to restore Western identity and its concrete manifestations in, for example, stable families, sound scholarship, and competent industries are not mere preferences on the same logical and moral standing as those of the relativist. Two more substantive arguments have already been discussed: The first is that a solid civilizational identity is essential, especially in the core states, for overall peace. The second is that multiculturalism is a bad policy not only for the threatened white males but for everyone. Multiculturalism creates tension, grievances, and social conflict and reduces total prosperity and well-being. That is not a service but an insult to those who, for whatever reasons, have not had access to first-rate educations, careers, and quality of life.

A third reason why the cultural relativists are wrong is that civilizations are not hermetically sealed and incommensurable. Huntington argues that beyond civilizations there is such a thing as Civilization. Shadowy, ill-defined, and "thin" it may be, but it does exist. Where is the proof? As Huntington writes,

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"Scholars easily identify highpoints and lowpoints in the level of Civilization in the history of civilizations" (p. 320). How can they do so without some external measure of what it means to be civilized? Furthermore, all civilizations seem to share a core set of values and taboos, for example, that incest and unwarranted killing are wrong. Noting these, Huntington proposes a commonalities rule as a counterpart to his abstention and joint-mediation rules: "peoples in all civilizations should search for and attempt to expand the values, institutions, and practices they have in common with peoples of other civilizations" (p. 320).

Lastly, the vibrant new approaches to human behavior arising from evolutionary biology and the biochemical study of human character and personality are amassing a stock of evidence that makes it increasingly hard to avoid the conclusion that human nature predisposes people to act and live in certain ways, and that if people disobey these injunctions of nature too often and too consistently, either as individuals or collectively, they produce what social critics rightly call "pathologies."

Fifty or a hundred years ago, very little of Samuel Huntington's philosophical or moral analysis would have raised eyebrows. Today, it is bound to irritate and insult, but that only makes it more pertinent. The value of *The Clash of Civilizations* lies less in whether its policy prescriptions are judged opportune than in the exciting ways it derives those prescriptions from a new theory of international relations that explains the forces behind world politics and how to maximize both social stability and individual liberty in the coming world order.

U.S. Strategy in the Wilderness Years

by Bruce D. Berkowitz

America Adrift: A Strategic Assessment. By Peter W. Rodman. (Washington, D.C.: Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom, 1996. 89 pp. $6.95, paper.)

Freedom Betrayed: How America Led a Global Democratic Revolution, and Walked Away. By Michael A. Ledeen. (Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, 1996. 167 pp. $24.95, cloth.)

The Imperative of American Leadership: A Challenge to Neo-Isolationism. By Joshua Muravchik. (Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, 1996. 259 pp. $24.95, cloth.)

A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. By the White House. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1996. 45 pp. Free.)

It has been seven years since the Berlin Wall came down and five since the Soviet Union collapsed, yet the United States is still struggling to develop a

Bruce D. Berkowitz is an adjunct professor at Carnegie Mellon University and the author of numerous books and articles on national security. He lives and works in Alexandria, Virginia.

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"national strategy." These selections under review attempt to fill that breach. Even so, it looks like Americans are a long way from replacing containment, the concept that organized U.S. national security policy for four decades. Here is why the problem is so hard:

First, Americans disagree about who the enemy is. National security strategies work best when fashioned around a specific opponent. No one nation seems as obviously threatening as the Soviet Union did, so there are lots of candidates for a potential threat: China, Iran, or a resurgent Russia, for starters. It would be easier to settle on a foe if someone would deploy 1,600 intercontinental ballistic missiles or stage a coup in Czechoslovakia. Alas, no one can afford an arms race anymore, and Czechoslovakia no longer exists.

Secondly, Americans disagree on the nature of the threat. During the cold war, if Americans forgot what the threat was, the Soviet army reminded them each spring by practicing its invasion of Western Europe. Now it is unclear whether the paramount threat is loose nukes, ethnic conflict, terrorism, regional hegemons, or perhaps something more exotic, like uncontrolled flows of refugees and narcotics. Some New Age strategists even propose global environmental degradation as a national security threat, and, barring a better traditional candidate, it is hard to argue with them.

Thirdly, Washington no longer has a clear scenario of global cause and effect. Containment at least had a great story line. The world's problems were the result of the Soviet Union's expansionist urge, and if the United States could contain the Soviets long enough their empire would crack along systemic fault lines—ethnicity, corruption, economic inefficiency, and the people's demand for freedom. This containment story read like good religious drama: it offered both commandments for behavior and the promise of ultimate salvation.

Yet the most important reason why the United States lacks a national strategy is that most Americans do not think the country needs one. Consider the recent election. President Bill Clinton and Bob Dole hardly mentioned foreign affairs, and Ross Perot's idea of foreign threats was the prospect of hordes of Toyotas and Panasonic televisions invading from across the Pacific Ocean. Politicians know their customers. If Americans had wanted security policy, the politicians would have served them security policy.

This lack of interest on the part of the typical American was reflected in the most recent edition of the public opinion survey conducted by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. The council has polled the public on its attitudes regarding national security issues for twenty years. While the public has continually assigned national security a low priority (the exceptions occur mainly during crises, such as the war in the Persian Gulf), this time the results fell off the table. Not only did the general public fail to list any national security issues in its top ten concerns, but even the elites gave just one national security issue ("foreign policy" in general) as a "top ten" concern.[1]

[1] See John E. Rielly, ed., *American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1995* (Chicago, Ill.: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1995), chapter 1.

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It is in this setting that Peter Rodman, Michael Ledeen, and Joshua Muravchik write. The conservative-liberal, hawk-dove divisions of the cold war no longer apply. Now the split is between "internationalists" and "isolationists." What is more, these two camps cross party lines.

On the Democrat side, the best examples of isolationists are organized labor and some minority leaders such as Jesse Jackson. They oppose free trade and favor reducing defense spending in order to increase domestic programs. There are also remnants of the radical Left in this wing, who believe that the United States is an imperialistic, evil force that would do the least harm by staying home. Ironically, many Democrat isolationists only recently advocated international causes célèbres. Labor played an important role in supporting unions in Eastern Europe, thereby contributing to the collapse of communism. And African-American interest groups championed the embargo on South Africa, which led to the collapse of apartheid.

Most Americans do not think the country needs a national strategy.

Republican isolationists are usually identified with Patrick Buchanan and his followers. They evince blue-collar, small-business protectionist tendencies, but also a touch of bigotry and xenophobia—as seen in their opposition to immigration (legal or otherwise) and Buchanan's blaming of Israel's "Amen Corner" in the United States for U.S. involvement in Desert Storm and Middle East affairs.

Republican internationalists include traditional pro-military hawks (Caspar Weinberger may be the best example), as well as others, such as Senator Richard Lugar (R-Ind.), who have long believed that the United States benefits from a peaceful world friendly to free markets and that America must actively work toward bringing about those conditions. Lugar, for example, based much of his 1996 campaign for the presidency on the internationalist terrorist threat. He also believes that the Balkan crisis could have been avoided if the United States had used military force in 1991 to deter the Serbs, and he has advocated that the United States lead a 100,000-man NATO expedition to secure peace in the region now.

Among the Democrats, the internationalists are represented by members of Congress like former senator Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) and Representative Lee Hamilton (D-Ind.), and by scholars such as Joseph Nye and Graham Allison; their view is aptly captured by the title of Nye's book, *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power.*[2] These internationalists argue that the United States is uniquely qualified to promote peace and democracy and must remain involved in international affairs to protect its interests. They are joined by human-rights activists like Representative Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.), who believe the United States has a moral obligation to oppose oppression abroad.

The Clinton administration also falls into this category. According to its official policy, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement,*

[2] Joseph Nye, *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1990).

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the administration favors a "strong defense capability" suited to "deterring and defeating aggression . . . in more than one region if necessary" (p. 13). It also promotes free trade and allows that the United States must be able to "act unilaterally when our direct national interests are at stake" (p. 11). And, like any good strategy, the doctrine stresses that the United States must set clear priorities.

Even a hawk would be hard pressed to criticize the strategy as it appears on paper. It is even difficult to argue that the administration was unwilling to use military force when necessary. Witness instances in Haiti, where Washington was prepared to depose forcibly a regime unfriendly to U.S. interests, and in the Persian Gulf, where the United States mobilized quickly to deter Saddam Hussein's troops massing on the Kuwaiti border in 1993.

Hence, any criticism the Clinton administration deserves for its national security policy is for execution rather than principles. The administration has been short-sighted and naïve, not soft or isolationist. Yet engaging does not equal acting strategically, and a willingness to use military force does not equate with using force effectively. In the case of Iraq, for example, the United States has surrendered the strategic initiative. Saddam determined in 1993 exactly how far he can push the United States before Washington will respond with a "show of force." He has since steadily improved his position within these limits, seizing opportunities as they came along. In this fashion he split the Kurdish factions that had opposed him and retook the northern territory he had effectively surrendered to U.N. control. In the end, the United States left itself with no effective options; its cruise-missile strike was so ineffective as to border on the pathetic.

Looking to the Past

Though they are internationalists, the three non-administration authors whose books are under review here would agree that the Clinton administration warrants criticism for its security policy. Peter Rodman, the director of national security programs at the Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom, would probably turn up the "military assertiveness" of the U.S. foreign policy machine. He, like the others reviewed here, does not seem to object to current policy as much on the basis of substance as on style. Though U.S. policy seems assertive, Rodman believes that U.S. statements and commitments have been mealy-mouthed and equivocating, when they need to be clear and loud in order to be effective.

Rodman was a protégé of Henry Kissinger, and, as one might expect, he holds a traditional view of world politics: nations are the building blocks, alliances and power are the forces of motion, and most problems occur when the international system is out of balance. In *America Adrift: A Strategic Assessment*, he uses a region-by-region analysis to argue that the Clinton administration has neglected the global balance, thereby jeopardizing U.S. interests.

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The result is pure, uncut geopolitical thinking. If a reader breathes in the vapors deeply, soon he too will believe he is Metternich. Not surprisingly, Rodman's prescriptions usually boil down to beefing up alliances, demonstrating clarity of commitment, and maintaining strong military forces. But he makes some valid points. For instance, traditional military power does still matter. Early in the Clinton administration, Secretary of State Warren Christopher opined that "in the Cold War world, stability was based on confrontation. In the new world, stability will be based on common interests and shared values."[3] Rodman disagrees (as would presumably many Kurds and Bosnian Muslims) and might counter with Al Capone's dictum that you can get much further with a kind word and a gun than you can with a kind word alone. (Clinton's nomination of Madeleine Albright for secretary of state suggests that Clinton himself may have changed his mind for the time being.) He also rightly criticizes the Clinton administration's early misguided efforts at "nation building" and its abrogation of leadership to "aggressive multilateralism."

Unfortunately, Rodman's analysis often seems to have one foot stuck in the cold war. For instance, he argues that

> in the final analysis, there is no counterweight to Russia's disproportionate power on the Continent without a continuing American military presence in Western Europe, and even the most positive future relationship between Russia and the West depends on this (p. 15).

Is this the same Russia whose troops have, at times, gone for months without being paid? Even during the Reagan era, all serious analysts agreed that without its Warsaw Pact allies the Soviet Union lacked sufficient forces to threaten Europe. Now former pact members are en route to NATO membership, and Russia and Ukraine cannot even agree on who owns the Black Sea fleet. The United States might want to keep U.S. troops deployed in Europe for several reasons (even many Europeans would themselves probably agree that a U.S. presence has quelled traditional animosities), but defending the Fulda Gap from a Russian invasion is not one of them.

Moreover, from Rodman's perspective, internal politics are a sideshow to competition among nations. But in fact, the engine of conflict in the post–cold war era so far has been politics within nations, not politics among nations. The new game of dealing with internal disorders that threaten U.S. interests is every bit as cutthroat, cynical, and hard nosed as any superpower confrontation.

Yet the most unfortunate omission in Rodman's analysis is that he rarely discusses the role of ideas and values in international politics. Practitioners of realpolitik, like Rodman, seem uncomfortable with such matters, perhaps because those issues tend to get in the way of the free-form alliance-building that a classical balance of power requires. Even so, ideas and values do matter in world affairs and often translate into power. Take Islamism, for example. The

[3] Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Senate, Nov. 4, 1993.

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right ideas can energize the people and promote economic growth. The wrong ideas can mobilize power, but they may lack the political constraints that keep countries from resorting to force and aggression.

Indeed, a value-based foreign policy often works to the advantage of the United States. Market democracy's superiority over socialistic dictatorship was critical to the Soviet collapse. In the end, the Soviet economy did not work, and the Soviet people disowned their government. Absent this underlying weakness, containment could not have pushed the communist system over the edge.

That is where Michael Ledeen and Joshua Muravchik come in. They represent a new wave among Republican internationalists, and, in contrast to more traditional geopolitical thinkers like Rodman, they argue that ideology matters significantly. Ledeen, a senior scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, draws on lessons from the cold war to develop principles for U.S. policy today. He describes how the United States strengthened NATO in the 1970s by supporting prodemocracy forces in Spain and Portugal, which aided U.S. efforts to contain the Soviet Union. He also asserts that supporting democratic forces in Eastern Europe and Latin America weakened the Soviet empire in the 1980s, hastening its collapse. His lucid accounts of these episodes are the best parts of the book.

As for U.S. policy today, Ledeen argues that the United States should follow the same course. After making much progress in the 1980s, Ledeen writes,

> The future of the Democratic Revolution is now in doubt. The advance of democracy is stalled, in grave danger of being rolled back. . . . Without clarity of vision in the West and the will to pursue our historic mission, our antidemocratic enemies will gradually claw their way to positions of power and eventually use their strength against us (p. 91).

Some evidence suggests that Ledeen makes valid points. Promoting democracy serves the long-term U.S. interest. American interests in Asia, for instance, are more secure now that Taiwan and South Korea have democratized. It will be easier to muster U.S. support for intervention to oppose, say, Chinese aggression if the countries that need protection have legitimate, elected governments. Similarly, as Ledeen points out, when the United States uses military force, such force should further long-term U.S. strategic goals.

The main problem with Ledeen's argument is that he takes it to extremes. There are cases when one cannot pursue a security policy that is pure in principle. Sometimes other, overriding interests demand a compromise. For example, Ledeen criticizes the Bush administration for failing to support Boris Yeltsin when he was the democratic alternative to Mikhail Gorbachev, and for not trying to topple Saddam Hussein at the end of Desert Storm. U.S. officials were not enamored with Gorbachev's government, but the collapse of the Soviet Union threatened the loss of control over more than thirty thousand nuclear warheads. Similarly, George Bush probably would have preferred to

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get rid of Saddam once and for all, but not at the cost of occupying a country the size of France and house-to-house fighting in downtown Baghdad.

In the end, Ledeen offers ten guidelines to promote U.S. security in the post–cold war era: support democratization, broadcast U.S. values, eschew trade with aggressors, build up the military, etc. Idea men tend to be idealists, so these guidelines may be impractical in most cases. But at least they provide a starting point for discussion.

For a more applied approach in the same genre, one need only take a few steps around the corner at the American Enterprise Institute and visit another AEI scholar, Joshua Muravchik. He agrees with Ledeen that promoting democracy and free markets ought to be the organizing concept for U.S. policy. But he takes Ledeen's thesis several steps further.

Muravchik criticizes the Clinton administration for failing to use force decisively, for underfunding the military, and for relying too heavily on allies to provide support. He has written at length about the fiasco that passed for Western policy in the former Yugoslavia, and he uses much of that material to make his point here. Rather than pander to the vacillations of allies and kowtow to U.N. deliberations, Muravchik argues, America must lead. He says that Washington needed to act decisively as Yugoslavia disintegrated, and that if it had done so the allies would have followed. More broadly, he proposes that the United States seize the opportunity afforded by its current overwhelming superiority internationally and take the steps necessary to ensure long-term peace. As he puts it,

> We find ourselves without a main enemy and enjoying the status of sole superpower. No force on earth could hope to defeat us in a war. . . . What to do with [such power]? . . . We can invest it by working to counteract hostile forces that could grow to threaten us, to dampen down turmoils that could grow into major conflicts, and to encourage the growth of democracy and trade. These burdens come with leadership. The goal of assuming them would be to strengthen the peace and prolong the high level of security we now enjoy (p. 5).

Muravchik's views reflect thinking that has emerged recently in some conservative circles; *The Weekly Standard*'s William Kristol and Robert Kagan (among others) have made similar arguments for a benevolent American hegemony in a world with only one superpower.[4] Kristol and Kagan go even further than Muravchik in proposing a "Pax Americana," or at least they are more explicit about proposing U.S. domination of the world for its own good. But many of their specific recommendations dovetail with Muravchik's: increase military spending, pursue missile defense, take tougher positions at the United Nations, reject multilateral decision making, and so on.

[4] William Kristol and Robert Kagan, "Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, July/Aug. 1996, pp. 18–32.

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Strategy for the Future

In sum, then, Rodman explains what the United States can do, Ledeen prescribes what Washington ought to do, and Muravchik describes in considerable detail how to do it. It is easy to sympathize with their position that America should look to its past in devising plans for the future. Yet one is tempted to paraphrase George Santayana: while those who forget the past may be doomed to repeat it, those who apply the lessons of the past too simplistically are doomed to make new mistakes.

For instance, the Nixon administration's China policy was brilliant strategy at the grandest level, designed to contain and weaken the Soviet Union. The ploy was to make an informal alliance with China, forcing the Soviets to worry about their eastern flank. Meanwhile, the United States swallowed China's human-rights abuses and sold out America's erstwhile allies on Taiwan. The audacity of the whole deal was that Richard Nixon, the Red-basher par excellence, conceived of an alliance with the communists.

Where is there an opportunity to pull off such a geopolitical coup now? The United States clearly faces no adversary like the Soviet Union. Moreover, the building blocks of strategy are smaller and more varied, making the task of developing a geopolitical strategy harder.

Other principles that helped the United States to victory in the cold war also have little application today. During the 1980s, the Reagan administration exploited the Soviet empire's weaknesses—in particular, economic failure—to bring about its collapse. But waiting for the Chinese economy to collapse from inefficiency is not a winning strategy. Similarly, during the cold war the United States took advantage of the fact that the Soviet leadership comprised a relatively small and unpopular elite, and that communist ideology was usually imposed without the consent of the people. (Remember the phrase "captive nations"?) In contrast, many—if not most—of the regimes opposing U.S. interests today are supported by grassroots movements. The Islamic regimes that took hold in Iran, Sudan, Afghanistan, and (almost) Algeria were popular movements rejecting Western modernization, at least for the moment.

No threat in today's world has the immediacy or potential costs of that posed by the Soviet Union. The United States has time. Eventually Chinese economic growth will increase popular demands for democracy, and eventually Western ideas will filter into the theocracies of the developing world. But these changes will require a long-term, persistent effort, so America needs a strategy that conserves its resources and keeps it in the game for the long haul.

In addition, military requirements have changed. Deterring the Soviet Union required a large, conventional military force and a potent, survivable nuclear force, whereas today's challenges call for special forces, information warfare, and precision-strike systems. Kristol and Kagan scold the Republican Congress for adding "only" $7 billion to Clinton's defense budget. They write, "But the hard truth is that Washington—now spending about $260 billion per year on defense—probably needs to spend about $60–80 billion more each

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year in order to preserve America's role as global hegemon."[5] But they neglect to mention that the United States already spends more on defense than the next five highest-spending governments combined—Russia, Japan, France, Germany, and China. The United States thus accounts for about 31 percent of the world's total military spending. Increasing spending by $60–80 billion would raise that proportion to about 38 percent. Is this 7 percent the critical difference between hegemony and mere dominance?[6] Truth be told, Kristol and Kagan probably do not have the foggiest idea where they derived the $60–80 billion figure.

To date, neither the Right nor the Left has made a good case for how large a military force the United States needs, let alone how much it should cost. But simply throwing money at the problem will not solve it.

And as a final break from cold war–era policy, Washington should be more concerned with practical results than symbolic diplomacy. The vociferously debated issue of NATO expansion offers the best example. NATO was designed to deal with a specific threat that no longer exists. To deter the Warsaw Pact, NATO required a uniform, all-encompassing alliance with an integrated command structure that reinforced economic relations, technology controls, interoperability standards, and so on. Current threats to the United States and its allies are more varied, but trying to adapt NATO to deal with all of them would be difficult, as each member country's concerns differ from those of its fellows.

NATO expansion also raises the question of how to deal with Russia. Forget the platitudes about Russia being a "strategic partner." In reality, Russia will often be an adversary. But Washington still needs Moscow's cooperation to deal with issues of mutual concern. Though Russia cannot prevent NATO expansion, it can stymie U.S. policy by ceasing to cooperate on issues like preventing nuclear proliferation.

The real issue is what Washington wants from NATO expansion—the security of Eastern Europe? A more subtle approach—economic integration, subsidies for military modernization, bilateral defense treaties, and informal cooperation on defense—would likely bring results with fewer complications. Unfortunately, subtlety is not the strong suit of the Pax Americana Muravchik proposes.

Overall, however, these books are valuable additions to the strategy debate. America needs ideas like those floated by Rodman, Ledeen, and Muravchik because internationalists of all stripes are in their "wilderness years." One is reminded of the ironic words Lord Mountbatten is said to have spoken to his troops when he assumed supreme command of Allied forces in Southeast Asia during World War II: "They call you the 'Forgotten Army.' But rest assured, you are not forgotten; they never even knew you were here at all."

[5] Ibid., p. 23.

[6] For world expenditures on defense, see International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1996/97* (London: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 306–11.

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Alas, today the typical citizen or politician probably does not know who Mountbatten was and might even have a hard time locating Southeast Asia. Like Mountbatten, internationalists in the United States are fighting a holding action until the rest of the public starts paying attention to international affairs—as they will inevitably have to do, because the United States cannot isolate itself from world events. Strange as it may seem, what Ledeen, Muravchik, and Rodman have to say may be less important than their persistence in saying it.

The Illusion of Bloodless Victories

by Michael P. Noonan

Explorations in Strategy. By Colin S. Gray. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1996. 265 pp. $59.95.)

"Toward Post-Heroic Warfare." By Edward N. Luttwak. In *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 1995, pp. 109–22.

"A Post-Heroic Military Policy." By Edward N. Luttwak. In *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 1996, pp. 33–44.

"Casualties, Technology, and America's Future Wars." By Harvey M. Sapolsky and Jeremy Shapiro. In *Parameters*, Summer 1996, pp. 119–27.

"Take No Casualties." By Karl W. Eikenberry. In *Parameters*, Summer 1996, pp. 109–18.

Casualties and Consensus: The Historical Role of Casualties in Domestic Support for U.S. Military Operations. By Eric V. Larson. (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1996. 126 pp. $15.00.)

"The New Warrior Class." By Ralph Peters. In *Parameters*, Summer 1994, pp. 16–26.

"Winning Against Warriors." By Ralph Peters. In *Strategic Review*, Summer 1996, pp. 12–21.

The official U.S. Army doctrinal manual for operations declares that "the American people expect decisive victory and abhor unnecessary casualties."[1] This supposed lesson of both the Vietnam War and the war in the Persian Gulf sums up much

[1] Department of the Army, *FM 100-5 Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993), chapter 1, p. 3.

Michael P. Noonan is a research analyst at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, where he focuses on American defense and national security issues as part of the institute's Defense Task Force program. He also serves as an officer in the United States Army Reserve.

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of today's thinking on American military affairs. But are these wishes of the American people always realistic? Proponents of the new American way of war, to fight and win quickly and cheaply, would say: if not, then do not enter the fight. Yet the post–cold war era has already seen American forces engaged in situations where both a clear victory and low casualty rates are not guaranteed. Just how important are these issues to U.S. military strategy or American civilian leaders? To judge by many recent publications, some analysts want to believe that the technological transformation of warfare, the so-called revolution in military affairs, has made the low-casualties victory a potential norm for American military action. Others (including this author) would argue that such victories will continue to be the exception rather than the rule, and as such, war making based strictly on low-casualties expectations could well lead to America's defeat on the battlefield rather than victory.

A Holistic Approach to Strategy

As with any battlefield objective, achieving a decisive victory with minimal casualties is rooted in strategy. Colin Gray, an eminent geostrategist at the University of Hull, approaches strategy holistically, reminding readers that it links political ends with military means. In *Explorations in Strategy*, Gray uses Carl von Clausewitz's definitions of strategy, "the use of engagements for the object of war," and tactics, "the use of armed forces in the engagement," in examining the role of strategy in the contemporary setting (p. 4). He posits that strategy operates both vertically—encompassing "all aspects of peace with security, from political vision down to tactical military performance"—and horizontally—including land, sea, air, and space power, and "strategic" nuclear and special operations forces (p. 7). Ultimately, strategy is "the bridge that connects the threat and use of force with policy or politics" (p. 8). But today, Gray contends, the means of strategy are so diverse that both political and military leaders have trouble grasping it holistically. Instead, they focus on the vertical or horizontal aspects, which often leads to friction between leaderships that must work together for effective strategic operations.

Gray's discussions of both air power and special operations as strategic instruments are of particular interest in regard to casualties and strategy. He argues that America is by definition an air power, and that it should use air power to the utmost effectiveness without losing sight of its limiting factors.[2] "Part of the appeal of air power is that it is literally above the messiness of conflict on the ground where alien cultures contend" (p. 93). He adds that when allowed to play a key role in certain conflicts, air and space power can be decisive factors.

The section on special operations is one of the most interesting in Gray's book, as the capabilities and merits of special operations forces are mostly

[2] See, in particular, Gray's chart on p. 98.

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ignored outside of military circles and widely misunderstood even within the military. But Gray argues that these forces are a potent strategic tool whose success depends on two conditions: "(1) a willingness on the part of political and military leaders to allow special operations forces onto the field to play and (2) the ability of all concerned to identify suitable objectives for them" (p. 151).

He does point out that such forces cannot be expected to provide solutions for all contingencies, but they may be the best option for contingencies with ambiguous objectives, when the public is less likely to tolerate casualties.[3] However, after the failed manhunt for the late Somali warlord Mohammed Farah Aidid in Mogadishu in October 1993, many analysts heaped blame on the "snake eaters"[4] for failed military policy, while largely ignoring the possibility that the policy itself was flawed.[5]

Gray's thoughts on national interests and the typology of conflicts are equally instructive. He asserts that four levels of problems comprise the national interest: survival, vital, major, and other. The balance of power, the U.S. reputation, and American citizens and their property are considered to be the greatest interests. Furthermore, five types of distinct conflicts could affect international security:

> Balance-of-(great)-power problems: problems that would threaten a world war.
>
> Regional roguery: conflicts over the balance of power in a particular region.
>
> Local disorder: conflicts confined primarily to one country or a former country.
>
> Nontraditional threats: organized crime, drug traffic, terrorism, and economic warfare.
>
> "911": unanticipated emergencies such as humanitarian relief and assistance.

As Gray proves, however, not all interventions undertaken in response to the above situations lend themselves to the decisive-victory/low-casualties goal. And for those strategists who believe technology will assure that result, he offers this:

> Few rogue or would-be rogue polities are going to oblige the best and the brightest American information warriors by setting themselves up to be "Iraqed" in an information

[3] For an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of employing special operations forces, see Gray's chart on p. 186.

[4] The term "snake eater" is the label that many apply to special operations forces, particularly U.S. Army Special Forces.

[5] See, for example, Edward N. Luttwak, "Toward Post-Heroic Warfare," *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 1995, p. 115; Daniel P. Bolger, *Savage Peace: Americans At War in the 1990s* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1995), pp. 305–7.

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war. If they are able, foes of the United States will decline to wage information war and instead will threaten or conduct operations which marginalize much of the nominal U.S. "third-wave" advantage (p. 240).

A Path to Improved Policy?

In keeping with the decisive-victory/low-casualties goal, many policymakers have proposed various checklists to attempt to regularize the decision to employ military means. During the last decade-plus, numerous such plans have been proclaimed concerning the use of American force abroad, all of which draw on America's experience in Vietnam and a reluctance to commit the military to situations such as the U.S. misadventure in Lebanon (1982–84).

After studying both disasters, then secretary of defense Caspar Weinberger unveiled what came to be known as the Weinberger Doctrine in an address before the National Press Club on November 28, 1984. He emphasized six principles that should govern the use of force: vital national interests are threatened; the United States clearly intends to win; the intervention has precisely defined objectives; there is reasonable assurance that the American people and Congress will support the intervention; the commitment of American forces and their objectives can be reassessed and adjusted if necessary; and the commitment of forces is a last resort.[6] Members of both the Left and Right attacked this plan as unworkable and, judging by the historical precedent, probably prohibitive of any use of force abroad.

The next set of rules came from General Colin Powell, who described the Powell Doctrine as the lessons he learned from the U.S. involvement in Vietnam and its invasion of Panama in 1989.[7] For any military intervention, Powell dictated, U.S. policymakers must have a clear political objective and stick to it; use all the force necessary and not apologize for it; and recognize that decisive force ends wars quickly and saves lives in the long run.[8]

This doctrine has also been criticized as too restrictive, largely because the general's conception of "decisive force" seems to prohibit action unless the United States assembles a grossly overwhelming force. In this vein, the six-month buildup to the war in the Persian Gulf gave the initiative to Saddam. Fortunately for the United States, he chose not to take it. Moreover, officials in the first Clinton administration claimed that the plan was an early obstacle to effective foreign policy. One senior official went so far as to say, "Everything we did effectively over the following two or three years, we did without the shadow of Colin Powell and the so-called Powell Doctrine."[9] While one can argue that

[6] Caspar W. Weinberger, "The Uses of Military Power," Department of Defense News Release, Nov. 28, 1984, cited in John Hillen, *American Military Intervention: A User's Guide,* Backgrounder, no. 1079 (Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, May 2, 1996), p. 5.

[7] Colin Powell with Joseph E. Persico, *My American Journey* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1995), p. 420.

[8] Ibid., pp. 420–21.

[9] Steven Erlanger and David E. Sanger, "On Global Stage, Clinton's Pragmatic Turn," *New York Times,* July 29, 1996.

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Powell's rules restrict the executive overmuch in formulating foreign policy, his rules should not be used as a cover for an indecisive intervention in Somalia and a delayed intervention in Bosnia that the White House held off even long after the general left.

Following these precedents, the Clinton administration devised its own rules for intervention, first with the 1994 Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-25. PDD-25's criteria for American involvement in multilateral peace operations dictate that: participation advances U.S. interests, and the risks to American personnel are considered acceptable; sufficient forces have been committed to achieve clearly defined objectives, and a plan exists to attain those objectives; an end point for U.S. participation can be identified; operations are continually assessed for their viability and effectiveness; and popular and congressional support either exists or can be raised.[10]

To clarify the administration's policy, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, in an address at George Washington University in March 1996, enumerated four principles for the use of force: the United States will always be ready to use force to defend its national interests; a credible threat of force alone will sometimes achieve objectives; force need not always be massive in its application; and end-state planning is necessary before forces are introduced overseas. He also described seven circumstances that might call for the use of force: defending against direct attacks on the United States, its citizens, and its allies; countering aggression toward American interests; defending key U.S. economic interests; preserving and promoting democracy; preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, international crime, and drug trafficking; maintaining American credibility and reliability; and performing humanitarian interventions in instances of famines, natural disasters, and gross abuses of human rights.[11]

Unfortunately, such checklists are either too broad or too narrow in their application of force—the United States will intervene either everywhere or almost nowhere. Because these criteria could create ambiguity or false expectations for an American response overseas, they are most useful as a loose conceptual framework for employing U.S. forces rather than as a step-by-step plan for a response.

But while many believe the rule-making exercises restrict U.S. force abroad, the military has seen increasing action during the Clinton administration, even as the armed forces shrink.[12] Between January 1993 and December 1995, the Clinton administration used the armed forces abroad on twenty-five occasions.

[10] For the unclassified version of this document see the White House, "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations," May 1994.

[11] National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, "Defining Mission, Setting Deadlines: Meeting New Security Challenges in the Post–Cold War World," Address at George Washington University, Washington, D.C., Mar. 6, 1996.

[12] See, for example, John Hillen, "Having It Both Ways On Defense," *Investor's Business Daily*, Sept. 25, 1996; Bradley Graham, "Two-War Scenario: A Strategy Straining the Pentagon," *Washington Post*, Dec. 12, 1996.

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That compares with seventeen instances during Ronald Reagan's two terms and fourteen during the Bush administration.[13]

The current vogue of operations other than war—the principal reason for the heightened operational tempo—has caused much consternation both within and outside the Beltway. While advocates claim that these missions are necessary and useful, the fact remains that humanitarian interventions, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement all risk lives. And much of the debate focuses on whether these operations are worth the lives of America's men and women.

Are Casualties the Sum of All Fears?

As noted, a central consideration in each of the proposed checklists is the probability of high casualties, a topic that recently has drawn considerable attention. In 1995 and 1996, Edward Luttwak, a senior fellow of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, published two articles in *Foreign Affairs* laying out his thesis of post-heroic warfare. In these articles, Luttwak contends that with the end of the cold war "the size of armed forces, military expenditures, fear of nuclear attack, and learned habits of restraint are all diminished" (1996, p. 33), bringing a new season of warfare to the international community. But few of today's conflicts merit U.S. involvement and the casualties American forces would suffer. Luttwak further argues that the American public is unwilling to sanction endless interventions, yet the United States must intervene in some situations that threaten the country's values and material interests (1995, p. 114). From this perspective, he advocates a return to some form of eighteenth-century warfare, when "most wars were fought for much less than imperative purposes that rarely evoked popular enthusiasm, with prudent strategies and tactics to conserve professional forces" (1995, p. 110).

In Luttwak's estimation, casualty avoidance should drive American military policy. High casualties, he asserts, can rapidly undermine domestic support for any military operation, which in turn is "the key constraint when decisions must be made on which forces to deploy in a crisis and at what levels" (1996, p. 36). But if the risk of American military casualties can be minimalized, "the response of public opinion to proposed military interventions should also change" (1995, p. 112). With an eye to these considerations, he makes several suggestions for maintaining a robust yet protected force.

During the cold war, countries maintained large forces for both deterrence and show. In this new era, Luttwak believes overwhelming military might is no longer necessary. While he concedes that ground forces are the most versatile, he argues that they are becoming too expensive to employ overseas absent a national will to accept casualties. Instead, capital-intensive forces are the best

[13] Richard F. Grimmett, *Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-1995,* Congressional Research Service Report, Feb. 6, 1996, pp. 19–25.

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option. Long-range bombers and cruise missiles become a viable option, and in most instances the superior one, because they can achieve objectives that reduce American casualties. However, the U.S. encounter with Iraq in September of 1996 casts some doubt on Luttwak's theory. That "victory" seems to have achieved few objectives, limited or otherwise.[14] Recall that victory in Desert Storm ultimately required a ground offensive.

Luttwak also argues for using a "casualty-exposure" index when ground forces must be committed. This index would prove that mechanized or armored forces are the most desirable ground forces for any type of terrain, because "inserting forces that are theoretically more suitable only to have to withdraw them abruptly because of politically intolerable casualties accomplishes nothing" (1996, p. 41). But Luttwak does not consider that armored and mechanized forces require a significant heavy-lift capability to be deployed into a theater of war, or, more important, that the narrow streets of an urban area may make armored or mechanized forces as susceptible to casualties as the less-protected light infantry (consider the Russian experience in Grozny).

Whether or not one agrees with Luttwak's casualties analysis, his conclusion that American forces must continue to be engaged abroad seems irrefutable. In his words,

> If the possessor of much of the world's military power refuses to use it, greater world disorder is only the most immediate consequence. At a time when Cold War restraint has given way to adventurism, if U.S. military power is withheld in one crisis after another, it is bound to stimulate the growth of other military powers. A vacuum will have been created that other countries will fill (1996, p. 44).

But whether the American people and their elected representatives deem engagements and their costs necessary continues to spark debate.

Parameters published two wholly different perspectives on this issue in the summer of 1996. In "Casualties, Technology, and America's Future Wars," Harvey Sapolsky, a professor and director of the Defense and Arms Control Studies Program at MIT, and Jeremy Shapiro, a Ph.D. candidate in political science at MIT, argue that the casualty issue divides the country because of vulnerabilities of Americans and U.S. society. Americans reject not only American military casualties but also opponent and neutral civilian casualties, and even enemy military casualties, owing to restraints U.S. society has imposed on itself.

According to the authors, casualty concerns began to hinder military policy as a result of the Vietnam War. In their words:

> What mattered was the domestic interpretations of the fighting, the cost to families and to public life of the casualties we suffered and inflicted. The potential political effects of these reactions began to constrain US leaders more than did assessments of opposing forces (p. 121).

[14] See, for example, Harvey Sicherman, "The Strange Death of Dual Containment," *Orbis*, Spring 1997, pp. 223–40.

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These effects were not limited to unpopular conflicts like Vietnam. As Sapolsky and Shapiro observe, the casualty issue affected the conduct of even the widely supported Persian Gulf War in three ways. First, the ground war lasted only four days because the generals claimed that they had achieved the military objective after that short time, and that further hostilities would risk American casualties for political objectives. Secondly, the United States stopped offensive operations for fear that a brutal offensive campaign would give the impression that the U.S.-led coalition was slaughtering Iraqi forces. And lastly, images of the suffering inflicted upon the Iraqi populace led to a modified air campaign. These perceptions, the authors believe, contribute to the quest for "magic bullets" that will sanitize warfare and reduce the risk of American casualties. For low casualty figures from the Persian Gulf War, as well as from the interventions in Grenada and Panama, give the false impression that future conflicts can also yield small numbers of American fatalities.

Thus, the desire for sanitized warfare has led to high-tech weapons, nonlethal weapons, and sanctions. High-tech weapons are desirable owing to the perception that they can defeat the enemy from a safe distance. They do, however, require tremendous intelligence input for employment; precision-guided weapons, for example, need precise targeting information. Nonlethal weapons are another option, but while sticky foam, sprays, traps, and noise-makers may be a feel-good alternative, their use can heighten an opponent's frustration and provoke a "lethal" weapon response. Calling means "nonlethal" may also give the inaccurate impression that they never inflict casualties: "What merely stuns a 20-year-old soldier may easily kill a two-year-old child or a slightly out of shape 56-year-old professor" (p. 123). Lastly, Sapolsky and Shapiro argue that sanctions are also unreliable because they generally affect those least responsible for the sanctions' imposition.[15]

Decreasing tolerance for casualties stems from more than just recent conflicts, however. According to the authors, Vietnam and Watergate sharpened an ingrained cultural distrust of government. Americans now insist that deaths "for state purposes" be proved necessary, purposeful, and unavoidable. For troops to be deployed when the country's survival is not on the line, the polity demands a moral cause that justifies the sacrifice, which in turn makes political leaders exaggerate the stakes.

With ideological and political restraints hindering deployment at nearly every turn, perhaps U.S. military action should be limited to hunting for enemy leaders who are increasingly harder to find.[16] Sapolsky and Shapiro note that "it is impossible to fight a war applying American civil liberty standards" (p. 125). They also recognize that while America may call for a crusade to expand tolerance and U.S. ideals abroad, it does not "have the stomach for the slaughter

[15] See Patrick Clawson, *How Has Saddam Hussein Survived? Economic Sanctions, 1990–93*, McNair Paper 22 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Aug. 1993).

[16] See, for example, Ralph Peters, "A Revolution in Military Ethics?" *Parameters*, Summer 1996, pp. 102–8.

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that such a crusade requires" (p. 126). The overarching problem is a lack of national will, which could provoke a retreat into "fortress America."

While Sapolsky and Shapiro examine the issues underlying the casualty debate, Colonel Karl W. Eikenberry looks to its possible impact on military doctrine, arguing that hypersensitivity to fatalities could impede the armed forces' ability to execute missions. In his article "Take No Casualties," Eikenberry, who works on the staff of the assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, contends that the military and statesmen see battle losses from entirely different perspectives. On the one hand, statesmen

> must weigh the repercussions of excessive casualties on the level of civilian morale necessary to successfully prosecute a war, and ultimately (at least in a representative form of government) on their own political futures.

But generals

> must balance potential losses against a wide variety of military factors including probable strategic or tactical gains, possible damage to the effectiveness of the forces employed and their ability to cope with enemy countermoves, and the difficulty of reinforcing or reconstituting the force. Military commanders, when planning and conducting operations, must also respond to their civilian leaders' guidance (if any) concerning the number of casualties deemed politically acceptable (p. 109).

Political leaders must consider the public's reaction to casualties and anticipate the response of the political opposition, attitudes largely shaped by whether people see a particular conflict as a legitimate defense of U.S. vital interests. Still, as Eikenberry notes, statesmen cannot set a precise, quantifiable limit for the number of casualties the United States would tolerate. To do so would invite the enemy to kill that number of American troops and then some.

Eikenberry argues that in a given conflict the military's psyche is affected by not only the number of casualties suffered but how the public perceives the losses, which translates into the level of popular support the intervention enjoys. Preoccupation with the public's perception of a conflict could result in disproportionate attention paid to force preservation, which commanders may come to consider more important than boldness. The continued U.S. commitment in Bosnia, for instance, seems to prove that force preservation is the goal. American personnel are not allowed off their compounds during off-duty hours, and even during duty hours they move about only in convoys.

Eikenberry further observes that "limited war begets limited objectives, which beget more urgent political concerns over casualties" (p. 112). Thus, it is "politically risky, if not suicidal, to preside over any limited conflict that could not be won quickly, with relatively few casualties" (p. 113). Like Sapolsky and Shapiro, he asserts that the low casualty levels in recent interventions may set unreasonable expectations for the U.S. military. The rub is that

> one of the most difficult dilemmas facing our statesmen today is how to respond effectively to domestic concerns about losses in conflicts abroad, while still showing the tangible signs of commitment necessary to maintain a claim to coalition and world leadership (p. 115).

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He further contends that "a military that on its own volition discards courses of action because they are too costly may lose its spirit of creativity and innovation" (p. 116), eventually leading to an operational blurring whereby commanders may believe that men are more important than the mission. All young officers, at least in the army, are taught "mission first, people always." That may seem like a contradiction, but as Eikenberry points out, "considered coldly, soldiers and an army are ultimately a means, not an end" (p. 117). While one may disagree with his argument, it should be considered by everyone, particularly all officers.

For the last perspective considered here on the casualty debate, Eric V. Larson provides a behavioralist analysis of the casualty issue and corresponding domestic support for American military operations. The author, a postdoctoral fellow at the RAND Corporation, bases his conclusions on a comparison of public support for American military action in World War II, Korea, Vietnam, the Gulf, Somalia, and Panama. He also touches on the Dominican Republic intervention of 1965 and U.S. involvement in Lebanon in the early 1980s.

Drawing on his survey data, Larson points out that five factors can explain public support or opposition to interventions:

> *The perceived benefits.* Interventions garner more support when they are seen as defending significant U.S. interests.
>
> *The prospects for success.* The operations most likely to achieve their objectives will receive the most popular support.
>
> *Prospective and actual costs.* The public is more likely to oppose interventions with potentially high costs in human and matériel resources.
>
> *Changing expectations.* The initial expectations for an operation lay the framework for support, but changes for the worse may cause the public to revise its opinion (for example, the effect the Tet Offensive had on perceptions of U.S. involvement in Vietnam).
>
> *The nature and depth of support for the intervention among the other actors.* Public and political actors influence the general public's opinion through their own support.

Larson also considers how media coverage can affect interventions. Taking on the "myth of the 'CNN effect,'" he argues that media reporting did not contribute to the decision to intervene in Somalia. Nor did the horrifying images of the failed raid in October 1993 substantially contribute to the public's demand for an immediate withdrawal. However, it will be interesting to see whether the survey data from the Haiti, Bosnia, and Rwanda interventions alter his analysis.

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Overall, Larson believes the American public will accept casualties, but only for worthy causes. Leadership consensus is also essential for the public to support U.S. military interventions. In sum,

> support for U.S. military operations and the willingness to tolerate casualties are based upon a sensible weighing of benefits and costs that is influenced heavily by consensus (or its absence) among political leaders (p. xv).

Facing the "New Warriors"

Unfortunately, the evolving nature of U.S. enemies could make high casualties likely in future confrontations. If the recent precedents of the post–cold war era continue, American forces will increasingly face ambiguous threats such as those encountered in Somalia. Major Ralph Peters, the special assistant for strategic planning to the director of national drug control policy, calls these forces "the new warrior class," a concept he introduced in his 1994 *Parameters* piece of the same name. According to Peters, the "warriors" are

> erratic primitives of shifting allegiance, habituated to violence, with no stake in civil order. Unlike soldiers, warriors do not play by our rules, do not respect treaties, and do not obey orders they do not like (1994, p. 16).

This new class is growing throughout the world, drawing members from the underclass, "course-of-conflict" joiners, patriots, opportunists, failed or cashiered military types, and child warriors. Warriors are seizing power in vacuums created by weak states or in areas where they can legitimize their rule.[17] To them, the will of the people "matters very little when it matters at all" (1994, p. 17). If that were not bad enough, Peters notes that warriors want to prolong violence because many of them have few marketable skills, and "the end of fighting means the end of good times" (1994, p. 17).

These marauders are the future opponents of U.S. forces. And because "the deployment of troops [has become] a substitute for policy" (1996, p. 14), American forces will encounter the new warriors on more and more missions and risk suffering casualties every time. To keep casualties to a minimum, the United States must understand the cultures and behaviors in regions where U.S. forces are deployed, plan for mission creep, and go in knowing that the intervention may require a heavy price. Furthermore, the United States should steer clear of places where an American intervention will not likely prove successful.

When American forces must fight warriors, Peters asserts, U.S. troops should use a strategy of separation. First, the warriors must be separated both physically and psychologically from the population, thereby cutting them off

[17] See, for example, Mark Urban, "Warlords' forces present new problems," *Washington Times*, Nov. 16, 1996.

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"from the sources of their strength." Then U.S. forces must "pursue them relentlessly" (1996, p. 18). Because fighting against warriors is a zero-sum game, those conflicts may ultimately place the greatest strain on the decisive-victory/low-casualties imperative.

The Future of American Military Policy

Simply put, the world remains a dangerous and uncertain place, and U.S. forces will continue to be sent into harm's way. With that in mind, several guidelines drawn from the above works could help shape better criteria for interventions.

Leadership. Effective leadership is the key to the support and success of interventions. When American forces must be deployed overseas, they need clearly defined objectives and bipartisan support for their mission. Sending U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines into ill-conceived and ambiguous missions is a recipe for disaster. When such missions are in the offing, the military and the Congress must present to the executive office clear, valid, and irrefutable objections against them. Ultimately, however, it is the president's responsibility to determine when an intervention is necessary and to raise support for that operation.

Restraints. Placing inordinate restraints on the president's ability to use military forces as an adjunct to policy may set dangerous precedents. Politicians intent on so restricting the chief executive for partisan reasons should remember that restraints imposed on the opposition today will shackle one's own party tomorrow, the War Powers Act of 1973 being the most obvious such restraint. Moreover, guidelines that allow for the massive use of force only in limited circumstances will impede the execution of an effective foreign policy. Still, the president must keep his finger on the pulse of public and military opinion, without becoming a prisoner of polling data.

Checks and balances. A new order of checks and balances must be developed to keep the United States from jumping into ambiguous interventions. The president, Congress, and military must work together whenever possible to govern the use of military force. The president must exercise leadership; the Congress should support or oppose employing force without trying to micromanage tactics; and the military should provide the planning and support to implement military operations, while also stating any valid objections it might have to a particular intervention. As Gray argues, this cohesion is necessary because there exists a fundamental divergence in strategic thought and implementation between the military and civilian leadership. Hopefully, constructive relations among the executive office, Congress, and the military could help bridge that gap.

Overall, Americans need to "sober up" about the realities of using force. Civilians must understand that war brings death to more than just the enemy, that it is not a science, and that the military needs clear guidance and responsibility. The military, in turn, should remember that war is about more than killing or

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avoiding casualties—it is an instrument of national policy decided by civilians. When senior officers strongly disagree with their civilian bosses, they must be willing to speak out. But they should be fully aware of and unreservedly accept the consequences of their actions. The military's ultimate goal is to fight and win the nation's wars, and war is after all a political act. To avoid too much friction between the men and women in uniform and their civilian leadership, however, American participation in operations other than war should be limited to those instances where it is critically needed.

Ultimately, the issue of casualties is not, and should not be, a deciding factor in the use of force when an intervention is valid and necessary. As Larson points out, the American people will accept casualties so long as the civilian leadership persuades them of that validity and necessity. Instead of fixating on potential casualties, American military policy must concern itself with preparing the force to deal with the threats to American interests. That should be done, however, while remembering what Ambassador Paul Wolfowitz told a conference at the American Enterprise Institute in December 1995: history has shown itself to be far more imaginative than any Pentagon scenario writer.

Mexico's Flight from Freedom

by Michael Radu

Bordering on Chaos: Guerrillas, Stockbrokers, Politicians, and Mexico's Road to Prosperity. By Andres Oppenheimer. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1996. 367 pp. $25.95.)

Tiempo Contado (Borrowed time). By Enrique Krauze. (México, D.F.: Editorial Oceano de México, 1996. 274 pp. N$85, paper.)

The Mexican Shock: Its Meaning for the United States. By Jorge G. Castañeda. (New York: The New Press, 1996. 257 pp. $23.00.)

Mexico at the Crossroads: Politics, the Church, and the Poor. By Michael Tangeman. (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1995. 138 pp. $17.00.)

Many aspects of Mexico's self-defeating political culture provide cause for lament: the country's love affair with authoritarianism; its antidemocratic, anticapitalist, anti-American sentiments; and not least its romantic illusions about a bloody past. While most Americans probably realize that they do not know much about their neighbor to the south, what they may not realize is that Mexicans also have trouble understanding Mexico. As Andres Oppenheimer puts it, "How could one write about a country where one could not only not trust what people said, but wasn't even sure whether people were who they were supposed

Michael Radu is an associate scholar of the Foreign Policy Research Institute and a contributing editor to *Orbis*.

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to be?" (pp. 265–66). Doubtless the four books under review will do little to change Mexico's political culture. But they do combine to give the reader a good understanding of it.

Two of the works are by Mexicans with opposing political views: Enrique Krauze, author and columnist, is one of the country's most respected essayists and a member of the democratic, anti-Marxist group of intellectuals centered around the journal *Vuelta* and its founder, the Nobel Prize–laureate Octavio Paz. Jorge G. Castañeda, son of a former foreign minister, is one of Latin America's most prominent left-wing intellectuals, author of *Utopia Unarmed*, and a frequent visiting professor at American universities. A third work is by a neutral observer: Andres Oppenheimer, perhaps the best Latin American journalist today. Argentine-born, Oppenheimer is a co-winner of a Pulitzer Prize, a correspondent for the *Miami Herald*, author of *Castro's Final Hour*, and a recipient of the most prestigious Spanish-language award, the Premio Ortega y Gasset. The last of the four works is by an American, Michael Tangeman, Mexico correspondent for the Catholic News Service and an author whose allegiance is to a utopian, "progressive" Mexico, as far removed as possible from the Vatican and Washington establishments.

The Antidemocratic Reality

During most of this century, the key institution in Mexican political culture has been the oddly named Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional—PRI), the social-political structure around which the country's ruling clique has clustered. With the fall of the Soviet Union's Communist Party, the PRI became the longest continually ruling political party in the world, having assumed power in 1929. So deeply entrenched has the PRI become over the years that it pays enemies for their criticism by subsidizing opposition newspapers, personalities, and parties, and by installing turbulent leftists in university chairs and public jobs. This total control has allowed old-style PRI leaders—known as "the dinosaurs"—to engage in massive corruption. As one of them (Carlos Hank González) told Oppenheimer, "A politician who is poor is a poor politician" (p. 180). That, in a nutshell, is Mexico's political slogan: Corruption is good and more corruption is better. Until recently, such large-scale corruption helped to sustain the regime, for when a system provides everybody with access to illicit income—policemen, generals, presidents, members of Congress, union leaders, and even humble street vendors paid to participate in progovernment rallies—then all have a stake in the system.

But times have changed, and the PRI system is steadily collapsing, its loss of control well demonstrated by the party's growing inability to determine election totals. During the 1920s, General Alvaro Obregón won his election with 1,670,456 votes in favor and 0 against. In 1988, Carlos Salinas de Gortari won (fraudulently) with 50 percent of the vote. His successor, the current president, Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León, received 48.8 percent of the vote in 1994 (Oppenheimer, p. 169). Opposition parties now control the governorships

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of a number of states, including the important ones of Jalisco, Michoacán, and Sonora, which have a combined population of more than 20 million. (Mexico's population is just less than 100 million.)

Moreover, the PRI no longer holds sway over public opinion. Only 18 percent of Mexicans have confidence in their government, and public officials are next to last on the list of persons people trust, barely above used cars salesmen (p. 266). Mexicans are so used to being lied to that the word "truth" itself has a negative connotation (p. 270). Under the circumstances, it is not surprising, but certainly worrisome, that one-third of Mexicans agree violence is a legitimate means of redressing grievances.[1]

The increasingly assertive opposition parties highlight some grave issues about Mexico's cohesion. For example, the main opposition party, the National Action Party (Partido Acción Nacional—PAN), which was established in 1939 as a procapitalist, nationalist reaction to the socialism and statism of the PRI, is still a largely regional party. It is geographically limited to the most developed and least Indian states, those along the U.S. border (Sonora, Chihuahua, Baja California Norte, and Nuevo León), plus the area around the capital. These northerners of PAN, Krauze observes, are "nationalists but not yankophobes; . . . do not see themselves as inferior to the gringos, their 'cousins' of the 'other side'; [and are] oriented toward practice and rejecting theories" (p. 158).[2] Such attitudes point to a serious cultural gap when contrasted with the statist and bureaucratic paralysis of Mexico City and the backwardness, both cultural and political, of the largely Indian south.

Oppenheimer, too, discusses at length the huge gap in mentality, behavior, and economic efficiency between northern businessmen and the rest of the country. For instance, Monterrey's streets are not named after revolutionaries or pre-Columbians but after successful businessmen. Instead of the names of the last Aztec emperor (Cuauhtémoc) and Mexican presidents Benito Juárez and Alvaro Obregón, one finds the names of Eugenio Garza Sada (a brewery magnate) and Felix López (a cement producer) (p. 281).

U.S.-trained since the end of the last century (often at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology), such northern businessmen established the Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey in 1943 to train the managerial cadres they needed. Today "El Tec" has twenty-six campuses and 57,000 students throughout Mexico, from Chiapas to Monterrey, and is indeed a twenty-first-century school, complete with Internet access and classes conducted over closed-circuit television (pp. 284–85). By contrast, the economics department of the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM), one of the largest universities in the world, only recently decided to reduce the proportion of classes on Marxist economics from some 90 percent to 10 percent, and then only because the department had lost most of its students.

[1] *Reforma* (Mexico City), cited in "The Backlash in Latin America," *The Economist*, Nov. 30, 1996, p. 21.
[2] This and all subsequent quotations from Krauze are translated by the author.

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Northern Mexico's distinct mentality and ideological inclination, taken together with its support for PAN, raise the issue of Mexico's long-term cohesion, particularly as northerners perceive themselves to be subsidizing the rest of Mexico. When Oppenheimer queried the faculty of the modern Colegio de la Frontera Norte in Tijuana about their opinion of the gap between northern and southern Mexico, he found them unanimously pessimistic. Comparing levels of income, health, and education, faculty members said, the southern states are about twenty years behind (p. 295).

On the other side of this great divide is the Democratic Revolutionary Party (Partido de la Revolución Democrática—PRD), whose main electoral strongholds are the southern states (Guerrero, Oaxaca, Michoacán, and Chiapas), which are the most economically backward and demographically Indian, and a combination of intellectuals and recent un-urbanized migrants in Mexico City. As Krauze puts it, "The PRD was born from two profoundly antidemocratic currents: communists and ex-PRIists. . . . The PRD is an authoritarian wolf in a democratic sheep's clothes" (p. 53).

The democratic credentials of the Mexican Communist Party, which joined PRD in 1988, need not be dwelt upon, but it is important to note that the PRD's founders were two leading members of the PRI, which also casts substantial doubt on the PRD's democratic inclinations. Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, the PRD's presidential candidate in 1988 and 1994, was a high-ranking PRI official for most of his adult life and the PRI's Michoacán governor; he is also the son of Mexican president Lázaro Cárdenas, who of course hailed from the PRI. Cárdenas's successor as PRD leader, Porfirio Muñoz Ledo, was the PRI's national chairman. As defectors from the PRI, these two men brought with them that party's leftist rhetoric, plus the claim that now they really mean it. They also brought the PRI's antidemocratic methods, such as the use of "spontaneous" peasant uprising in Michoacán to take over private lands (Krauze, p. 56), and the manipulation of trade unions not controlled by the PRI.

The Revolutionary Illusion

In the southern state of Chiapas, on the Guatemalan border, one sees the other characteristic of Mexican political culture: a deluded perception of Mexico as a revolutionary society. The consequences of this delusion became painfully obvious on January 1, 1994, with the apparently sudden armed insurgency of the Zapatista National Liberation Army (Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional—EZLN).

Both Oppenheimer and Krauze are highly skeptical of the goals and nature of the EZLN. (The former has been from the start; the latter became skeptical after a brief period during which he gave the organization the benefit of the doubt.) Though neither author has more than a basic knowledge of Latin American Marxist insurgencies, they both instinctively understand the nature of the EZLN, and Oppenheimer is quite informative on the subject. Oppenheimer also makes fun of Ed Bradley from *60 Minutes*, who tossed puff questions to

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the EZLN's chief propaganda leader, "subcomandante Marcos," presumably because Bradley chose to see him as a romantic idealist fighting for "human rights" (p. 44), despite both common sense and widely available evidence. As Krauze observes, "for the *comandantes* neither justice nor democracy is important; what is important is power maintained by force of arms" (p. 72).

By contrast, Tangeman claims that the "nebulous concept of democracy" of the Zapatista Indians "meant but one concrete thing: an end to years of manipulation by non-indigenous politicians" (p. 90). But if that is the EZLN's objective, why are Bishop Samuel Ruiz of San Cristóbal and, especially, the blue-eyed, Internet-using Marcos involved, since neither of them is Indian or even from the region? And what do homosexuals, inmates, and prostitutes—whom Marcos so frequently mentioned along with the Indians—have to do with the culture of Marcos's Tzotzil or Tzeltal followers?[3]

Krauze is far closer to the truth when he writes that

> in the Chiapas uprising there is a clear stratification. At the base of the pyramid are the Indians and the peasants. . . . Although [they] fight for the satisfaction of real and concrete grievances—social and economic inequality, political oppression—they are also motivated by a religious factor: the preaching of thousands of "catechists." These soldiers of Liberation Theology believe and make believe in the use of violence to establish the teachings of Jesus Christ and bring perfect equality on Earth. . . . The Indians contribute the fervor and the deaths, the "catechists" the preaching, but at the top of the pyramid, above them both, are the comandantes, without doubt professional guerrillas (pp. 74–75).

The best known of these professionals is Rafael Guillén, a.k.a. "subcomandante Marcos." Oppenheimer, who interviewed Guillén in Chiapas, also investigated his background. It turns out that the voice of the oppressed Maya Indians of Chiapas comes from a comfortably middle-class family in Tampico: his father was the owner of a furniture factory; his sister, a lawyer, was a local PRI deputy; and the brothers were graduates in, respectively, business administration, philosophy, sociology, engineering, agronomy, and public accounting (pp. 249–250). Not surprisingly, Rafael is the philosopher, a graduate of UNAM. In his dissertation he advocated "a new philosophical praxis: philosophy as a revolutionary weapon" (p. 251), parroting one of Marx's own slogans. For that he graduated with honors and attained a teaching position at another public university in Mexico City. At the same time, he established ties with a radical teamsters' union, which would later finance his new incarnation in Chiapas: spokesman for the oppressed Tzotzils and Tzeltals.

Although sporadic clashes between Zapatistas and the military in Chiapas were mentioned in the media as early as 1991, and irresponsibly denied by a government obsessed with Mexico's image during the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) negotiations, the EZLN erupted "officially" on January 1, 1994—the day of NAFTA's implementation. As Tangeman describes it,

[3] See, for example, "Mesa nacional de diálogo independiente: Marcos" (National independent dialogue roundtable: Marcos), *La Jornada* (Mexico City), Sept. 29, 1995.

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> The rebel leadership [that is, the professional revolutionaries] impressed upon them [the Indian followers] the link between poverty and NAFTA; the opening of Mexican agriculture to free trade, said Marcos, represented a potential "death certificate" for Mexico's indigenous peoples. Bound by tradition to ritual subsistence cultivation of maize and beans, they would fail any attempt to turn them into agribusiness entrepreneurs, losing their land and culture in the process (p. 90).

Herein lies the crux of Mexico's problems in general and the recent insurgencies in particular. Contrast Tangeman's sympathy for the EZLN with the reaction of a successful hotel magnate from the northwestern state of Sinaloa to the news that a rebellion had broken out in San Cristóbal de las Casas: "There's nothing wrong here. . . . When the Zapatista uprising took place, I had to go to the map to find out where San Cristóbal de las Casas was. To us, Chiapas is Central America. We feel very far from it" (Oppenheimer, pp. 286–87).

NAFTA

Nothing in recent years has opened the political-geographical cleavages in Mexico as much as NAFTA. For the developed north, it meant easier access to natural markets beyond the Rio Grande. For the backward south, and especially for the maize and bean producers—mostly Indians, small scale, and hopelessly inefficient—it threatened lost subsidies and competition with Kansas and Manitoba farmers. For the PRI and the entrenched elites, it meant admission into an exclusive club. And for most Mexicans, it meant a vague feeling that they were going to live better, as well as a mistaken impression that they would be able to enter the United States more easily.

Castañeda's collection of essays is most informative on the complexities of NAFTA's impact. He asserts, correctly, that

> without NAFTA, any one of the devastating events of that year [1994]—the Chiapas uprising . . . the assassination of [PRI presidential candidate Luis Donaldo] Colosio, the [businessman Alfredo] Harp and [businessman Angel] Losada kidnappings . . . the murder of the PRI leader Ruiz Massieu—would have been enough to bring down the government (p. 67).

Yet Castañeda opposed NAFTA for contradictory reasons. On the one hand, he regretted the fact that it placed Mexico in an inferior economic and financial position; on the other, he complained that Washington and Ottawa did not use the occasion to force democratization on Mexico. Now, resigned to NAFTA's existence, he just wants the pact renegotiated, to make it "an instrument for growth with justice, for democracy within the rule of law, to help consolidate whatever sovereignty we have left" (pp. 70–71).

Such contradictory attitudes are characteristic of the Mexican Left. It tries to demonstrate its ability to adapt to postcommunist realities but retains vaguely utopian dreams of some noncapitalist polity. Likewise, as the rest of the world learns to think economically, the Mexican Left persists in seeing everything through political lenses—notice that Castañeda's interest in NAFTA concerns

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democracy, not the economically important details of tariffs, regulations, and financing. Quite clearly, between a free-market policy under the new technocrats of the PRI (or possibly the PAN) and the statist, egalitarian, and paternalistic rule of the past, Castañeda prefers the latter.

For different and less-idealistic reasons, so do many of the old PRI bosses, who are successfully trying to dismantle or at least halt the privatization policies of the last three Mexican presidents. Unlike Castañeda, the dinosaurs realize that a smaller state means a more honest government—more "poor politicians" and fewer people like themselves.

The Church

One institution that for many years had little say in Mexican politics, but now is increasingly joining in the chorus against free markets and modernization, is the Roman Catholic Church. The Mexican church, like much of Mexico's culture, is living in the past, aptly if inadvertently described by Tangeman (pp. 10–51). He traces the convulsed history of church-state relations since the 1910 revolution, including the deeply rooted anticlericalism of Mexico's elites (both PRIists and Marxists), and the changes in those relations as the church and the elites themselves changed during the last three decades. For some sixty years after 1910, the church's overwhelming goal was decent and "normal" treatment by the state, and thus the hierarchy mostly refrained from criticizing the PRI, which was and still largely is the state. On the other hand, a strong streak of Marxist "liberation theology" has developed among Mexico's clergy, partly as a result of weak church leaders since the 1960s and partly as a result of the radicalization of significant sectors of the Roman Catholic Church throughout Latin America since the 1968 Medellín Latin American Bishops' Council.

The election of John Paul II as pope in 1978 and his visits to Mexico in 1979 and 1983 forced a reassessment and an increased discipline among Mexican bishops and clergy—"increased" but far from complete. Bishop Sergio Méndez Arceo—whom Tangeman calls "the prophetic bishop of Cuernavaca"—continued to support Marxist-Leninist totalitarianism. Indeed, he published an article in a Prague-based, KGB-subsidized journal just months before communism, the journal, and the KGB collapsed.

Liberation theology lost the Vatican's earlier tolerance in Latin America, and the Vatican's representative to Mexico, Girolamo Prigione—who serves as Tangeman's evil genius—proved his effectiveness by marginalizing radicals like Méndez and his pupils, the most important of whom is Bishop Samuel Ruiz. Nevertheless, Ruiz followed closely on the path of his mentor. During the 1980s, he encouraged, supported, and subsidized urban-based Maoist recruiters from the north—the "torreones" (so called after Torreón, a northern center of Maoism)—until the Chiapas Indians finally showed more sense than he and rejected them. Like Méndez, Ruiz never apologized for his role in creating the Chiapas insurgency. On the contrary, he claimed the right to be a mediator

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and for some time between 1994 and 1996 actually played the role. That pattern has found eager followers since Tangeman's book came out, with radical bishops in Tabasco and elsewhere offering themselves as mediators between the Mexican state and the Marxists of the newest Mexican insurgent group, the Popular Revolutionary Army (Ejército Popular Revolucionario—EPR), aptly described by *The Economist* as "the cavemen of the left."[4] Apparently, neither Tangeman nor the bishops grasp the incompatibility between Maoism and Christianity, or between the status of recruiter-trainer (which is what the bishops have been) and that of mediator.

In short, just as the Roman Catholic Church in Mexico is finally being recognized by the state as a legitimate institution, it has started to behave as if the sorry history of liberation theology in Latin America had never occurred and must be played out all over again in Mexico. Hence, the church now supports violence in the name of indigenous rights—and consequently backs Bishop Ruiz—and is openly critical of Mexico's economic and political reforms. The latter is yet another institutional push backward, one Mexico does not need. With admirable consistency, Ruiz opposed NAFTA and even sent one of his protégés to Washington to lobby Congress against it (Tangeman, p. 15). Since the overwhelming majority of Mexicans supported Mexico's entry into NAFTA, Bishop Ruiz and his colleagues on the Catholic Left simply put the short-range interests of their Indian followers—at most 10 percent of the population—ahead of the rest of the country's well-being with the same arrogance that characterizes their friends in the Zapatista leadership.

Conclusion

For most of this century, Mexico was different from the rest of Latin America. Moreover, it saw itself as different and was seen by other Latin Americans as different. Politically stable, and forced by history and geography to engage in a close but ambiguous relationship with the United States, the PRI regime combined socialist rhetoric with a corporatism that would have made Mussolini or Salazar proud. It tried to solve problems, particularly political problems, with corruption: buying off inefficient workers and peasants with subsidies and perquisites, the middle class with bureaucratic jobs, and café revolutionaries with university chairs and hugs for Fidel Castro. As long as oil prices were high enough this approach worked, but at the expense of the economy's private sector, which became paralyzed by corruption, red tape, and taxes. With the weakening of oil prices at the beginning of the 1980s, the PRI could no longer afford this corruption, and its fortunes declined rapidly. Starting in the presidency of Miguel de la Madrid (1982–88), through that of Carlos Salinas (1988–1994), and continuing now at an increasingly slow pace with that of Ernesto Zedillo (1994–), technocrats have tried to modernize the country

[4] "The Backlash in Latin America," p. 20.

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with economic reform. Inevitably, economic reform has forced them into an acceptance of political reform, with the result that, *pace* Castañeda and Tangeman, Mexico is more pluralistic and democratic now than ever in its history. Unfortunately, but probably inevitably, among those taking advantage of this development are precisely those whose goal is not democracy but a collectivistic and authoritarian utopia: the EZLN and EPR.

This all suggests that Mexico's main problem may well be its lack of modernity rather than injustice, absence of democracy, or poverty. For Tangeman, modernity is a threat to the romantic past of the backward Indians. Castañeda knows that Mexico is not a modern country and faults the absence of democratic transfers of power, but he admits that it is also "a country accustomed to 'presidentialism,' to arbitrariness, and the inscrutable motives of the *tlatoani* [emperor] of Aztec rulers" (p. 70). In other words, the problem is cultural and goes back many centuries, to the country's still-revered pre-European past. Krauze states the dilemma well:

> The brutality of Aztec power has disappeared, but certain political habits, like the *tapadismo*,[5] the concentration of power in the capital of the country . . . continue as alive as they were in Tenochtitlan. . . . This inertia is confusing. It is not easy to explain it to the world or even to ourselves: it is shameful to dine with Adam Smith and have breakfast with Ahuízotl (p. 62).[6]

[5] "Tap-ism" is the traditional practice by which one PRI president simply chooses his successor.

[6] During the reign of *tlatoani* Ahuízotl (1486–1502), Aztec human sacrifices reached their bloodiest apogee.

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Reference Shelf

The European Union Encyclopedia and Dictionary 1996. (London: Europa Publications, 1996. 2nd edition. 478 pp. $385.00.)

The succinct chronology that opens this volume, and lists some three hundred dates in the history of the European Union (EU), declares that the earliest seed of that organization was the Treaty of Dunkirk, a defensive pact between France and Great Britain, signed on March 4, 1947. By that measure, the EU turns fifty in 1997. Thus, taking the Declaration of Independence as the beginning of the American union, one might say the EU is where the United States was in 1826, which is to say, at the end of an "era of good feeling" and perhaps on the road to disunion.

Time will tell. Meanwhile, a volume like this one is a must-have for Europhiles. Following the chronology are an excellent map and several pages of charts that outline the various decision-making processes of the EU, helping to make sense of the labyrinth that is the union's bureaucracy. Then comes a mini-encyclopedia of 100-plus pages called "A-Z of the European Union" and including every imaginable acronym, committee, policy term, and relevant historical figure and event. Simple, concise explanations make for easy wading through the alphabet soup. These brief definitions and charts are next fleshed out by seven short but dense essays that focus on key aspects of the EU—from its political, legal, and social frameworks to economic integration and external relations.

The largest section, more than 200 pages, is the "Directory of the European Union," containing all one could want to know about each of the EU's ministries, councils, courts, and committees, as well as the subgroups within them. This directory also provides summaries of major EU treaties, a most welcome feature to authors and editors.

A final, 100-page statistical survey that ranges from agriculture to tourism would seem to be comprehensive. But, on closer inspection, the pages embody some curious choices. Why not present figures concerning ethnicity and religion rather than figures on the EU lemon crop? (France has been squeezed out, it seems.) Why not set forth figures on unemployment compensation and minimum-wage rates rather than on the number of households with central heating? (Sunny Italy is low, with 21 percent.) For future editions, the publisher might ask researchers which data are in fact most used and most debated in articles about the European Union.

Roger Donway

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World Disasters Report 1996. By the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. 178 pp. $65.00; $29.95, paper.)

If foreign policy is becoming social work, obviously the United States will need to establish some new posts in its State and Defense Departments: assistant secretaries for floods, earthquakes, drought, famine, hurricanes, and typhoons. All of them will want to read *World Disasters Report 1996*.

The book has fifteen chapters divided unequally into five sections: key issues, methodologies, the year in disasters 1995, the disasters database, and a final chapter on the work of the book's "authors," the Red Cross and Red Crescent. The two "key issues" considered are population movements and global food supply. The section on methodologies discusses nutrition and food aid on the one hand and developmental relief on the other. The section on 1995's disasters devotes one chapter each to five high-profile catastrophes: the Kobe earthquake, Rwandan refugees, the Oklahoma bombing, refugees in the former Yugoslavia, and North Korean floods.

But those who wish to lead a new army of mercy against the world's woes will want to ponder the fourth section above all: "Disasters Database," whose seventeen tables serve to quantify this vale of tears. For example: which type of disaster, on average, over the last twenty-five years, has been responsible for killing the most people annually? The answer: drought and famine, with a toll of nearly 75,000 deaths per year, is far and away the leader; high winds at nearly 30,000 is a distant second. But which type of disaster has annually caused the most monetary damage, on average, over the last five years? Call it a tie, with floods listed at $183 billion annually and high winds at $179 billion. And which region of the world has suffered the most annual deaths from natural disaster over the last twenty-five years? Unsurprisingly, Africa leads with 53 percent of the world's total, but Asia accounts for another 39 percent, largely owing to Bangladesh.

Unfortunately, *World Disasters Report 1996* comes to a most disappointing close, literally. Although it seems evident from the data presented within the work that the capitalist world has best conquered the depredations of nature, the last page of this book carries an advertisement for something called the *New Internationalist* magazine. One NI cover shown in the ad displays a caricature of a typically porcine capitalist, smoking two cigars; beside him a headline screams, "Filthy rich! The new robber barons."

The fact of the matter is that if Africa and South Asia had a few dozen men like America's nineteenth-century "robber barons," the tragedies recorded in this work would be so far diminished as hardly to merit a separate book, much less the ministrations of the U.S. armed forces. For proof, see Julian Simon's *Ultimate Resource 2* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996) and George Reisman's magisterial *Capitalism* (Ottawa, Ill.: Jameson Books, 1996).

Roger Donway

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La Longue Durée

In this issue, David R. Gress examines the nature of Western civilization and its relationship to the world's other civilizations. That is a topic which has attracted *Orbis*'s attention since the journal's first volume. In the winter of 1958, *Orbis* published "The Atlantic Community and the World," by Hans Kohn, a professor of history at the City College of New York and a frequent contributor in the magazine's early days.[1]

"Modern Western civilization is a young and growing civilization. It emerged only at the end of the seventeenth century and gained shape in the course of the eighteenth century. . . . Though rooted in the Greco-Roman tradition and in Christian piety, the Atlantic civilization, based upon the individual dignity of man, liberty of thought, and tolerance, is in its own way a new civilization, implying fundamentally new attitudes toward man and society.

"No final answer can be given to the question over the geographical limits of the Atlantic civilization and Community. These limits are not fixed. This fact has nothing to do with national prejudices, though they, too, play a role. Reputedly there are some Englishmen who believe that modern civilization ends at the English Channel. There have certainly been French thinkers, like Maurice Barres and Henri Massis, who believe that the Occident must be defended on the Rhine, that this famed River marks the border of civilization. On the other hand some Germans like to place the frontier of Western civilization on the German-Polish border. There are Poles who believe that the frontiers of the West run along the Russian-Polish border. Russians have placed the defense of the Occident along the Urals, perhaps even along the shores of the Pacific. But irrespective of these national prejudices, the frontiers of Western civilization have been shifting throughout modern history and may be shifted again. For modern Western civilization as we understand it is not a geographic term nor a national term. It is an intellectual and moral attitude.

"After June, 1940 the frontier of modern Western civilization was, for a brief time, on the English Channel. Almost the whole continent of Europe was then overrun or controlled by anti-Western regimes which rejected scornfully the very foundations of the Atlantic Community. Today its frontier runs along the German-Polish border or perhaps across Germany. It was not always there; it certainly will not always be there. In the nineteenth century Russia and Poland were to a growing degree members of the Western community of individual liberty and tolerance.

[1] Hans Kohn, "The Atlantic Community and the World," *Orbis*, Winter 1958, pp. 418–27.

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Thus we should see clearly that the frontiers of modern Western civilization and of the Atlantic Community are geographically undetermined. One can as well say that no nation *qua* nation belongs to it and that all people potentially can join it. . . .

"For the North Atlantic Community is by its own character an open society, the first open society in history. When Milton wrote his famous vision of the future in his *Defense of the English People,* he saw the spirit of liberty spreading from England to the farthest corners of the earth. The Declaration of Independence spoke not only for the Anglo-Americans, it spoke for mankind. The Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen meant not only the French, it meant everyone. This universality of the message of the North Atlantic civilization is its great strength. It is in the true tradition of the older Western civilizations. Hellenism and the Stoic Roman Empire carried their civilization over the *orbis terrarum.* Christianity was not destined for Europe or for white men: it was a message for every soul on this globe. Modern Western civilization is not an exclusive society. If it ever tried to be that it would renege its own nature. On the other hand, it should be stressed that the North Atlantic Community does not wish to impose its civilization on anyone. If some nation feels itself the bearer of a different civilization, it has the right to be different. It is again of the essence of modern Western civilization to respect these differences, to see in them a source of potential fertile intercourse, as long as the dissenting nation does not try to destroy or undermine the North Atlantic Community and its civilization of human liberty."

It has been almost four decades since Hans Kohn penned those thoughts. The end of the cold war has revived the debate over the geographical definition of Western civilization. But as Kohn suggests, that was always a false debate. What Westerners find themselves asking today is whether their civilization is "modern" or "post-modern"; "young and growing" or in decline; still rooted in Greece, Rome, and Christianity or in fact rootless and defined by an "intellectual and moral attitude" based on little more than technology. Too bad that Kohn and Samuel Huntington cannot meet to discuss such conundrums.

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